Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1973

United States v. Calandra
Lewis F. Powell Jr

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
United States v. Calandra. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 13. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

L,...,.. • .._,
(

"'f

A~d•t-a4.4'\4•'"f ~J..

~.J. ~ ~~ A,•..-t--)
I"JA...--1-..~ ~ o/..Q ~
Jc,.,.J. ,.., 41"r --1 •
..14".

9::::::::r-

~Q

~44u.. ~ ~~.J.
February 16, 1973 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2, Page 2

•
No. 72-734-CF'Y

Cert to CA6
(Peck, Mi ile r
and Kent)

United States
Federal Criminal

Timely as extended by
Mr. Justice Stewart
Ziglar

Calandra

le

Pursuant to a search warrant, respondent's place of business

was searched for evidence of wagering and· bookmaking activities.

In the

course of the search, evidence of loansharking activities was discovered.
A special grand jury was convened and respondent was called as a witness.
When he appeared, respondent invoked his privilege against self-incrimination.

The Government requested the USDC for the ND Ohio (Battisti)
to grant Calandra immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2514 as he was not the
target of the

investig~tion.

The government acknowledged that the quest-

ions which it intended to put to Calandra were based on the items
seized 8uring the above-mentioned search.

Respondent then filed a reques

for-postponement of the immunity hearing in order that he could prepare
Sof'PRt'SS.\o~

·a motion to suppress the seized evidence.

After thejhearing, the USDC

determined that respondent was entitled to litigate_the question of

,.

-2whether the evidence on wh ic h the questions were t6 be based had been
·. l

obtained in violation of respondent's constitutional protection against
unlawful search and seizure.

The USDC found that the search warrant had

been issued without probable cause and that the scope of the search
~

-

authorized was Qverly broad.

ed

•

The USDC order/the evidence to be

suppressed and retur ned to respondent and further ordered that responden·
need not answer any grand jury questions based upon the suppressed
evidence.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the USDC finding that the

warrant was not valid and held that the exclusionary rule should be
applied in a situation such as this in order to protect respondent 's
right of privacy and to deter improper police practices.

The government

cqntends that a grand jury witness (for whom the government sought
transactional immunity) is not entitled to invoke the exclusionary rule
"\::::)

f ormula t ed under the Fourth Amendment by moving to suppress evidence
intended for use in questioning him before the grand jury, on the

ground that the evidence was the product of an illegal search and seizur E

2. FACTS: The pertinent facts are outlined above.

3. CONTENTIONS:

AR The government contends (1) the decision below sanctions an
unwarranted interference with the grand jury process.

Citing Costello

v. U.S., 350 U.S. 359 and a number of other cases decided by this
Court, the government notes that grand jury witnesses traditionally have
not been permitted to challenge the evidence that led the grand · jury to
call them .

The government also cites cases from the CAS, CA2 and CA9

(p. 5 of the petition) which are in conflict with the decision in this

C)

cas.e and which have refused to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule to grand jury proceedings or to permit collateral
on the exclusionary rule.

inquirie~

based

The government also contends that the decisior

-3below is inconsistent with the visws expressed by a ma J ority of this
J

Court in Gel bard v. Unit e d States, 408 U.S. 41.

The g+ernment cites

Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Gelbard in which he noted
i

that the statute involved in that case " unquestionably works a change
in the law with respect to the rights of grand jury witnesses, but it is
a change rooted in a complex statute,,,,"

408 U.S. at 70; and (2)

the government contends that the court of appeals has unjustifiably
expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule by allowing the suppression
of evidence upon the motion of a person who has been offered immunity
use.
from its adverse/ [the government points out that it is not conced i ng
the unconstitutionality of the search in making this argument.]

The

government points out that in order to invoke the exclusionary rule one
must be the person against whom the resulting evidence is sought to
be admitted.

In this case the respondent was not seeking to prevent the

use of seized evidence a gainst himself.

Rather, he sought to prevent

its use against others, a result not dic t ated by the exclusionary rule.
B. Yhe respondent concedes that the question in this case should
ultimately be reviewed by this Court and that the issue was expressly

left open by this Court in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. at 45, n . S
The respondent contends, however, that the Court should deny cert in
this case to await empirical evidence as to the impact on grand jury
proceedings resulting from the decisidn below,

Respondent also contends

that this case is not a good vehicle for resolving the issue since the
1

interruption of the grand jury proceedings 1n this case was not caused
by respondent ' s assertton· of his Pourth Amendment rights, but the
governme nt's interruption of the proceedings for the immunity hearing
I

--

and the delay attributable to respondent's right to advance notice
Rules S(a)(b) and 6(d) of the

Fede~al

Rules 'of Civil Procedure.

The

respondent points out that no "full blown suppression hearing" was

J :

unde ~

-4-

required, as the invalidity of the search warrant was determinable from
the face of the affidavit, and the facts pertaining to the scope of ihe
search were adduced through uncontroverted affidavits.

Respondent

claims that the above factors distinguish this case from the other
CA cases cited by the government as in conflict with the decision
below.
4. DISCUSSION:

The question in this case seems to have been left

open in Gelbard and there does seem to be a general difference of
opinion in the circuits.

The question is clearly important.

There is a response.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: John J. Buckley
Re: United States v. Calandra, No. 72-734

I would reverse the CA 6 decision on the following

------------------------

rationale . First, I think that respondent Calandra has
standing under Rule 4l(e) to assert his 4th am ~ment rights .

7

Bule 4l(e) is not limited to "parties" or "defendants" but
extends to

a ~ person

"aggrieved" . In the present case, Calandra

was the subject of the illegal search; his 4th amednment rights
were violated by the Government's unlawful search of his business
and seizure of his papers . Furthermore , Calandra'will incur
an additional injury to his right to privacy if compelled to
testify before the grand jury . Under either Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) or Association of Data Processing
Services Org . v Camp, 387 U. S. 150 (1970), resp has standing .
It does not follow, however, that Calandra is also entitled
to supression of the evidence and exclusion of its fruits . Here , it

--

is important to distinguish between the constitutional right
conferred bX the 4th

ame~ment

an~

the constitutional remedy of

-----

exclusion . As this Court has often stated, the exclusionary rule
is not pr imarily intended to repair the injury to the person whose
4th amednment rights are violated . Rather , its purpose is to
deter unlawful go vernmental conduct by removing the incentive
to disregard the copnstitutional prohibitition against unreasonable
search and seizures . This extra a•.inar y remedy has traditionally
been applied in cases where the government seeks to use the
unlawfully obtained evidence against a person suspected of

-criminal behavior. It is in these limited cases that the incentive
for the government to act unlawfully is greatest and the resulting
injury to individuals is most severe. On the other hand, the
exclusionary rule has not been applied
moving to supress is not the object of the criminal process.
This point is easily illustrated by the fact that, as mats best
I can determine, the exclusionary rule has no application to ciWil
actions. Although the govern ~ t may have obtained the evidence
unlawfully, it is nevertheless admissible.
Thus, application of the exclusionary rule depends
just

no ~on

whether a witnesses 4th amednment rights have been

violated, but on

~

~

whether the illegally seized evidence

is sought to be introduced against him in a criminal process .
Turning to the present case, the inapplicability of
the exclusionary rule • is

tN,'l'\
~

apparent . Calandra is not

the target of the criminal investogation; no evidence is sought
to be introduced against him . We need not rely on the subjective
intent of the prosecutor for assurance

in this matter since

the Government has sought transactional immunity for Calandra .
Thus, there is no possibility that he will become a "de facto"
defendant . This point disposes of the case .
There are several advantages for taking the
approach suggested . First , it does not require a re-examination
of the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule . I would think
the Court would be on solid ground in stating that the exclusionary
rule is available only to those who are objects of criminal
-._

--

-

investigations . Here, Calandra ' s life or liberty are clearly

------........ ........

the approach is responsive to the CA 6 ' s

tcrwflcH.t"\

that ~ immunity does notl protect Cal~ndra ' s privacy

-

\t.ftct.U.Se,

interest sj(: :sc he may still be called before the garnd jury
to testify. The simple answer is that the exclusionary rule

t P

1

is not

intenct''"~o

Calandra's remedy is

a

redress or prevent that kind of

injury ~

civil suit for damages for invasion

of his privacy rights. Thirs, the approach distinguishes between the
right and the remedy. It is essential to recognize that
-standin~ t~a~s~rt _a~ ~~metf1~ent cla~m is not the "same thing"

---------

as applicability of the exclusionary rule. Otherwise,
evey person having standing to assert the 4th amednment claim
would also be entrutled to the benefits of exclusion. My point
is that the remedy must be examined separately in terms of the
purposes which it has traditionally been thought to serve.
The Government confuses standing with exclusion, and unconsciously
acknowledges this fact in footnote 9 of it brief by a ~ noting
has standin
!the return of the property under rule
that Calan
for ~~~xessia~xa~tsi~ext~ex~xa~~x~~xy
4l(e).
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v . United States, 251 U.S. 385,
is not to the contrary . There, illegally obtained evidence
was presented to a grand jury which had already indicted the
Silverthornes. Later, in a separate proceeding, a district court

ruled that the evidence was obtained illegally and ordered its return
to the Silverthornes. Meanwhile the grand jury framed a new
indictment based on the illegally obtained evidence and then issued
a subpoena to the
••rui :i' b
•
Silverthornes to produce the same documents
and papers. The Silverthornes refused to obey the subpoena
and were held in contempt. The Court held that the subpoena
was invalid because it was based on knowledge obtained from
the illegally seized evidence; under Weeks v. United States,
the grand jury could not use that evidence.

(f"i'•

Uo/t~Au~

.I:)

-

By contrast, in the present case, resp Calandra has been granted
transactional immunity and is not the object of the criminal
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule has no application.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse.

/
l/

I have been pondering this statement, and I think it should be

modified. It would make sense to apply the exclusionary rule
in cases involving "substantial'' violations of the 4th amednment.
I am referring, of course, to the ABA standard and the

( lt L I

balancing test it implies. This is an extremely limited exception,
but it would satisfy the need for a remedy in the truly
exceptional case •

.
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No. 72-734 United States v. Calandra
Summer Memorandum
This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having
read most of the briefs.

It is entirely preliminary and,

in large degree superficial.

Further study is indicated.

Statement of the Case
Federal agents were conducting an investigation of
extensive gambling and bookmaking operations .

Based on

information obtained from various sources (court ordered
wiretap, physical surveillance of various suspected participants,
and the statements of informers), a search warrant was issued
for the search of respondent 1 s place of business .

In making

----------------------------------------------

this search for documents and equipment relating to illegal
gambling, the FBI discovered a record believed to constitute
evidence of a federal loan sharking offense against a previously
identified victim .

The government intended to present this

and other evidence to a special grand jury conducting an
investigation of loan shark activities .
Respondent, when subpoeaned to testify before the
grant jury refused .
)

He invoked the Fifth Amendment, and

continued his refusal after the government has requested the
District Court to grant respondent- immunity pursuant to 18
U. S . C. 2514 (see Kastigar) . At the suppression hearing- which
interrupted respondent 1 s appearnce before the grand jury-

2.

respondent asserted that he would refuse to answer questions
based on the seized material.

The District Court concluded

(i) that the warrant was inadequate to justify the seizure in
question; (ii) that the search was broader than the warrant
justified, constituting a "general search"; (iii) that due
process "allows a witness to litigate the question of whether
the evidence which constitutes the basis for questions asked
of him before the grand jury has been obtained" in violation of
the Fourth Amendment; and (iv) the DC ordered the evidence
suppressed, and specified that respondent need not answer any
questions before the grand jury based on the suppressed
evidence.

CA 6 affirmed in a strong and carefully written

opinion reviewing numerous authorities.
The

g~~xex

government considers this a case of first

--

importance, as affirmance of the decision below would

-----

constitute an "extravagant extension" of the exclusionary

--------------

-

--

rule which - in turn - is said to rest on "standing to suppress "
the fruits of an illegal search and seizure .

Questions Presented
The only question presented is summarized by the
SG as follows :
"Whether a grand jury witness (for whom the
government has sought transactional immunity under
18 U. S . C. 2514) is entitled to refuse to answer
questions put by the grand jury on the ground that
the questions are based upon leads which were the
product of an illegal search and seizure . "
(brief for U. S. p . 3)

3.
Discussion
I have read, preliminarily, the briefs by both
parties and am strongly inclined toward the government ' s
position primarily because I am opposed to a further
extension of the exclusionary rule .

Under the doctrine of

Mapp and in the subsequent line of cases referred to in my
Bustamante opinion if the rule is here extended to federal
grand juries and witnesses before them, it will also be
extended to state court grand juries and collateral proceedings
in both the federal and state courts .

For the reasons stated

in my Bustamante opinion, unless and until empiric evidence
documents more fully than at present the efficacy of the
exclusionary rule, I consider its extension in collateral
proceedings - indeed its present use in Bustamonte-type cases is not only a futile exercise but gravely impinges on other
important interests .
Accordingly, I find the brief of theSG generally
congenial with my views .

The brief of respondent essentially

tracks the same arguments made by CA 6 in its opinion.

While

these are well stated and viewed narrowly are persuasive, the
broader considerations that impelled my Bustamante opinion
seem controlling here .
There is no authoritative opinion of this Court on
the issue squarely presented .

Although Silverthorne Lumber

Co . v . U. S . , 251 U. S. 385 is relied upon heavily by respondent,

4.
the SG distinguishes it well in note 2, p. 11 of its brief.
In any event, more recent Supreme Court cases lean the other
way (see Alderman, language in Gelbard, Dionisio and others
cited in SG's brief).
The SG makes two separate points which, though
related, would independently support a reversal if they are
sound:
A.

Even though a search and seizure is unlawful

under Fourth Amendment, a grand jury may consider and a grand
jury witness must answer questions based
of such a search and seizure.

upon ~ the

fruits

In support of this argument,

the SG emphasizes - as would be expected - the freedom of a
grand jury from

11

technical rules 11 , the importance of the

investigative power of such a jury, its authority to consider
11

tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor or the

personal knowledge of grand jurors .

" Branzburg v. Hayes,

408 u.s. 665, 700-701.
It is also emphasized that if a grand jury witness
has a due process right to a "full blown suppression hearing
•

11

U.c..

G/t}-_

Gel bard, 408 U.S. 41, 70, ~ would be saddled
.A

11

wi th

many trials ) and preliminary showings would assuredly impede
its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the
fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws."
Dionisio, slip opinion at 15-16.

5.
Although CA 6, and respondent rely on Rule 4l(e) of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the SG disposes (perhaps
adequately) of this argument in his footnote 4, p . 15 of his
brief .
In addressing the exclusionary rule issue which
underlies the entire argument, the SG notes that this would do
little if anything to promote the privacy interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment .

--

There is already little or no

incentive for the discovery of evidence which cannot be used

-------

at trial; thus a holding that illegally seized evidence cannot
even be presented to a grand jury would have a miniscule

----

deterrent effect, if any .
B.

The government ' s second point is that the

--

exclusionary rule may not be invoked by a witness to prevent
questioning with respect to which he has been offered immunity.

-----

As noted in Alderman, 394 U. S. at 175, the exclusionary
rule does not "provide that illegally seized evidence is
inadmissible against anyone for any purpose . "

Historically,

the rule xxx has more narrowly provided only that "evidence
obtained in violation (of the Fourth Amendment) cannot be
used in a prosecution against a

vict~m

of the unlawful search

and seizure if he makes timely objection . "
316 U. S. 114, 120 .

Goldstein v . U. S . ,

As Alderman further stated (394 U.S . at 174) :

"There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant
in order to protect the rights of another .

No rights of the

6.

victim of an illegal search are at stake when the evidence is
offered against some other party.u
Thus the holding of CA 6 would benefit gratituously

------

third parties (respondent in this case) who would lack standing
under existing authorities of the Court to invoke the
exclusionary rule.

Respondent, according to the SG, is in

essentially the same position "as a witness who, having
refused to testify solely on Fifth Amendment grounds is offered
immunity.

Although such a witness may prefer not to testify,

he has no constitutionally protected interest in preventing
the use of his own self incriminating but immunized testimony
against others."

See Kastigar.

The SG further argues that the rationale of the
decision below"would presumarly even authorize a non-witness
to challenge the presentation of evidence to the grand jury
or at trial, on the ground that the discovery of the evidence
infringed his Fourth Amendment rights" (SG's brief p. 23).
It is to be remembered in considering this case that
the grand jury was in its

investi~ative

stage, no indictment

-

or charge has been made against respondent, the search of his

---

business offices was in fact made only pursuant to a warrant
(although this was held to have been too narrowly drawn),
respondent himself was not the object of the grand jury's
investigation, and the government had offered transactional
immunity.

To extend the exclusionary rule this far would, as

the SG states, constitute an "extravagant extension of a
prophylatic rule."

No. 72-734
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MEMORANDUM

No. 72-734 U.s. v. Calandra

•'

cellaneous thoughts concerning our opinion in the above case.
1. I think the importance of the role of the grand jury - the
l·

foundation of my position - should be emphasized somewhat more than
'

in the initial draft. I am inclined to include in our opinion all, or at least

'

most of, the ''quotations" from Branzburg set forth on p. 9 of the SG's
brief. This is the most recent expression of opinion by the Court, and
it is fairly comprehensive.

2. In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary,

·I

'

...

unduly hamper the work of a grand jury to be denied access to the type
)·

of documentary or physical evidence which is usually the pooduct of a
search and seizure. We might quote from Justice Black's dissenting
opinion in Kaufman (394 U.S. at 237) to the effect that:
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendemtn is crucially different from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence seized can in
no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means
of its seizure and indeed often this evidence alone establishes
beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant
is guilty. "

..

,.

'

",,

If we use all or a part of the foregoing quotation, we should make it clear

, that in the present case we are not concerned with the admissibility at
trial which presents an entirely different issue. It is only with respect
to such admission that the exclusionary rule has been held applicable by
this Court. Respondent would now have us (as you have already said) make
an extravagant and unwarranted extension of a rule which often excludes
the clearest proof of guilt with a very high content of reliability.
3. The SG's brief (pp. 13, 19, 23, n. 9) makes the point that
respondent has other remedies which protect his "legitimate interest".
The term "legitimate interest" comes from pionisio (cited p. 12, 13)
of the SG's brief. At p. 19, the SG cites three cases and states that:
•"

"The essence of such decisions is that more limited
re-medies are available to vindicate the 4th Amendment
interest at stake and provide an adequate measure of
deterrence. In the present context, those remedies
would include return of the seized property, exclusion
of the property and its fruits from evidence against
respondent at a criminal trial, and an action for damages. ''

' I have net checked the three cases cited to see to what extent
they support the SG's argument. If they do lend support, I think the
argument is worth making- certainly to the extent of emphasizing that
the intrusion on respondent's privacy has already occurred (and cannot
be repaired) and that he is fully protected for the future against the rule

excluding the evidence or fruits thereof at a criminal trial. I doubt

.,

,.

•

.,..

3.
that it is realistic to talk about an "action for damages".
4. If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "deter" (as the
cases have said), the question arises in this case as to why deterrence
would not result from applying the rule to grand juries. The SG suggests
one answer as follows:
"Such an extension of the exclusionary rule (to grand jury
proceedings) would deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely
, for the purposes of grand jury consideration; the instances
of such intentional police action must be comparatively
rare." (SG's brief 18)
r;'

I agree with this. There may well be situations in which conscientious
policemen are deterred from Fourth Amendment violations because they

.

w

know that the evidence seized will not be admissible in the trial of the
person whom they have arrested or wish to charge committing a crime.
.' '•

It is quite unrealistic to assume that even the relatively sophisticated
policeman would be thinking of the implications of a search and seizure

···-

with respect to a grand jury investigation. I suppose that the great
majority of illegal searches and seizures come about more or less under
emergency situations. If there is abundant time to obtain a warrant,
police are taught and normally required to do so. There will be few
emergency situations arising with respect to a pending or contemplated
'··

grand jury investigation. In short, whatever may be said in terms of
the deterrent value of the Rule with respect to the conviction of a

.. .

'

,
, /:~'

;.

,_

.',.

•.

4.
a suspected criminal, it simply strains credulity to suggest that police
conduct will be affected one way or the other by extending the Rule to
grand jury proceedings.
5. Subject to your views, it seems to me that the central theme
of our Calandra opinion - after setting the stage appropriately - should
be a bldancing, on the one hand, of the societal interests in safeguarding

the role of grand juries against the marginal deterrent effect (if any)
; on police misconduct which might result from extending the Rule to grand
jury proceedings.
6. Stated broadly, the public's interest

ia ~ ?Jl

safeguarding the

efficiency and effectiveness of graud jury proceedings or investigations.
Extension of the exclusionary rule, as sought by respondent, would
-

undercut the public interest in two significant respects (i) it would deny
to grand juries the fruits of such searches and seizlix-es as may be found
by a court to have violated the Fourth Amendment, quite without regard

to the egregiousness of the violation or of the importance to the
investigation of the evidence in question; and (ii) suppression hearings
which could be quite numerous -would result inevitably in protracted
interruptions and delays of grand jury proceedings, no doubt in some
instances to the point of total frustration or expriation of the grand jury's

You have identified both of these interests in your first draft.
as you continue working on the opinion, that you can place

...

-..
5.
lt.'·

somewhat greater emphasis on these, especially the latter. I think it is
worth at least a footnc:te to indicate the extent of the disruption in this

.,.

case. On December 11, 1973, three years wUl have elapsed since th
search of Calandra's office, and more than two-and-a-half years
have elapsed since the grand jury was convened. If Calandra, and the
information derived from the search of his office, are vital to the
conspiracy investigation underway in 1971, it is entirely possible that

•'
~·

~··L

'

0

':,j this particular investigation has been frustrated completely.
,.

7. I have just looked again at respondent's brief, and the truth
•"·'·

is neither you nor I have addref}Js.e.,..IJ.it; ,Pmcipal ~rgument.

~~

~..~c~relies
.,

a an alleged "invasion of privacy" which results from the questioning
~:

,

,

,

.

~

HI

)

~

before the grand jury. .:.:·1i'Ot fr,om the seizing of th:e dpcument
'"

'

;;>,

Respondent concedes that the exclusionary rule is a "remedy'' which
"»:r":k

)!';t' ..~

._

.~r!l\\~.

/. ~

·~.~-

"'·

··~·

'

llrOJ

""

• ,.,,: ,

«..-

he contends would afford incomplete or bia proprtate relief in th1s 1'case
'

f.('

~-· '~

,,

'-"'

. --,_..

''

•.

'l

~:~-~''i ·*·~

'" \ _,.

.'~

;.~r;-_· ~.1·

'

'

He relies, rather, on a'"'clitim of "Fourt Amendment right of privacy".
I.

·'!I'

't

'"

See Summary of A~gument in respondel}t~, si,brief, asf" more fully elaborated
·M

It

'

f_

*"~ ;'i-~···~';-}f &\' .,}''- ·,

'·~

~·

'

~··.

·""' -1 ,1!1,

'

.

'ii

.,.,

~fii!f•

in his aggument. At the oral argument,
as my notes \'fill
ind1cate, responden
'V•'
'
'
A

,

!\'c

,,

~ f, '

'

"

contended that each e(Uestion asked before the grand jury would constitute
a fresh invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.

~

There are several answers. The privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment is the invasion of one's person, house, papers or effects.
No prctection is afforded by the Fourth against being questioned before

·.

,.•

6.
either a grand jury or a petite jury except by virtue of a suppression

'

.

:.'

(under the exclusionary rule) of the product of an unlawful search and its

It seems to me that respondent is trying to frationate Fourth
Amendment rights, and in effect to create a new right. The Fifth Amendment provides protection against questioning which incriminates, and
respondent's reliance upon the Fourth in this respect is misplaced.
is forced into this posture by virtue of the immunity grant.
I have taken a new look at CA6's opinion, and it does speak of
the "right of privacy". Yet, the opinion seems to predicate the privacy
on the operation of the exclusionary rule as the "means of giving effect
to the Fourth Amendment guarantee of privacy." (Petition p. 15).
, The CA6 opinion states the question in an interesting manner:
"Whether one whose Fourth Amendment right to privacy
has been violated by an illegal search and seizure and
is therefore a proper party aggrieved in the Alderman
sense may assert such right when called as a witness
before the grand jury. "
The Court stated that the answer to this question is "currently:
a matter of serious debate", and cites a number of circuit court opinions.
Perhaps you should take a look at these.
In summary, I believe we need to address more directly respondent's

as well as the analysis of CA6.

*****

•';,.

'>·

, I lmow that you have already been collaborating with John Jeffries,

.

,
.<-

who made a special study during the summer of the exclusionary rule.
'. Please give John a copy of your second draft when you make one available
I am anxious to circulate this opinion next week.

..

'

*****
Please do not construe the foregoing comments (or any other
comments) as indicating criticism or dissatisfaction with your first
draft. This is a difficult case to write - at least it is for me. It is
also an extremely important case, and I would like to have a scholarly,
thorough and well-documented opinion.

J·
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MEMORANDUM

'--"

Lewis F.
Calandra
On page 10 of your draft of 11/9 you refer to the evidentiary
privileges established by statute or common law. What about the
privileges derived from the eonstitution?

{_e.~·

recently considered

in Brewster and Gravel, as well as number of other cases). In view
of the pendency of the Watergate nightmare, we would have to deal with
these privileges with the utmost care and neutrality. Yet, if we do not
mention them, the omission might be noted. What do you think?

...

-~

'

,,

..

\

rw18ed draft ot November 9, toPther with papa 1 aDd 3 of the nctea
!

(excluding note• 10, 11 and 12).

~.Thts is a ~e product, ·~ri~tlng eubatantlal improvemen~ tn
..

,~

'f•

"

!,

'

«' '

.

.

pntzatloo and substance OYer the flHt draft. I think you succeeded
~-

·-'' '

'

~

.

i.

·:

>,

•

'

-

·--·•""

·,

e well in Incorporating the ngpattou I made on the margin ol the

tat wtll be a~l;»le during the da~. Thts ~~~ us, I thlftk, In good shape
o~mg from

the prtater a ebambers lli'aft, bJ Wedn•day (I hope,

the latest).
'

' , · .~
f·
~11:

I~bave aC:1d8d

'

number
',. i

a couple ot rtdera to your draft, and wMtten tn a

ot suggested changes. None of theee 1s of any great ccmaequenee.

•. ,. ~··. ~ In addition, u 1 was ln the process .of revtew I dictated a few
-·~~

r.:...

~

'

...

I.
J'lnally, I make a few generaly obaervattons:

1. There

~

~

ww

'~,

a certain repetttlowmess in the opinion which yoU

1D Yin of the way the oplnioa S..~ •tructured. The repetttton oecun

primarily from p. 13 to p. ~ 18, where - ln ldent:lfytng the publle 1nte

we repeat (In aummary form) a

good deal that liJ

set forth under Part U.

Thla 18 espeetally t~< on pages 13-15 1n empbaslzlngtbe role and function ,,, ',
'

&

of the p-and Jury. I do think tt te necessary to repeat, in summary form,
the eaence of what hal been sald tn Part II, aDd I am content to leave it

u presently wrlttea tf - after rereading - you and John Jeffries thtak lt

2. We may be laylnglt on a btt thick (paps 15, 18) 1n the dtscasslan

ot ''delayl.4(i' dllruptlon...

Thla 18 an important polDt, but I do

n« want to onremphutu tt.
S. I hope that you and John Jeffrlea both wW bear tn mind my

ButamODte optnton. I jut do not wl8b fo ay anything that can tie ued
aptnat me if aDd when the Court addresses the coDUnued UM of the
aclulCI'l&ry rule In eollateral.attaek proeeedlnp. Allo, pleue keep
In mind that the Sollcltor Generalis trying to perauade the Court to

·. . . tbe subatance Of the ALI fQrmulatton wtth respect to the exelusl«W"f
le~

Thll wu rataed tn Robinaon but not reached. I am not sure u

to my flDal poettlOD on this proposal, I do n« want to foreclose either

,

3.
myself or the Court .~ what ta Aid In tbta cue. ·
"
"
'' .. f"
• '!
; i
: . 4i' I belleve we wW have fairly met' each ·:c.t the prtnclpal arguments
>r"

'\f~'".
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~
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'i. '">i.\ '
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•

'ffl.

'I> t'

~

advane~J>Y,· l1'spondent. ~ · you Jmow, hOWeftr, 1t hu been my practice
•:

>

. . ·.

,",'

'·'
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-

'

,o; :.

. .

',

:

•

number of the leading ones, 1 aleo rely <a you for the relevancy of. the
.

:~

j}

F

j

\

' ues which we have cited. Under no clrcumstancea, do I want t.o cUe
·;ol!

'

,.,

-

,

... :P -~"'·

·ln any opinion a cue based on What somebody else has aid tt holdS•
.

~

.
...
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Jobn J. Bue
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Le ta F. P

D TE: November 10, 19'13
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TO:

Mr. John J. Buckley

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Also on pgge 10 you have a good quote from Blair (near the
bottom of the page) indicating that under certain circumstances a witness
may be excused from telling all that he knows. What would you think of
citing my concurring opinion in Branzburg as a see also at that point.
I may add here that we have used Branzburg - at my suggestion - so
strongly that we may be chilling Justice stewart (although basically he
is willing to follow precedents in most areas).

On page 12, in stating the purpose of the exclusionary rule,
retum to your primary reliance upon Tehan. Do you think that case
is as strong authority for the deterrent purpose of the rule as the statement I quoted in my rider from Elkins? We might discuss this. ,

*****
Also on page 12 in stating the analytical basis of the rule, you
have generally followed my suggestion. Although numerous eases have
said that deterrence is the purpose of the rule, the Brenn8f Douglas

•,

---

y•

2. '

Marshall axis will react strongly to as precise a formulation as we
now have in this draft. I am inclined to leave it in my first circulated
draft of the opinion, as I would like to settle the question that is sometimes
raised as to whether the exclusionary rule is itself a constitutional personal
~.-

.~ );

i:

right. As John Jeffries has given this a lot of thought I am particularly ,'
take
anxious that he tlmt a good look at this sentence. We will also want to r
know what Jack thinks about it. I personaijy have no doubt as to the
11'·.

'

correctness of what we have said as a matter of constitutional law. :'
~;;;

do want to be sure that we have expressed it as carefully and precisely
as possible.

..
I have not seen the footnotes that accompany the handwritten
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,., •:;
~

l,

addition at the top of page 13. I cannot recall, off the cuff, what you
!1
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have in mind in talkingaabout . . _ . _. .=~klllBfml~
potentially de facto criminal defendants .
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. John B. Buckley

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

November 19, 1973

Calandra
I write this memorandum to remind me to discuss with you

the following:
1.

The press undoubtedly will be reading this opinion carefully

to see whether any "smoke signals" are being sent up with respect
to Watergate grand jury proceedings.
\1\.,0/

'/

You and I have mentioned this.

You might ask Jack and John Jeffries whether they see any language
that creates any legitimate problem in this respect.
2.

One quite minor point which I raised earlier:

I still

wonder whether we should refer to my concurring opinion in Branzburg possibly adding it to note 4 on page 5?

I see no inconsistency in

our heavy reliance on Branzburg in this case, and what I said in my
concurrence in that case.

/

0~

3.

What do you think?

Perhaps we should have a footnote on the

A brief note might prevent s a,meoo.e

thinking we had overlooked this.

L. F. P., Jr.

TO:

Mr. John B. Buckley

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. ,
Calandra
I write this memorandum to

the following:
1.

The press undoubtedly will be reading this

, to see whether any "smoke signals" are being sent up with respect
to Watergate grand jury proceedings.

You and I have mentioned this.

You might ask Jack and John Jeffries whether they see any language
that creates :tuoJ;w legitimate problem in this respect .
.··;~

2.

One quite minor point which I raised earlier:

wonder whether we should refer to my concurring opinion in Branzburg possibly adding it to note 4 on page 5?

~

see no inconsistency in

our heavy reliance on Branzb1:1rg in this case, aad what I said
concurrence in that case.
3.

What do you think?

Perhaps we should have a footnote on the immunity point.
might prevent

Ill~ ttHP~in~

we had overlooked this.

·,

.jtqrrtmt Q}ou.rt of tltt 'J[tni:tcb ~tatts
~lttllrmnton, ~.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR.

November 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

No. 72-734 United States v. Calandra
In due course I shall circulate a dissent
'

in the above.

'

W.J.S.Jr.

...

~u.prtmt

<!}curl cf tlrt ~tb ~tatts

._uJringhm. ~. <!):. 2llgt'1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 23, 1973

Re:

No. 72-734 - United States v. Calandra

Dear Lewis:
I anticipate joining your fine opinion in this case.
I am presently uneasy -- very likely unjustifiably so -by two statements in the opinion, both on page 8. The
first is:
"When the grand jury itself threatens
to commit a wrong, it may be restrained."
The second is:
"And presumably grand jurors who themselves
threaten to conduct an illegal search may
be restrained like any others. Judicial
intervention is appropriate in such cases
because it may prevent the wrong be fore it occur s. "
Without having gone into the subject as deeply as I
know you have in preparing this opinion, I had thought that
the principal control over grand juries is that which you
detail in footnote No. 4 on page 5:

-

"In particular, the grand jury must rely
on the court to compel production of books,
papers, document~ and the testimony of
witnesses, and the courtL~~sh or modify
a subpoena on motion • • • "

- 2 -

Though there may be cases of this Court which support
injunctions against grand juries themselves, I am not familiar
with them. I am worried that the two quoted sentences may
be thought to authorize injunction actions which would cut
entirely against the thrust of your opinion here, and of
Potter's opinion of last year in Mara and Dionisio.

Sincerel~

Mr. Justice Powell

~ttpr.cmc C!j' ~,.n.rt

of tltt ~ttitdt ;jtatc£t
'lttlasl(htgft1tt. ;D. <!f. 2.0,ct>i-~

CHAMBCRS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 23, 1973

Re:

No. 72-734 - United States v. Calandra

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your opinion in this
case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

Qtcurt cf t!rt ~tb .itatts
Jfasqmghm. ~. Qt. 2llp)l.'

.iu:pTmtt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 26, 1973

No. 72-734 - U. S. v. Calandra
Dear Lewis,
Upon the understanding that you will
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Dear Lewis:
I shall be with you in this case, I am sure, but might
I offer the following suggestions for your consideration:

1. I am somewhat disturbed about the two references,
on page 8, to restraint of the grand jury. This aspect is not
before us here, and I would prefer not to cover it by dictum at
this time. Could we omit the first full sentence on page 8 and
the last two sentences of Part II?
2. I had a little trouble with the very end of the opinion.
think my difficulty would be alleviated if the word "The 11 at the
ginning of the next to the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph were changed to " 0 ur. 11 I admit that this is a trivial suggestion, but it seems to straighten me out.
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Dear Lewis:
I am pleased to join your opinion as recirculated November 27.
Sincerely,
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Mr. Justice Powell
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The respondent in this casf

grand jurf investigating

as called to testify before a

~ sha..':king activities.

His place of business

had pr eviously been searched by feEi@FEHo ageat s under a warrant

direct~ solely toward evidence in bookmaking operations.

-----search, evidence as to loan sharking was seized.
------

In that

The warrant was

11

not broad enough to encompass such evidence, and accordingly its

1

seizure was unlawful.
On respondent's motion, the district court ordered suppression

of this evidence• .!J"further held that respondenyheed not answer/
any of the grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mltl Ttie case

-

is here on the governmentf s petition for certiorari.
The exclusionary ruley a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights,/ is applicable in criminal trials
to suppress illegally seized evidencr'and the fruits thereof.
question in this case)s whether the exclusionary rule

The

applies ~

to a grand jury investigation.
We hold that it does not. The rule does not proscribe the
use of illegally seized evidence/in all proceedingsj or against all
persons. Its application has been restricted to those areas where

2.
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.
Extending the rule to grand jury investigations would, at

most, achieve only a speculative advancf in the deterrence of
police misconduct. More importantly, such an extension would
unduly interferf

ith the effective and expeditious

grand jury's duties.

dischar~f the

The public has a substantial interesy in

preserving the historic role and functions of the grand jurf

ithout

burdening it with what the Court, in a recent case, has characterized
as mini-trials.
It is to be remembered/that a witness called by the grand

jury,rL:rt eSiieftdallt 'i peeiii' may of course protect his . own •

positior

y invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination. Indeed, in this case, respondent had been offered
transactional immunity.
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined.
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Case Held for No. 72-734 United States v. Calandra
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 72-1649 Westerberg v. District Court in and for
the Second Judicial District of Colorado, et al
Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify before a state grand jury
empaneled to investigate certain criminal activities. After having been
notified that the grand jury intended to ask questions based on information obtained pursuant to court-approved electronic surveillance,
petitioners moved unsuccessfully in the state courts for a suppression hearing. Petitioners later appeared before the grand jury but
refused to testify, contending that the wiretaps violated the Fourth
Amendment. Petitioners were then granted transactional immunity
but again refused to testify. After the state trial court announced its
intention to hold a suppression hearing, the State applied to the
Colorado Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. That court
granted the writ, holding that petitioners' claim could only be considered after they had refused to testify and been cited for contempt.
Petitioners' contentions are essentially the same as those in
Calandra. No claim is made under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 u:s. C. §§ 2510, et seq.
I would therefore deny certiorari.

L. F. P., Jr.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 72-734
United States, Petitioner,/ On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of ApJohn P. Calandra.
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
[December -, 1973]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether a witness
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search
and seizure. This issue is of considerable importance to
the administration of our criminal justice system and
has not previously been decided by this Court.

I
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a
warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calandra's place of business, the Royal Machine and Tool
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued
in connection with a11 extensive investigation of the suspected illegal gambling operations and specified that the
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of
bookmaking records and wagering paraphenalia. A
master affidavit submitted in support of the application
for the search warrant contained information derived
from statements by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), physical surveillance

,.
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conducted by FBI agents, and court-authorized electronic
surveillance. 1
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a
two-story building. The first floor consists of about
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and
inventory. The second floor contains a general office
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied
by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary.
On December 15, 1970. federal agents executed the warrant directed at Calandra's place of business and conducted a thorough four-hour search of the premises. The
record reveals that the agents spent more than three
hours searching Calandra's office and files.
Although the agents found no gambling paraphenalia,
one did discover, among certain promissory notes, a card
indicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making
periodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an
affidavit that he was a\Yare that the United States Attorney's office for the Northern District of Ohio was investigating possible violations of 18 U. S. C. §§ 892, 893,
and 894, dealing with extortionate credit violations, and
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loansharking" enterprise then under investigation. The agent
concluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized
along with various other items, including books and
records of the company, stock certificates, and address
books.
On March 1, 1971 , a special grand jury convened in
the Northern District of Ohio to investigate possible
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The
1
On the ba sis of the sa me affid:wit, fed em! agents also obtained
warrant s authorizing ~c arrh cs of Calandra'" re~:; idcnce and automobile . Th e present rase involves only the search of the Royal
Machine and Tool Company.
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grand jury subpoenaed Cala11dra in order to ask him
questions based on the evidence seized during the search
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 1971, but
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privileged against self-incrimination. The Government then
requested the District Court to grant Calandra trans~
actional immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2514.
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the-.
hearing on the Government's application for the immunity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress'
the evidence seized in the search.
Calandra then moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and
return of the seized evide"nce on the grounds that the
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that
the· search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On
August 27, the District Court held a hearing at which
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer
questions based on the seized materials. On October 1,
the District Court entered its judgment ordering the
evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the
grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence.
332 F. Supp. 737 (1971). The court stated that "due
process . . . allows a witness to litigate the question
whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for the
questions asked of him before the grand jury has been
obtained in a way which violates the constitutional protection against unlawful search and seizure." 332 F.
Supp .. at 742. The court found that the search warrant
had been issued without probable cause and the search
had exceeded the scope of the warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
465 F. 2d 1218 (1972) , holding that the District Court
had properly entertained the suppression motion and
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that the exclusionary rule may be invoked by a witness
before the grand jury to bar questioning based on evi-·
dence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. 2 The
offer to grant Calandra immunity was deemed irrelevant,
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari,
U. S. (1973 ~
reverse.

II
The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in
Anglo-American history.:l In England, the grand jury
served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn
to discover and present for trial persons suspected of
criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against
arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this
country the Founders thought the grand jury so essential
to basic liberties that they provided ii1 the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only
be instituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury." Costello v. Unit ed Slates, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362
(1956). The grand jury's historic functions survive to
this day. Its responsibility in our con stitutional framework includes both the determination whether there is
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed
and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal
2 The Court of Appcnls affirmed the Diot ri rt Court's finding that
the search of Ca l a ndra '~ bu~ine~s and ~e izurc of his propert y was
unlawful. AI! hough the Go,·crnmcnt docs not agree with th e court's
finding, it has not sought rr1·irw of this issue.
~Fo r a cliHr u ~~ ion of the history and role of the grand jury, see
Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359 , 361-362 · air v. m e
States. 250 U . 8. 273, 279-283 (1919) ; !I ale v. He1zkel, 201 U.S. 43,
59 (1906) , 4 Blurbtone Commentaries 301 et seq.; G. Edwards,
The Grand .Jury 1- 44 (1906) ; 1 F. PoHoek and F. Mait land, History ·
of English Luw 151 (2d rd. 1909) ; 1 W. Hold~worth, History of Eng- .
!ish Law 312-323 (7th rev. ed . 1956) .
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prosecutions. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686687 (1972).
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide
latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No
judge presides to monitor its proceedings.~ It deliberates
~
in secret and may determine alone the course of its- j
:lnquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of?L..
evidence or the testimony of ,{Witnesses i.:n the--marme it.
considers appropriate, and its operation generally is ~
unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary
---rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a
grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and
inquisition, the scope of whose inquiry is not to be limited
by doubts whether any particular individual will be properly subject to an accu~'<ation of crime.'; Blair v. United
States, 250 U. S. 273, 282 (1919).
The scope of the grand jury's power reflects its special
role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A
grand jury proceeding is not a11 adversary hearing in
which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudi·
cated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether
criminal proceedings should be instituted against any
person. The grand jury's investigative power must be
broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be dis4 The grand jury, of conr~c, is subjert to the court's supervision
in several respects. Sec Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 49
(1959); Rules 6 nnd 17, Frd. Rule Crim. Proc. ; L. Orficld, Criminal
Procedure Under the Federal Rules, 475-477 ( 19GG). In pnrticular,
the grnnd jury must rely on the court to compel production of
books, papers, and documents or testimony of witnesses, and the
court may quash or modify a subpoena on motion if compliance
would be "unreasonable or oppressive." Rule 17 (c), Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc.

?
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charged. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra; Costello v. United
States, supra.
In Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the
importance of the grand jury's role:
"[T]he investigation of crime by a grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and the property of the
citizen .... " I d., at 700.
"The role of the grand jury as an important
instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily
includes an investigative function with respect to
determining whether a crime has been committed
and who committed it . . . . 'When the grand jury
is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area .. . society's interest is best served
by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood
V:· Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 392 (1962). A grand
jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until
every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime
has been committed.' United States v. Slone, 429
F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2. 1970). Such an investigation
may be triggered by t{ps, rumors, evidence preferred
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowled.ge of the·
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S.,
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined
the evidence that a determination of whether the
proceeding will result in an indictment can be
made . . . ." I d., at 701.
. The grand jury's sources of information are widely
drawn. and the validity of an indictment is not affected
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an
itldictment valid on its face is not sub.fect to challenge
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of
inadequate or incompetent evidence, Costello v. United
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States, supra; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245
(1910); or even on the basis of information obtained in
violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, United States v. Lawn, 355
u.s. 339 (1958).
The power of the Government to compel persons to
appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly
established. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441
(1972). The duty to testify has long been recognized
as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Govern-:
ment. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438
(1932); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)~
ln Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 688, the Court
noted that " [ c] itizens generally are not immune from
grand jury subpoenas .... " and that "the longstanding
principle that 'the public has a right to everyman's
evidence' . . . is particularly applicable to grand jury
proceedings." The duty to testify may on occasion be
burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury
to a witness' social and economic status. Yet the duty
to testify has been regarded as "so necessary to the
administration of justice" that the witness' personal
interest in privacy must yield to the public's overriding
interest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250
U. S., at 281. Furthermore, a witness may not interfere
with the course of the grand jury's inquiry. He "is not
entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy,
such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his."
Id., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the authority of the Court or the grand jury" or "to set limit to
the investigation that the grand jury may conduct."
Ibid.
Of course, the grand jury's subpoena power is not
).....-----:W-R-ei+:Y unlimited.
It may consider incompetent evidence, but it may not itself violate a valid privilege,
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whether
thr Conf?titution, statutes, or the
common law. Branzburg v. Hayes, supm; United States
v. Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United SLates, supra; 8
J. Wigmore. Evidence. ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev.
1961). When the grand jury itself threatens to commit
a wrong, it may be restrained. Ro, for example. an
indictment baf?ecl on evidence obtai ned in violation of
a defendant's Fifth Amrnclment privilrge is nevertheless
valid, United SLates v. Lawn, supm, but the grand jury
may not force a '"itness to answer questions in violation
of that constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witness is granted immunity co-extensive with the privilege
against self-incrimination. Kast?'gar v. United States,
supra. Similarly, a grand jury may not compel a person
to produce books and papers that would incrin1inate him.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633-635 (1886).
Cf. Couch v. United Stales, 409 U. S. 322 (1973). The
grand jury is also without power to invade a legitimate
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
A grand .i ury's subpoena decus tecum will be disallowed
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to he regarded as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.n Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). And presumably grand
jurors who threaten to conduct an illegal search may be
restrained like any others.

III
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also
grand jury's subpoena power and ,.Y1at a wit~
limits
ness may refuse to answer thr grand j ur~!:Iuestions
based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search
and seizure. The exclusionary rule was adopted to ef~
fectuate the Fourth Amendment right of all citizens
"to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects, against

§9
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unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . " Under this
rule evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend' cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against
ment
the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Weeks v.
United Stales, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U. S. 643 (1961). This prohibition applies as well
to the fruits of the illegally seized evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 ( 1963).
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress
the injury to the privacy of the search victim:
<' [T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too
late." 'Uinidetter v. Walker, 381 u~ S. 618, 637
(1965).
Instead, the rule is designed to deter unlawful police
conduct in the future and thereby e · tuate t e guarante.e
of the Fourth Amendrr\eni against unreasonable search
and seizures:
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair:
lts purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutidnal guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.';
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan v. United
States, ex rel Shot, 382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29 ( 1968). In sum, the rule is a
judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right ~xercisable

~the

l '!J LA- ._..,......._

party aggrieved."

There is some di~agreemenl as to the practiral effirnry of the
exclu~ionnry rule, and a::; the Court noted in Elkins v. United States,
5

r

/.4.a.~

--~-------
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Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary
rule has never been intcrpret<'d to proscribe the use of
illegally-seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons. As in the application of any remPclial device,
the scope of the rule has been restricted to those arras
where its remedial objectives arc thought most efficaciously served. The balancing process implicit in this
approach is expressed in the contours of the standing
requirementf. Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionary
rule has been confined to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate- the
victim of the unlawful SC'arch. Brown v. Unitfd States,
411 U. R. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394
U. S. 165 (1969); TVong Sun v. United States, supra;
Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 ( 19GO). This

standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the
364 U. R. 206, 21R (1960). rrlrvnnt "rrlrnpiriral stnii"tirf< arr not
avnilnhlr." ('f. Oak,.:. Rtud~·ing: thr Exrlu~;ionar~· Rnlr in Srarrh
and Rriznrr. 87 U. Chi. L. Rrv. 66.'i (1970). Wr hnvr no occasion
in thr prr~rnt rnsr to ronKider the extent of the rule's efficacy in
criminal trials.
6 In wrig:hing thr comprting: intrrr..;f~, it should br notrd that the
primary social rost of the Fourth Amrndmrnt exrlu~iona ry rule is
tha.t it depriws thr rrimin:d. jHslirr sy~trm of probative evidence.
v~tout tcgutel to the c.dc::l of 11:t ~ottlia HJ 1o 1 in1rPoian 21 the
v!ntirt~'a fili Mf, or 1lu r. hm' nod 1 0 COl?! icier tho 0 ililoNOP. We
ha e0 If 0~1 in eel 2 ~flit a:J jJI tt tliilfJfitJB ll11!A 'not All , m,Jg ,,lai,eh
aCCOJttpli Ia: fl:::t 1@1 alt.
Nw do::: '. e'::Jq l ~-l·k 888 "H.~. QQQ; '1~0
(.WjOS). 'fl:e .<petttl fottc of 'he arahwi enerr mde in 'he eont("!!ft
~ltd illu..-d senoh ond seiz liP n moll :lsl'Dt !d
Mr. JuRtice Bla~k s-t-.et•J
in his dis. rnting opinion in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,
237 (1969):
"A rlnim of illegal ~rnrrh and srizmr . is rrurinlly diiT<'rrnt from
many ot hrr constitutional rights; ordinnril~r the e,·idrnre seized cnn
in no wny have bern rrnclrrwl untrnst worthy by the means of its
seizure and indeed oft en t hi~ evidence nlone est ablishrs beyond
virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty."

i

I

fl·
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evidence are strongest where the Government's unlawfui
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction
on the victim of the search. 7

IV
In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the injury
to the historic role and functions of the grand jury
against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in
this context. At the outset, it is evident that this ex~
tention of the exclusionary rule would seriously under~~----------~-cut the
role of the grand jury. Because the
grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence,
The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amrndmrnt am1Iics even
to administmti,·e srarchrs wherr the primary purpo~e of the governmental intrusion is not to obtain evidence of criminal conduct by
which to convict t hr ~earch Yictim. SPe Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U. S. 523, .530 (1967); See v. City of Seattle. 3 7 U. S. 541
(1967). The rxrlusiomtr~· rule, however, has been applied to a
more limited catrgor~· of ~ituntions. Standing to in\'oke the rule
genernlly has been confinrd to crirninnl drfendantH, Alderman v.
United States, supra. Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
supra; One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693,
702 (1965).
In holding that the respondrnt had Htanding to invoke tllP rxclusionary rule in t1 grnncl jur~· procePding~. tlw Court of Appeals relied
on Rule 41 (e) of the Fedrral Rules of Criminal Procedme. Rule
41 (e) prm·idr~, in reiP\'ant part, that "[a] per..;on nggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizurp ma~r move the district court ... for
return of the property :md to suppress for usc as evidence anything
so obtained . . . . " It further states thnt "[t]he motion shall be
made before trial or hPnring . . . . " We have recognized that Rule
41 (c) is "no broader thnn tl1P constitutional rule." Alderman v.
United Stales, 394 U. S., at 173, n. 6; Jones v. United States, 362
U. S. 257 (1960). In the present rase, the Government docs not
challenge the cou1i 's order dirPct ing return of the illegally-seized
property to respondent. \Ve therefore ha\'e no occasion to consider
whether the return order i:,; proper where, a~ here, it is made for
the first time in the ~ of a grand jury proceeding.
7

4n.h'(f
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it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a
criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate
adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on
the merits and occasion delay and disruption of grand
jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the
orderly progress of an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related
to· the grand jury's primary objective. The iHevitable
result would be "protracted interruptions of grand jury
proceedings," Gelbard v. United States, 408 U. S. 71,
70 (WHI'l'E, J., concurring), effectively transforming them
into preliminary trials on the merits. In some cases the
delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the criminal
law. 8 Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclination to
allow litigious interference with grand jury proceedings:
"Any holding that would saddle the grand jury
with mini-trials and preliminary showing would
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the
public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal law." United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U. 8.1, 17 (1973).

o

Cf.

United States v. Ryan, 4'02 U.S. 530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 30!) U. S. 323 ( 1940). In sum,
we believe that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke
the exclusionary rule would interfere with the grand
jury's effective and expeditious discharge of its duties.
The force of this nrgumcnt i~ well illu ~ tratcd by the fact s of
the prrsrnt case. A~ of the d:ite of this decision , ~ore thim two
and one-half ~·car~ \\"ill h:~vc elapsed ,.:incc Calmidr:n wn ~ ~tnrunoned ·
to appear :~ncl te,.;tif~· beforr the p;rnnd jury. If Calandra '~ testimony waH vital to p;rnncl jur~· 's im·c,.;tiga1ion in August 1971 of
rxtort ion:tte crrdit t rn n~a ct ions, it is po~~iblc that thi~ rwrticular: '
invc~tigation has been completely fru~ t rated . .
8
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Against this potential damage to the historic role and
functions of the grand jury, we must weigh the benefits
to be derived from this proposed extension of the exclusionary rule. Suppressio11 of illegally-seized evidence
from use against the search victim in a criminal trial
is thought to be :it ·
met 1od of effectuating
the Fourth Amendment right of privacy. But it does
.not follow that that constitutional guarantee requires
.adoption of every proposal that might deter police misconduct. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S., at
J. 74, this Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule
to one .who was not the victim of the unlawful search.:
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated
.have been considered sufficient to justify the sup·pression of probative evidence even though the case
·against the defendant is weakened or destroyed.
We adhere to that judgmei1t. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth."
,We think this observation equally applicable in the
present context.
· Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatcvorftl~~~~;:t:~;t:-\
vlith re&j3eet t9 exclusion of illegally-seized evidence from
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly affect police conduct. Such an extension would
only deter police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for usc in a grand
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jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to obtain an indictment from a grand jury is substantially
negated by the fact that the illegally-seized evidence
would be inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the search victim. We therefore decline to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police
~iSC01_1duct at the expense. ou~~ VItiating the

v
Respondent also argues that each and every question
based on evidence obtained from an illegal search and
seizure constitutes a fresh and independent violation of
the witness' constitutional rights. ~il , of course,
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury.
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every
man owes his testimony. Blair v. United States, supra.
He may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, but he may not decline to answer on
the grounds that his responses might prove embarrassing
or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal
9 At

ora.l argument, counsel for

re.spondcn~tetl

the

e6~

~it to the Court that raeh que::;tion a~krd of the R<'!'pond~·
ent before the grand jur~· . which qur~tion was only a;.:krd because
of n past vi oint ion of t hr Fourth Amendment, f amounts to] a new,
immediate violation of the Fourth Amenclm('l1t . . . . fA] question
cleri1' ecl fmm n pnst violation, a question into the pri1·acy of the
witneBs amounts to another intru~ion in violati(n1 of the Fourth
Amenclmenl. 0 Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.

~~

.J:u~

LL·ta~~f

~k;f. '' :

"[R]efu~ing to answer a quei'lion in which the quest ion coneeiYably

is deri1·ed from a pa~t violation of the Fourth Amrmlmrnt, giws
rise to ~ aclditiQ.!?al or nrw Four! h Amrudmrnt right to re~ist
answrring that question because·· the quest ion . iti'df become[;; an
additional intrusion . . . . '' Tr. of Oral Arg. 20: (~ ~

)

~ .
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affairs. Respondent's claim must be, therefore, not
merely that the grand jury's questions invade his privacy
but that because those questions are based on illegally- c:..<obtained evidence, they somehow constitute distinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree.
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong ~-~
condemned is the unjnstified governmental invasion .. of/
L__
."areas of an individual's life~tabot~ which he entertaihs
'
legitimat expectations of pnvacy.' United States v.
~---;:-Robinson ~ U. S. - , (1973) (PowELL, J., con~ 1
curring). That wrong,
in t 11s case, is fully
accomplished by the original search without probable
'cause. Grand jury questions based on evidence obtained
thereby involve no independent governmental invasion
'Of one's person, house, papers, or effects, but rather the
usual abridgement of personal privacy common to all
grand jury questioning. Questions based on illegallyobtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product
of a past unlawful search and seizure. They work no
new wrong, Whether such derivative use of illegallyobtained evidence by a grand jury should be proscribed
presents a question not of rights but of remedies.
In the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizure but also any derivative use of that
evidence, r..Hl..Q.4:)l:.G'ffil~t0fl-t}HA.e.~~~*H~"'"f'i:He-ffi'HS'Ih<
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of
detering police misconduct. In the context of a grand
jury proceeding, we believe that the damage to that
"' .. ~.~
institution from an extension of the exclusionary rule
~-~--- outweigtis anYlincremental deterrent effect. That con------elusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizure and any question or evidence derived

r,.
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therefrom. 10 The same considerations of logic and policy
apply to both th e fruits of an unlawful search and seizure
and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not dis..
tinguish between them. 11
10 It should br notre! that n grnnd jun· wi11WRR mn~· hnvo o1hcr
remrdirs, of vnr~·ing r fTirnr~·. 1o rrdr rR~ thr injm~· to hi,; privncy
and to prr,·rnt n fmthrr inv:tsion in 1hr fu(lll'('. Tir mn~· br rntitlrd
to maintnin n rn u ~o of nrtion for cbmngr~ ngain~1 1hr offirrr:< who
conducted 1he nnlnwful srn rrh . Biv fns v. Si:r Unkown N amrd
Agents of the Ji'rdeml Bureau of lnvrstigation. 403 U. S. 3Ril ( 1071).
He rna~· also srrrk return of thr illrgn ll~· - sP i zrd proprr1~· . and rxclusion of thr propPrt~· nnd it R fruit. from !wing u ~r d as Pvidcncr
against him in a. rriminnl tr ial. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. Unitrd
Stales, 2, 2 U. S. ::!44. In thrsr rirr11m~tnnrcs, we cnnnot sn ~· !hat
sueh a. witne.:s is A'lcft remediless in tfie face ol nn unlnwlul sea rch
and se izure. ~",..,...~""
11 ~nl m;M«l),_relirR primn rily on Silverthorne Lmnber Co. v. United
Statrs. supra . In thnt rn~r, frdNnl offirN;: unlmvful l ~ · seizrd rertain
documents h r longing 1o 1hr Rih-rrt hornr;; nne! their lumber company
and 11rr;:rntrd 1hrm to a grnncl jur~ · 1hn1 hnd alrcnd y indicted thr
Silvrrthornes. A distrirt court ordrrrd thr return of thr document;: but im]10t11ldrd pho1 ogrnphs and copirs of the originnls.
Later , th e pro~rcu1or cnusrd thr grnnd jur~· to i;:suc suh]10rnm; duces
tecum to the Rih·rrthornrs to produre thr originnls, nnd their refusal
to comply lrd to a contrmpt ritn! ion. In rrvrrsing the judgment,
the Court hrld thnt 1hr suhporna " \\·rrr im·n lid brrause thry wrre
ba srd on knowlrdge oht ainrd from thr i ll Pgnll~· sri zed rvidence, ri! ing
W eeks v. United States, supra. Mr . .Tusti cr Holmrs, writing for the
Court , stated 1hn1 thr "rssenrr of the provision forbidding 1hc
acquisition of e,·idrncp in n rrr!nin wny is not merrly that the
evidrnco so ncquirrd ~ hnll not hr usrcl before the Court but that
it shall not br used at nll." 251 U. S. at 392.
Silverthorne is distinguiHhnble from the prr~e nt rase in ~e vrral
re~p rcts. Thrrr, 1hr Rilwrthorne;; had prrviou sl ~· bren indic1rd by
the gmnd jm~r and hnd standing to invokr the rxclusionnry ru le on
~ ...u
the bnsi~ of 1hrir R1ntus ns rrimiml drfrndants. The Govrmment's
...(/r- - - - - - .1-n'te
:"'_r_e--:RtArcraptming the originnl documents was obviously bnsed on
~
belief 1hnt the~· might br u;;el'ul in a subsrqurnt pro~er ution . Jndred ,
the funrtionnl ronsequrnrc of the court·~ dcci8ion wn s to exclude
the evidence from the subsequent crimina!' trial. Furtlierinote, prior '

72-734-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. CALANDRA

17

The judgment of the Court <1Jf Appeals is

·Reversed.

to the issunn ce of the grnnd jury subpoenns there hnd been a judicial
determination that the search and seizure was illegal. The Silvcrthorncs' claim was not rai::;ed for the fir::;t time in pre-indictment
motion to suppress.
f\,1 r-es .._ &..."+
By contrast, in the instant rase Elalsf1 dl'l1 had not been indicted
by the grand jury and wu s not. a crim inal defendant . Under traditional principles, he had no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule.
The e!Tect of the Distri ct Court's order wa::; to deprive the grand
jury of testimony it needrd to conduct its investigation . La st ly~
9ttltt,;J:t~~~1ion to suppress wa s made prior to indictment and
required int erruption of the grand jury proceedings. In these circumstances, Silverthorne i · not eon trolling. To the extent that the
Court's broad dictum might ~ di!Terent result in the present
case, we decline to follow it.
)-..___
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l 1 nited States_, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Ap, .John P Calandra.

peals for the Sixth Circuit.

[ Dt->cember -, 19731
Mu JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court,
Th1s case presents the question whether a witness
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search
and seizure. This issue is of considerable importance to
the administration of criminal justict>,

I
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a
warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calandra's place of business, the Royal Machine and Tool
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued
in connection with an extensive investigation of suspected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of
bookrnakmg rPcorcls and wagering paraphenalia. A
master affidavit submitted in support of the application
for the warrant contained information derived from statements by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau
Qf Investigation (FBI) . from physical surveillance con-·
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rlucted by FBI agents. and from court-authorized elec·
tromc surveilla11cc.'
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a
two-story building. The first floor consists of about
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and
inventory. The second floor contains a general office
area of about 1.500 square feet and a small office occupied
hy Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary.
On December 15, 1970, federal agents executed the warrallt directed at Calandra's placr of busuwss and conducted a thorough four-hour search of the premises. The
record rrveals that the agents spent more than three
hours searching Calaudra's office and files.
Although the agents found 110 gambling paraphernalia,
one discovered, among certain promissory notes, a card
indicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making
perwdic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an
affidavit that he was aware that the United 8tates Attorney's office for the Northern District of Ohio was investigating possible violations of 1R P. S. C. ~~ 8Q2, 893,
and 804, dealing with extort.ionatc credit transactions, and
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loansharklllg" enterprise thru under investigation. The agent
roncluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized
along with various otlwr items. including books and
records of the company. stock certificates, and address
hooks.
On March 1. 1!:171. a special grand JUry convened in
the Northern District of Ohio to investigate possible
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The
On tiH' ha~t ~-> of thr ~am<· al!idavJt, f<'d<'ral ag<'nt~ abo obtained'
warrnnt:-; authortziug ~<·arriJPH of Calandra '~ rr~ tdrurt> and autolllobt!<' . Thr pm;mt ea~P tnvolvr>< onlY tlw se>arrh of tlw Hoyal
~laehut<' and Tool Compan~ .
1
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grand .1 ury subpoenaed Calandra m order to ask him
questions based on the evidence seh:ed during the search
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 1971, but
refused to testify, mvoking his Fifth Amendment privileged against self-incrimination. The Government then
req l.lested the District Court to grant Calandra transactional immunity pursuant to 18 U. 8. C. § 2514.
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the
hearing on the Government's application for the immunity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress
the Pviclence seized in the search.
Calandra then moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and
return of the seized evidence on the grounds that the
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient aud that
the seE~-rch exceeded the scope of the warrant. 011
August 27, the pistrict Court held a hearing at which
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer
questwns based on the seized materials. On October 1..
the District Court entered its judgment ordering the
f•vidPnce suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the
grand Jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence.
332 F ~upp. 737 (1971). The court stated that "due
process . . allows a witness to litigate the question
whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for the
questions asked of him before the grand jury has been
obta111ed 111 a way which violates the constitutional protectiOn agawst unlawful search and seizure.·· 332 F .
~upp., at 742. The court found that the search warrant
had been issued without probable cause and that the
search had exceeded the scope of th e warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the :-lixth Circuit affirmed,
465 F . 2d 1218 (1972). holding that the District Court
l)·ad properly Pnt~rtanu=-d thP suppression motion and
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that the excluswnary rulr may be mvoked by a wituess
beforP th<" grand .1 ury to bar questioning based on evidence obtainPd in an unlawful search and seizure." The
offer to grant Calandra unmunity was deemed irrelevant.
465 F 2d, at 1221.
We granted the Government's petitwu for certiorari,
-- l' H ( J!.l7:3 l \V r IlOW rrverse.

1T
ThP Jnstitutwn of the grand jury is deeply rooted in
A11glo-American history." ln England, the grand jury
served for centunes both as a body of accusers sworn
to chscover and present for trial persons suspected of
criminal wrongdoiug and as a protector of citizens against
arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this
country the Founders thought the grand Jury so essential
to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only
he mstituted by "a pres€~ntment or indictment of a grand
JUry
Costello \'. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362
(1956 ). The grand JUry's historic functions survive to
this day. Its responsibility in our constitutional framework includes both the determination whether there is
probable causf' to believe a crime has been committed
and the protrction of citizens against unfounded criminal
Tho Court of AppPal~ affirmed the Dt~t net Court ';; finding that
search of Calandra':-; lntsine:-;~ anrl ~eiznre of hi;; proprrty was
unlawful Although thP Gon-rnment do(',.; not agree with thr court';;
finding, tt ha~ not ~ought rPviPw of t Ju,.; I$i:iUC
a For a di;;cussion of t hr lw.;tory and role of t hP grand jury, see
2

f lw

fosteflo ' l 111ited 8tates, 350 P . S. :35!:1, :31il-311:2 (1956); Blair ,._
l 'nited State~. 250 ll S. 27:l, 279-21\:3 (1919); Hale v Henkel, 201
! ' ::3 4:3, 59 (1901>) . -t Blark~tollf" C'ommC'ntanP~ :l01 et seq.; G. Edward:;, TIH• <:rand .Jury 1-44 (1901)), 1 F Pollock nnd F . Maitlnnd,
Ht~tory of Englt~h Law liH (2d C'd. 1909) ; l W. Holc!Kworth , Hi;;tory

nl

<

•

Eng:h~h

Law :n2- :r2.:3 17th

rPv

rd

~95fil.
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prosecutwns. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686687 (197:2) .
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide
latitude to mquire into violations of criminal law. No
JUdge presides to monitor its proceedings:' It deliberates
Ill secret and may determine alone the course of its
1nquiry. ThP grand jury may compel the production of
evidence or th<> testimony of witnesses as it considers
appropriate. and its operation generally is unrestrained
by thP technical procedural and evidentiary rules govern~
mg the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a grand inquest,
a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the
scope of whose inquiry is not to b<> limited by doubts
whether any particular individual will be properly sub.i ect to an accusation of crime ." Blair ' '· United States,
:250 r . s. 273. 282 11919)
The scope of the grand Jury's powe!S reflects 1ts special
role m insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A
gra1H.l Jury proceeding IS not an adversary hearing in
which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, 1t IS an e.r parte investigation to determine
whet,her a crime has been committed and whether
rnminal proceedings should be mstituted against any
rwrson . The grand ,jury's investigative power must be
broad if Jts public responsibility is adequately to be discharged. Branzbury v Hayes, supra, Costello v. United

8tates, supra
ol rour:::<· . i ~ ,;ub.wrt to lh<' court 's ~uprrvision
Srr /3rotNl v. l'uited States, ;359 U. S. 41, 49
(Hl59) . Hule:; Ha nd 17, Fed Hul<' Crun. Proc., L. Orfkld. Cnmmal
Procrdurr Under the Federal HttiP;;, 475-477 (19()()). In particulnr,
IIH· grand Jltry mu ~ t rrly 011 the court io comprl produrt1on of
hlloh, 1>11Jl<•r,.;, doc ument~ . and tiH' trHtunon.v of Wltn(>::<~r~. and tlw
<·ourt ma~ qua;;h or mod1f~ a subpoena on moti011 if compliance
\V(HIId br ·· unrra ~onnhlP or opprr"'"lV<' "
Hulf' 17 (r) , Fed . Hule

· Tlw grand

in

.Jllr~ ,

~ev<'ral resp<>rt ~.

ll rim.

P1 111,
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lu 8ra11zburg, the Court had uccaSIOil to reaffirm the
un portance of thP grand jury's rolf'.
" [T]he mvestigat10n of crime by a grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and the property of the
Citizen .. " 408 U. 8., at 700.
"The role of the grand Jury as an important
instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily
lllcludes au investigative function with respect to
determinmg whether a crime has been committed
and who committed it . .
'When the grand jury
is performing Its investigatory function into a genPral problem area ... society's interest is best served
by a thorough and extensive Investigation.' Wood
v Georgia, 370 r . ~. 375, 392 (1962). A grand
jury mvestigatwn 'is not fully carried out until
Pvery available clue has been run down and all w1t11esses examined in a proper way to find if a crime
has been conumtted.' United States v. Stone, 429
F. 2d 138, 140 ( CA2 1970). Such an investigation
may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proferred
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S.,
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined
the evidence that a determination of whether the
proct>edi11g will result in an indictment can be
tnadP
!d., at 701
The grand .1 ury's sources of Information are widely
drawn, aud thf' validity of an mdictment is not affected
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an
mdictmeut valid on Its face is not subject to challenge
on thf' ground that the grand .1 ury acted on the basis of
madequate or incompetent evid('nce, Costello v. United
States, supra. Holt \', United States, 218 U. 8. 245
I HllO); or even on thr basiR of information obtained in
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Lu Hra11zburg, the Court had occaSlOJl to reaffirm the
importance of the grand JUry's rok.
:c [ 1'] h<~ m vestigatwn of crime by a grand jury imple~
meuts a fundamental governmental role of securrng the sa-fety of thP person and the property of the
crttzen , .. ' 408 P. S., at 700.
' 'The role of thC' grand .1 ury as all important
instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily
tnoludes au investigative function with respect to
determinmg whether a crime has been committed
and who committed it . .
'When the grand jury
ts performing tts investigatory function into a genPral problem area ... society's interest is best served
by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood
" Georgia, 370 P. S. 375. 392 ( 1962). A grand
,lury mvestigattotl 'is not fully carried out until
c>very available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in a proper way to fiud if a crime
has bee11 committed.' United States v. Stone, 429
F. 2d 138, 140 ( CA2 1970). Such an investigation
may be triggered by ttps, rumors, evidencr proferred
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S.,
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined
the evidE'nce that a determination of whether the
proceeding will result in au indictment can be
tnacl<'
!d., at 701
The grand jury's sources of mformatiOn are wtdely
drawn, and thE' validity of an indictment is not affected
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an
· mdictmcnt valid on Its face is uot subject to challenge
on the ground that the grand .1 ury acted on the basis of
madequate or incompE'tent evidence, Costello v. United
States, supra . Holt \', United &ates, 218 U. ~. 245
( HllO), or evf'n on the basis of inforlllation obtained in

"tt
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violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. United States v. Lawn, 355
P . S. 33H ( 1958) .
The power of tlw Government to compel persons to
appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly
estabhshed. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441
( 11:)72) . The duty to testify has long been recognized
as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Government. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438
(1932); United States Y. Bryan, 339 U. ~. 323.331 (1950).
Ju Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S .. at 688, the Court
noted that "l c] itizeus generally are not immune from
grand jury subpoenas
... and that "the longstanding
·princ1plr that 'the public has a right to everyman 's
ev1deucp '
IS particularly applicable to grand jury
proceedings. " The duty to testify may on occasion be
burdensome and C'Ven embarrassing. It may cause injury
to a witness' social and econonuc status. Yet the duty
to testify has been regarded as "so uecessary to the
adminis~ration of JUStice" that the witness' personal
Interest 111 privacy must yield to the public's overriding
mterest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250
l'. S .. at 281. Furthermore, a Witness may not interfere
w1th the course of the grand jury's inquiry. He "is not
rntitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy,
such as a party might raise. for this is no concern of his."
/d., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the authorIty of the Court or the grand JUry" or "to set limits to
the 111 vest1gatwn that the grand Jury may conduct."
lbtd.
Of coursP , the grand JUry's subpoena power is not
unlimited It may consider incompetent evidence, but
It may not itself violate a valid privilege. whether
established by the Constitution, statutes. or the common law Rrnnzbury \ Hay es, supra; United States.

..'
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Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; s·
J. Wigmore, Evitlence, ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev.
1961). When the grand jury itself threatens to cop1mit
a wrong, it may be restrained. Although, for example, an
indictment based on evidence obtained in violatio11 of
a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 1s nevertheless
valid. United States \'. Law11, supra, the grand jury
may not force a witness to answer q uestious in violation
of that constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witness 1s granted immumty co-extensive with the privilege
agalllst self-mcnminatwn. Kastigar v. United States,
S'upra. Similarly, a grand JUry may not compel a person
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him ..
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. 8. 616, 633- 635 (1886).
Cf. Couch v. Umted States, 409 U. S. 322 ( 1973). The
grand ,1ury is also without power to invade a legitimate
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Arnendment.
A grand jury's subpoena duces lecum will be disallowed
Jf it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. 76 ( 1906). And presumably grand
jurors who themselves threaten to conduct an illegal
search may be restrained like any others. Judicial intervcntion is appropriate in such cases because it may prevent the wrong bPfore it occurs,.
Y

TTl
ln the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also
limits the . grand ·jury's power to compel a witness to
answer questions based on evidence obtained from an
unlawful search and seizure. The exclusionary rule was
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of
all citizens " to be secure in their houses, papers, and
~ ffects. against unreasonab]P searches and seizures . . . ,' ''

·.I
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y Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; 8
.T. Wigmore, Evidence, ~~ 22!10-2391 (McNaughton rev.
1961 ). When the grand jury itself threatens to CO)Umit
a wrong, it may be restrained. Although, for example, an
indictment based on evidence obtained in violation of
a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 1s uevertheless
valid, United States ,. . Lawn, supra, the grand jury
rnay not force a witness to answer questions in violation
of that COllstitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witness 1s granted 1mmumty co-extensive with the privilege
agamst self-mcruninat1011. Kastigar v. United States,
supra. Similarly, a grand JUry may not compel a person
~o produce books and papers that would incriminate him ..
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. 8. 616, 633-635 (1886).
Cf. Couch v. Umted States, 4ml U. S. 322 (1973). The
grand JUry is also without power to invade a legitimate·
privacy iuterest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
A grand jury's subpoena duces tecum will be disallowed
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). And presumably grand
j urors who themselves threaten to conduct an illegal
search may be restrained like any others. Judicial intervention is appropriate in such cases because it may prevent thP wrong before it occurt'o.

Til
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also
limits the . grand · jury's power to compel a witness to
answer questions based on evidence obtained from an
unlawful search and seizure.. The exclusionary rule was
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of
all citizens "to be secure in their houses, papers, and
E)ffeets. against. unrc>asonab}P searches and seizures . . . ,.,
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Linder this rule. evidence obtained iu violation of the
Fourth Amendment cannot he used in a criminal procreding against the victim of the illegal search and sei-:zure. Weeks v. United States, 232 r. ~. 383 ( 1914);
Mapp v. Ohio, 307 P. ~. 643 ( 1961). This prohibition
applirs as well to the fruits of the illegally seized evidence. Woll(J Sun v. U 11ited States, 371 U. S. 471 ( 1963);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385
( 1920) .
The purpose of the exclusiOnary rule is not to redress
·Lhe ll1JUry to the privacy of tlw search victim :
" [T Jhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too
late." Linkletter \' Walker, 381 lT . S. 618, 637
(1965) .
Instead, the rule 1s designecl to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search
and seizures
" The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
[ ts purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way- by removing the incentive to disregard
tt.'' Elki11s v. (Tnited States, 364 U. S. 206, 217
( 1D60) .
Accord. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan
v. United States, ex rel. Shot, 382 U. S. 406, 416 ( 1966);
Terry v. Ohw, 392 lJ. S. 1, 29 (1968) . In sum, the rule.
is a judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved '
' Tlwre

t:>

(''\cht~touary

:somP ch~agrC'l'llll'lll a~ to 1he practtcal efficacy of the
rult•, and"~ tlw Court uot<'d in Elkin.~\' , United States,
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Despite its broad deterreut purpose, the exclusionary
i·ul<> has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of
illegally-sei~ed evidence m all proceedings or against all
perso'ns. As with any remedial device, the application
of the rule has been restricted to those areas where
Its renw(·lial ob:J<'Ctives are thought most efficaciously
serve(L The balancing process implicit in this approach
1:-; expressed in th<> oontours of the stanuing requirement. Thus. standing to invoke the exclusionary rule
has been confined to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the
victim of the unlawful search. Brow'// v. United States,
411 C. S. 22~ ( 1973); Alderman v. United States, 394
U. :-5. 165 ( 1969); Woug Sun v. United States, supra;
Jones v. United States, 362 C. S. 257 (1960). This
standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the
t>v1dence are strongest where the Government's unlawful
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction
on the victim of the search "
C. S. :!Oti. 21!-. (1!:JliU), relevant •·[e]mpmral ~tat1~tic!; III'P not
avadaulr. ' Ct. Oak~. Stud)·mg thr Exclmnonary Rulr 111 Search
and 8c•Jzun•, :37 lJ Ch1. L. Hev. ()()5 (1970). Wr have no occa~:~ion
lll tlw pre~ent ('H~e to ronHtder the Pxtent of tlw rule '~ efficacy in

,{()4

('l'llllllla I t rwl~

ln holdmg that tlw n•~:~poudrnt had oti!nding to invokl' the Pxclu;.;wnary rul(• m a grand Jlll')' procerchng:<, the Court of Appeab relied
on Hule 41 (P) of tlw Frdrral Hub of Crnninal ProcPdure. Rule
41 (e) providE'ti , Ill rPi<'VH nt part, that
a] per~Oll aggripved by an
unlawful ~earch and ::;rJzurr ma)· mov(• thr d1~triet court . . . for
return of the Jll'Operty and to ~liJl]lfPI':> for U~(' Itt' Pvit\Pnce anything·
so obtauwd.
lt furtlwr HtntrH that " I tjlw motion ~hall be
madP brforP tr~al or h<'al'lng. . '' We have rPrognized that Rule41 (r) tH ''no broad<•r tlwn the cou~tllutwnal rulE'." Alderman v.
( 'mted Stateo•', :3!:.14 ll . S .. at li:~. n. G; Jones v. ( 'mted States, :362·
l'.. H 2!'>i ( 19!)0) Smc<· the OoV!'qmwnt ha~ not C'hnllengcct the
11

"r
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lV
In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary ru le
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential
injury to the historic role and functions of the grand
jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this context. lt is evident that this extention of the exclusionary rule would seriously undercut
the role of the grand JUry. Because the grand jury
does not finally adjudicate gt1ilt or innocence, it has
traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative
and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evi·
dentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a
crirninal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate
adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on
the merits and occasion delay and disruption of grand
Jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the
orderly progress of an investigation and might necessitate extended litigatiou of issues only tangentially related
to the grand jury's primary obJective.' Tho probable
result would be "protracted interruptions of grand jury
proceedings," Gelbard v. United States, 408 C. S. 41, 70
(1972) (WHITE. J.. concurring). effectively transforming
Dtst rirt Court ':,; ordrr c!Jrert mg rrt\ll'n of t lw illcgally-:;eizrd proprrty
to respondrnt, we do not n•arh that I~::iUt' .
Tlw Court of Appral~ al:;o found I hat I hr Gowrnmc·nt 's offrr of
immumt ~· undrr 18 ll . 8. C. § 2514 wa~> im-lr~nnt to rrspondrne~
"tanc!tng to mvokt> tlw exelu~wnary rule. W(• ~ with that dPtcrmmatwn for thp rpa,;ons ~!ftted m Part~ III, IV, and V of this
opimon.
· Thr fo1w of tht~ nrgumrnt i:; W<:'ll Illustruted by the facts of
tlH• prPsPnt. cas('. A~ of the dntr of thtl' drcision, more than two ~ _ .-.u_L...d
·uHI one-half yt>nr:; will havr t>lapsPd ~ince Gnl~tnelat'"~:a;' summoned~
io appear and tP:;tli\ bd'on' thr grand Jury . If E:nlm:tl :n"'S""fesh- ~
mon.\· waK vttal to grand Jury ':; mvr.;;tigatwu :n Augu~t. . 1971 of
nxtort wnnte rrPdtt t rnn~art wn~, 11 ::; po~::;iblr that this particular
i.I.JVP::;ttga t 1011 h<I~'- bPt>ti eomplPtrly fn~~~ rat PeL
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them wto preliminary trials on the merits. In some
cases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the
criminal law. Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclination to allow litigious interference with grand jury
proceedings :
" Any holding that would saddle the grand jury
with mini-trials and preliminary showing would
assuredly impede its investigation and frustq:tte the
public's interest in the fair and expeditious admin1Stration of the criminal law.'' United States v.
Dionisio, 410 P. S.l. 17 (1973) .

Cf. Uuited States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 ( 1971); Cobbledick v United States, aon U. S. 323 ( 1940). In sum,
we belirve that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke
the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the
t'ffective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's
duties.
Against this potential damage to the role and functiOns of the grant! jury, we must weigh the benefits to
be derived from this proposed extension of the exclusionary rule. Suppression of the use of illegally-seizeq
evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial
is thought to be an important method of effectuating
the Fourth Amendment. But it does not follow that the
Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal
that might deter police misconduct. In Alderman v.
United States, 304 U. S .. at 174. for example, this Court
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to one who was
not the victim of the unlavv·ful search :
"Thr dett>rrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated
havr been eonsiderPd sufficient to justify the suppression of probativr evidence even though the case
agamst tlw defendant is weakened or destroyed,

l'NITED HTATr•;S u.
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\Yf' adlwre to that .Judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having the~n
acq11itted or convicted on the basis of all the evi·
dellCC' which C'Xj)OSeS the truth.''
\VP think this observation equally applicable in the
present context.
Any incremental det('rrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedmgs is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrent effect h1ay
rcsul t from the exclusion of illegally-seized evidence fron1
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceediugs would sigtufican tly affect police conduct. Such an extension would
deter only police investigation cousciously directed toward tlw discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to obtain an indictment from a grand jury is substa11tially
negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally-seized evide nce i 11 a subsequent criminal prosecution of the search
v1ctun. For the most part, a prosecutor would be unlikely to request an indictment where a ~lltteetK!,~ Ct~NV; c.l1 ~~
not be obtained. \Ye therefore decline to embrace a
view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly
minimal advancf' in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the ex pense of substantially impeding the role of the
grand JUry.'
'R<·~pondem rl'IIC'~ prnnanl~· on

81/vrrthurne Lu111b1'1' Cu. v. Uuitrd
In ilwt caoC>, fedC>rnl oJ!irn~ unlawfully
Hl' IZNI cPrl n Ill dorumPJlt,.; I>Plonp;mg 1o 1iw Sli vC>rthorne~ and the1r
lumbt•r eompan.\' and prC>,;PntPd 1lwm loa grand .iur.\· that hnd nlrC>ndy
mc(lrt<'d t lw 81! vPrl horn<'>- , A \ll:>l nrt r·otJrt urd<'r<'d t hr I'<' I urn of the-

Stat.-&, :l51 l i. 8. :~b5 (1920) .
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v
RPspondent also argues that each and every question
based on evidencC' obtained from an illegal search and
seizure constitutes a fresh and iudependent violation of
documpnl,.: but Impounded photogmph,.: and eopir" of thr original:;.
Lat PI'. t h<> pro~rcu tor r:tll~<'tl t lw gmnd jury Io i~,.:ur subpoena:; d'Uces
tecum to the SIIv<·rt horne:< to proclucp the original::<, and their refu:;a ]
to romp]~· k•d to a contempt citation. In rrver;,;ing thr judgment,
the Court held t hnt 11H· HubpoPtHI>' \\'<•re invalid hP<·au~c· they wcrr
ba~Pd on knowledgP obtuinPd from tlw ilkgall~· ~<'i~rd PvidenrP, citing
Weeks\'. United 8tates, supra. :\[r. .l11~iiee I-Iohrws. writing for the
Co11rt. HI n1ed 1ha 1 tlw "P>'>"l'll<'C of t lw provi,.:iou forbidding t hr
acqut>'Jtion of p,·iden<·<' in a errtain wa~· i" not !TH'r<·l~· that tho
evHlPncc HO acq11ired ,.:h;tl] not bP used before thr Court but that
II· ~h;tll not br used at all." 251 U. S. at 392.
Silverthome is distingui:;habiP from the pre~·Jtt ca~c· in :<everal
re:>]Wd:;. Tllf'rP, thl' Sih·Nthornes had prrviou:;ly been indieted by
the grand jur~· ;md mm.....,..,nuiin~ tt~ofri'Vokr the Pxclu:;ionary rule im
tho basi~ of thrir :,;tatu,.; a~ crimtnal drfendant;,;. Tllf' Government's·
mtpre~t in reeaptunng the onginal docum<•nt~ wn~ obviou~ly hn:;ed on
a belief that thry might br usrful in a rrim\nal pm~rcutinn. Indrrd,
t hr pnma ry eon,;rquc·nce of 1hr Court·~ dPei:;ion wa;; 1o <·xclud<'
the Pvidener from the ~;ub~rqtH'lll crimina I 1rinl. Fmt hennore,,JJI'ior·
to tlw l:s.,;wtner of the grand jur~· ~ubpoma:> tlwrr had bPen a judicial
d.rt <•rrnina tion that t h <· .,;rarch and "<'i~urr wa~ illeg;a!. The Silverthorne:;' claim wa~ not raisPcl for the fin;t tinw ilt pre-indictment
motion to supprr:-:,~.
By contrast, in the im:tant ea::;<' rr::;pondent hnd not brrn utdieted
by the grand jury and wn:; not a eriminnl defendant. Under tracli-.
11onal prtneiple::;, lw h·td no :;tanding; to invoke tlw rxelusionary rulo.
The effeet of the D tHtrirt Court'"' ordrr wa" to dqll·i,·e thr grnnd
Jllr~· of tr,.;IJmou~ · it nredrd to conduet its invc>:stigntion. La,;tl~·.
rr::;poncl<•nt '"' motion o supprr::<s wa" made prior 1o indictmrnt a net
rrquired intc>rruptioJ 1 of thr grand jm~· proccwlings. In thrse cireum:::tancr:;. 8ilverth C•l'lll! Jli not controlling. To the t•xt rnt that the·
Court's broad dJelul1J might be eon:st rued to :suggr:;t n diffPrrnt result 111 tlw pre::;rnt c a:,;e, we noll' that 11 has lw<·n "ubstantlally undt·r·
minrd by lat<•r rase:; Sec Part~; Ill :mel IV of 1hi~ opinion.
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the witness' constitutional rights." Ordinarily, of course,
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury.
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every
man owes his testimony . He may invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but he
may not decline to answer on the grounds that his
r·esponses might prove ~mbarrassing or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v. United
States, supra. Respondent's ' claim must be, therefore,
not merely that the grand jury's questions invade his
privacy but that because those questions are based on
illegally-obtained evidence, they somehow constitute distinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We
disagree.
The purpose of the .fourth Amendment is to prevent
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong
condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, committed in this case, IS fully accomplished by the original
search without probable cause. Grand jury questions
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no independent governmental invasion of one's person , house, papers,
" At oral argument, coun~el for respondent ::;tated tho contention
a;; follows ·
' 1 oubm1t to tlw Court that each questiOn aoked of the Reopondent before thr grnnd jur~,., whirh que::;tion wno only asked because
of H pa~>t violation of the Fourth Amendment, fnmounts to] u new,
Immediate violatiOn of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] question
cjerived from a pa~t violatiOn, 11 question into the privacy of the
wttne~>o amo~mto to another intrusion in vwlatwn of the Fourth
Amendment.'' Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.
'' I H] efu"mg to answer a que::;tion tn which the question conceivably
i:> <ienved from a past violation of the Fourth Amenchnent, gives
rise ro an ndditiOIJill or nrw Fourth Amendment right to resist
nhswenng that qu<'~twn because the que~tion itself becomes an
addlttonal mmuswn ••• : Tr. of Oral Arg. 20.

,,
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or effects, but rather th<> usual abridgement of personal
privacy common to all grand jury questioning. Questions based 011 illegally-obtained evidence arc o1lly a
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search
and seiwre. Tlwy work 110 new wrong. Whether such
derivative usc of illegally-obtained evidence by a grand
Jury should be proscribed presents a question not of
rights but of remedies.
ln the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizun' but also any derivative usc of that
evidence. The prohibition of the exclusionary rule must
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of
deterring police misconduct. In the context of a grand
JUry proceeding, we bPlieve that the damage to that
institution from an extension of the exclusionary rule outweighs any possibl<> incremental deterrent effect. The conclusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an unlawful
search ancl seizure and any question or <'vidence derived
therefrom. 10 The same considerations of logic and policy
apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure
and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not distinguish between them .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
10

H

~hould

br notPd that, rven nbsPnf tlw <•xl'lu,;wn:tr.l· rule, a
witnrs,; ma~· hav<• othrr n·tnPdi(·~ to rPdrr~s tlw injury to
hi,.; pnvaf·~- and to prrwnt n futihN tnvn;,;ion in tiH• f'nlurr. Hr ma.1·
br entitlrd to mamlain a cau:;c of :tl'lion for d:tma~r" a~ains1 11w
o!lierr;,; who conductrd th<· unlawful ;;parch . Bivl!118 \'. Si.~: U11knvw11
Named Age'llts of thl' Federal Bureau of hwl'stioatiou, 40:~ U. R. :~Rt'
(1971) . Hr may nl~o ~<'<'k rrtum of thr iiiPg;nll~·-~piz('d proprrt~·,
:111d exeluswn of the prop<-'l'l)' and its fruit>' from IH'mg u~Pd n~ <•vict<'ll<'<' ng;atn~t hun m n cnmmal trial. Go-Bal'l lm]Jorting Co. \'.
Cmted otate~;, :21-12 U. S. :3+4. In tlw~r cireurn~tunr·P~. we> rannol ~ny
that ~uelt a wttnP~~ Jt< necp~ .-mrily ldt rrmeclilr:<~ in tlw facr of nn
unlawful ~rarch and sr1wn•,
~rand jm~·

,,
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Jm:mcE PowELL delivered the opinion of the

Court,
Th1s case presents the questwn whether a witness
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search
and seizure. This issue is of considerable importance to
the administration of criminal justicP,

I
On December 11, 1970, federa.l agents obtained a
warrallt authorizing a search of respondent 'John Calandra's place of busmess, the Royal Machine and Tool
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued
111 connection with an extensive investigation of suspected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of
hookmakmg records and wagering paraphenalia. A
master affidav1t submitted in support of the application
for the warrant contained information derived from statements by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau
Qf Investigation ( FBJ ), from physical surveillance con-

t·NTTED STATES
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rlucted by FBI agents. and from court-authorized elec~
tromc surveillattcc.'
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a
two-story building. The first floor consists of about
1:3,000 square feet and houses industrial n1achinery and
inventory . Tht> second floor contams a general office
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied
hy Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary.
On December 15, 1970. federal agents executed the warr-ant directed at ( 'alandra's place of bus1ness and conducted a thorough four-hour search of the premises. The
record rf:'veals that the agents spent more than three
hours searching Calandra's office and files.
Although the agents found uo gambling paraphernalia,
one discovered. among certain promissory notes, a card
1ndicatmg that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making
penodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an
affidavit that he was aware that the United 8tates Attorney 's office for the Northern District of Ohio was investigating possible violations of 18 P. S. C. §§ 8Q2, 893,
and 894, dealing with extortionate credit transactions, and
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loansharklllg" enterprise thf'u under investigation. The agent
concluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized
along with various other Items, including books and
records of tlw company. stock certificates, and address
books.
On March 1. 1971. a special grand .Jury convened in
the Northem District of Ohio to investigate possible
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The
'On tlw ba~1s of thr ~amr atlidavlt, fPdPral H!!;l'llt~ abo obtained
nuthonz!ltp: ~Par(']H•:-: of Crdaudra.'~ re:>td<'IH'(' and automol))!P . Tlw pn>:·wnt ra~e tnvolv!'~ onlY tlw "Parrh of tlw Hoval
\la<'hUH' and Tool Compan,\ .
•
warrnnt~

72-7~4-0PINION

l"NITED STATES v. CALANDRA

grand jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him
questions based on the evidence seized during the search
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandr1:1
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, l971, but
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privileged against self-incrimination. The Government then
requested the District Court to grant Calandra transactional immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § ~5l4.
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the
hearing on thE' Government's application for the irnmunity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress
the evidence seized in the search.
.
Calandra then moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and,
return of the seized evidence on the grounds that the
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that
the ' se~:~-rch exceeded the scope of the warrant. On
August 27, the pistrict Court held a hearing at which
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer
questiOns based on the seized materials. On October 1..
the District Court entered Its judgment ordering the
evideuce suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordering that Calandra qeed not answer any of the
grand Jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence.
332 F Rupp. 737 (l971) . The court stated that "due
process . . allows a witness to litigate the question
whether the evHience which constitutes the basis for the
questions asked of him before the grand jury has b,een
obtawed m a way which violates the constitutional protectwu agamst unlawful search and seizure.'' 332 F .
Supp., at 742. The court found that the search warrant
had beeu Issued without probable cause and that the
search had exceeded the scope of the warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the ~ixth Circuit affirmed,
t65 F 2d 12l8 ( 1972) , holding that the District Court
h'lld properly Pnt.ertamed the suppression motion and

'

'
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that the exclusiOnary rule may be wvoked by a witness
bf'fore the grand JUry to bar questioning based on evidence obtained i11 an uulawful search and seizure! The
offer to grant Calandra unmunity was deemed Irrelevant.
46.'> F 2d, at 1221
We grantf'd the GovcmnH'nt's petitwn for certiorari,
Ht W7:3l We now rf'venw.

-- e

H
ThP instttut io11 of the grand jury is deeply rooted in
Auglo-American history.'1 In England, the grand JUry
Herved for centunes both as a body of accusers sworn
to discover ami present for trial persons suspected of
cl'irnitlal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against
arbitrary aud oppressive governmental action. In this
country the Founders thought the grand JUry so essential
to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only
he 111stituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand
.1ury" Costello v (lnited States, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362
( 1956 ). Tlw grand JUry's historic functions survive to
this day. Its respousibili ty 111 our constitutional framework includes both the df'termination whether there is
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed
and the protPction of citizens against unfounded criminal
2

Thl~

Court of

AppPHL~

alfirnwd t h<'

Dt~t net

Court'IS finding that

tlw ::;rarrh of Calandra's busuw;;s and setzurP of his property wa:s
unlawful Although thr Gowrnmt•nt doe:; not agree with the court's
finding, it ha::. not "ought rPviPw of t hts l$Slll'
~ For a discussion of the lu:;tory and rolP of tlw grand Jury , see
rostello v ( Tn!trd 8tates, 350 l' S. :359, :31H-:3H:! (1956); Blail' \' ,
( 'nited 8tatr.s. 250 l1 S. 27:1, 279-21-\:~ (1919); Hale v. Henk~<l , 201
11 ~ 4;{, 59 (J90ti), -l Blnck,.;tour C'ommentanr:; :301 et seq.; G. Edward::<, The Urand .Jury 1-·!4 (1901i), 1 F Pollock and F . :vi:utlund,

l·IJ;;tury of Engltsh Law 151 (2d eel. 1909): 1 W.
•.1l Engh~h Law :U2_-;{.~:~ 17th n•v PC! ~95f1l.

Hold~worth,

History
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prosecutwns. Branzbur(J v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686687 (1972) .
Traditwnally the grand jury has been accorded wide
latitude to mqmre into violations of criminal law. No
judge presides to momtor Its proo~edings:' It deliberates
111 secret and may determine alone the course of its
1nquiry. Th(:' grand jury may compel the production of
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers
appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained
hy thP technical procedural and evidentiary rules govern~
mg the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a grand inquest,
a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the
scope of whose inquiry is not to be limited by cjoubts
whether any particular individual will be properly sub.l.ect to an accusation of crime." Blair v. United States,
'250

r. s.

273. 2s2 ( 1919)

ThP scope of the grand JUry's power reflects Its special
role Ill msuring fair and effectivE> law enforcement. A
graud JUry proceeding JS not an adversary hearing m
which the guilt or mnocence of the accused is adjudicated. .Rather. 1t IS an ex parte investigation to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether
rnminal proceedmgs should bf' mstjtuted against any
person. The grand .1ury's mvestigative power must be
broad 1f Its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged. Brauzbur(l v. Hayes, supra, Costello v. United

S.tates, supra .
· Thr grand jur). ol rour~P . 1~ ~ubwct to thl' euurt's ~upervision
in sevt'ral rPspPc·t~ See Brou•n \'. United States. 359 ll. S. 41, 49
(Hl59J . Hule::< fi awl li . F'<'rf Bulr Cnm Pror, L. OrfiPld. Crnrpnal
Procedure" UndN tht' F'ed<'ral HuiP~. 475-477 (1966). [n particular,
th<• grand .JIIl'Y mu,;t rel~· ou the eourt to comp<'l procluctwn of
hnoh, pnp<• r~< . dO<'IIIlH'IIt,., ami thP te~tunony of wttnP!l~e~ . :wd tlw
<·ourt may quaiih or mod1f~· a ~uupoena on motwn if compliance
wqnJd lw ' tmr<>a~onahlr or oppr<•.~,;tv~>" HuiP 17 (rl. Fr.-d Rule
(.;':tim. Pt (oo •
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In HratLzburg , the Court had occas10p to reaffirm the
importance of the grand jury's role .
'' [T]hP mvestigatwn of crime by a grand jury imple~
ments a fundamental governmental role of securrng the safety of the person and the property of the
cr t1zen
· 40R l'. ~ .. at 700.
"The role of the grand jury as an important
Instrument of effect1ve law enforcement necessarily
Ill eludes an investigative function with respect to
determimng whether a crime has been committed
and who committed 1t . . . 'When the grand jury
ts performing 1ts investtgatory function into a genPral problem ar·ea ... soc1ety's interest is best servf:ld
by a thorough and extensive 111 vestigation.' Wood
v Georgia, 370 l'. ::-l. 375, 392 ( 1962). A grand
,lury mvestigabqn 'is not fully carried out until
Pvery av11ilable clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime
has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429
F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation
may be triggered by t1ps, rumors, evidence proferred
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S.,
at 362. H JS only after the grand jury has ex11mined
the evidence that a determination of whether the
prom..edillg will result in an JtldJOtmf'nt can be
madP . . " I d., at 701 ,

I'lw graud JUry 's sources of wformatwn are w1dely
drawn, and the validity of an mdictment is not !lffected
by the charfl.cter of the evidence considered. Thus, 1'\.B
· mdictmeut valid on Its face is not subject to ch!lllenge
on the ground that the grand JUry acted ou the basis of
rnadf'quate or rncompetent evidence, Costello v. United
States, supra, lfolt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 .
flHl 0) ; or pven otr the bu.sis of mformation obtained m
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violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
agawst self-incrimiuation. Um:ted States v. Lawn, 355
{' ~ . 33~) (1958)
The power of t,b.Q Go¥er·
to compel persons to
appear and testify before a grancl jury is also firmly
established . Kasti(Jar v. United States, 406 lJ. S. 441
l1972) . The duty to testify has long been recognized
f.l,s a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Government. Blackmer \'. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438
( 1932); United States v. Bryan, 3:19 U. ~. 323,331 (1950).
In Rranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. ~ .. at 688, the Court
noted that "I c Jitizetls generally are not immu11e from
grand .il.lry subpoenas
. .. allf! that "the longstanding
pnnciplr that 'the public has a right to everyman 's
ts particularly applicable to grand jury
evidence '
proceedings. " The duty to testify may 011 occasion be
burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury
to a witness' social and economw status. Yet the duty
to testify has been regarded as 11 SO necessary to the
auministratlOil of JUStice" that the witness' persona)
tnterest ' 111 privacy must yield to the public's overriding
mterest 111 full disclosure. Blair v United States, 250
r S., at 281. Furthermore, a Witness may not iuterfere
wtth the course of the grand jury's inquiry . He "is not
rntitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy,
such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his."
/d ., at 282. Nor is he entitlerl "to challenge the authortty of the Court or the granrl JUry" or "to set limits to
the 111 vesttgation that. the grand .) ury may conduct."
lbtd
Of course , the grand jury's subpoena power is not
unlimited It may constder incompetent evidence, but
tt may not ttself vwlate a valid privilege, whether
established by the Constitution. statutes. or the cornown law Rmnzbnry ' Hayes, supra; Tlnited States
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y Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. l:nited States, supra; 8
J Wigmore, Evidence, ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev.

1~~!.1-JWhen tne grand jury itself threatens to cmnmi
~IJ&,. it may be restrained! Although~eA~.amp)e~
__....-indictment baseq on evidence obtained 111 violation of --z7
a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege IS nevertheless
valid, U niled States \'. Lawn, supra, the grand jury
may not force a witness to answer questions in violation
of that constitution11l guarantee. Rather, the grancl jury
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witness IS granted unmumty co-extensive with the privilege
agaHlSt self-mcnminatwn. Kastigar v. United States,
supra. Similarly, a grand Jury may not compel a person
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him ..
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. :::l. 616, 633-635 (1886).
Cf. Couch v. Umted States, 409 U. S. 322 ( 1973). The
grand .1ury is also without power to invade 11 legitimate
privacy mterest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
A grand jury's subpoena duces Lecum will be disallowed
if it JS "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
1·easonable under ~he Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43.76 (1£!Q,6).jAira p;·esumably grand~,..
.turors who "t'hemselves threaten to conduct an illegal
Gl
~h may be restrained like auy others.! Judici11l intervention IS appropriate in such case~se it ~ pte..
~-t·A- • ~
~ th~ wmug ·befor& it ocetJrR.
~ ~

tf

-/-u

Til
ln the instant c~:tse, the Court of Appeals held that
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also
lilnits the , grand ·.Jury's power to compel a witness to
answer questions based on evidence obtained from an
unlawful search and seizur~. The exclusionary rule was
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of
all citizens l(to be secure in their houses. papers, and
f]ffectR, agau1st. unrrasonable searches and seizures . .. ,'''

-----w.- -

&,-r.i·(~
t
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Under this rule. evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure . Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914);
Mapp v. Ohio , 367 P. S. 643 (1961). This prohibition
applirs as well to the fruits of ~he illegally seized evidence. Jll 'ong Sun v Uuited States, 371 U. S. 471 ( 1963);
Silverthorne Lumber Co . v. United States, 251 U. S. 385
( 1920) .
The purpose of the excluswuary rule is not to redress
·t,he lllJUry to the privacy of the search victim.
" [ T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too
late." Linkletter \' Walker, 381 U . S. 618, 637
(1965)
Instead, the rule IS designed to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search
and se1zurrs :
" The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way- by removing the incentive to disregard
1t ·• Elkins \' f'nited States , 364 U. S. 206, 217
( 1960 ).
Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan
v. United States, ex rel . Shot , 382 U . S. 406, 416 ( 1966);
T erry v. Ohio, 3fl2 U. S. 1. 29 ( 1968) . In sum, the rule
is a Judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
rffect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieVf•d "
TIH•re 1::. ~onw ch~agreenwm a ~ to the prnct1cal efficacy of the
l'X<'Iuswnar,y rul!•, and a:< 1lw Court notPcl iu Elkin,~ v. United States,
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DPspitE' its broad deterre11t purpose, the exclusionary
t·uiP has never bePn interpreted to proscribe the use of
illegally-seized evJdencP Ill all proceedings or against all
pPrsc)ns. As with any remedial device, the applioati011
of thP rule has been restricted to those areas where
i'ts remedial ob:wctives are thought rpost efficaciously
serwt'!. ThP balancing process implicit in this approach
1s expressed in the pontours of the Stltnding require·
ment. Thus, standiqg t.o invoke the exclusionary rule
has been confined to situations where the Government seeks to usf' such evidence to incriminate the
v1ctim of the unlawful search. Brown v. United States,
411 U. S. 22~ ( 1973); Alderman v. United States, 394
F . S. 165 ( 1969), Wong Sun v. United States, supra;
Jones v. United 8tates, 362 U. ~. 257 ( 1H60). This
standing rule is premised on a recognition that t.he need
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the
t'VIdence are strongest where the Government's unlawful
c~onduct would result in imposition of a criminal sapction
on the victim of the search ~>
;{()4 U. S. :.!01-i, 211- (HHiO), rt'!Pvnnt " [r]mp•rical ~tatistico; are not
avallaiJlc·.' Cf. Oak~. Studymg th<' Exclu:;wnary nufe m Search
and SPJZill'l', ;n P C'h1. L. HPv. 6()5 (1970). We have no occao;wn
in the· prP;:mt c·a~r to c·onsJf[Pr tlw oxtent of the rule'~; efficacy in
<'l'lllllllal ti'J:t]lu In holdm~?: that tlw re,;pon<lrnt had stamlmg to invoke the exclu'~!Onary rule m a gmnd JUI'~' proceechng::-:, the Court of Appeal;; relied
on Rul<' 41 (P) of t!JP Federal Rul<'i:i of Cnminal Procedure. Rule
41 (e) providrs, Ill rPlt•vant part, that '' fa] person aggrieved by an
unlawful ~Parch and :;(•Izurp may mov(' th<' d1stnct court . . for
retmn of the property and to supprP~~ for nsr a~ evic!ence> anything·
so obtamrd.
' It furtlwr o;tat<'i:i that ''lt]he motion shall be
made b<'fort• tnal o1· hranng.
\VP havr rpcogmz<:'d that Rule·
41 (<') 1:; "no broadPr than the coustnutwnal rulr." Alderman v.
( 'mted State~'. :394 l t. S .. at 17:3, n. (l; Jones v. United States, 362·
''.. H. 2,"Ji (l!:lf\0 l
Sm<'e t lw Governnwnt ha::; not rhnllcngecl the·
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IV
[n deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential ~
injury to the historic role and functions of the grand
_.-- ~~~ • LJ, 9.._
~
111
Jury against the potential benefits of the rule as ap- _ ,.,~~
lf..6ct-:
plied in this context. It is evident that this~ exten.
tion of the exclusionary rule would seriously undercut
the role of the grand .1 ury. Because the grand .i ury
does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has
iraditiOllally been allowed to pursue its investigative
and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary a,nd procedural restrictions a,pplicable to a
criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the exclusioqary rule before a grand jury would precipitate
adJudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on
the merits and occasion delay and disruption of grand
Jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the
orderly progress of an investig11tion and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related
to the grand jury's primary objective. 7 The probable
result would be "protracted interruptions of grand jury
proceedings," Gelbard v. United States, 408 l..J. S. 41, 70
(1972) (WHITE. J .. concurring). effectively transforming
D1st rirt Court '::; order directing rrturn of t hr illcgally-;,;eizPd property
In rr~pondc·nt . wr do not rParh that l~i>tW .
Tlw Court of AppPal~ ubo found th(lt til<' Gowrnmf'nt 's offer of
inunu1nty und!'r 18 ( l. 8 C. § 2514 wa;; irr<'l!'vant to l'!'lSj)OI'\denes
-..ramlmg to mvokP tlw !'Xclu~ronary rule . We argue with that dctermmntwn for thr rpa,;om; ~tated m Part~ Ill, TV, apd V of this
opiuron.
. Thr forrP of I hi:- argunwnt i~ \V(')) IllUstrated hy the facts or
IIJP pr<'lSent. ca::;t·. A~ or the dut<' of th1~ deciswn, more tlum two
and on(•-half yt-ar:s w111 hav<> t•laps<'d ~incr Calandra was :summoned
to appear and te:st!l'y b<>ror<' the grand JUry. If Calandra's testimon.\' wa:; v1tal to grand ]my 's rnv~t1gation rn August . 1971 of
<\Xtortwnat!l cred11 ti'Hnsartronb, 1t I~> po:s::Hble that this particular
i tlVr::-tlgatloll h<
t." lwt•IJ rompletPI;> fru;:;trat!'d ,
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them into preliminary tnals on the merits. In some
eases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the
(•riminal law. .Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclinatiou to allow litigious interference with grand jury
proceedings :
" Any holding that would saddle the grand jury
wit,h mini-trials and preliminary showing would
assuredly impede its investigation and frustr11te the
public's interest in the fair and expeditious adminIStration of the criminal law." United States v.
Dionisio, 410 P . S. 1. 17 ( 1973) .
Cf. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 ( 1971); Cobbled-ick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940). In sum,
we believe that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke
the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the
effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's
duties.
Against this potential damage to the role and functwns of the grand jury, we must weigh the be11efits to
he derived from this proposed extcnsiop of the exclusiopary rule. Suppression of the use of illegally-seizeq
evidence against the search vwtim in a criminal trial
is thought to be an important method of effectuating
the Fourth Amendment. But it does not follow that the
Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal
that might deter police misconduct. In Aldermrt-'n v.
{1 nited States, 384 U. ~ .. at 174. for example, this Court
declined to extend the exclusionary rule tq ope who was
not the victim of the unlawful search :
''The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated
have been considered sufficient to .justify the !:!Uppression of probatiw evidence even though the case
against thr defendant is weak<'twd or destroyed.
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Wt> adhPre to that JUdgment. But we are not convmced that the additional benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evia
dence which exposes the truth."
\V P think this observation equally applicable in the
present context.
Any incremental deterrent effect which might be
achirved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedmgs is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrent effect t:nay
rrsult from the exclusion of illegally-seized evidence front
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would sigtuficantjy affect police conduct. Such an extension would
deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand
jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the requirement of th<' fourth Amendment in order to obtaitt an wdictment from a grand jury is substantially
negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally-seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution pf the search
vtctun. For the most part, a prosecutor would be unlikely to reql.lcst an indictment where a connection could
not bP obtai ned. We therefore decline to embrace a
view that would achieve a speculative ami undoubtedly
minimal advance in the deterrt~nce of police misconduct
at the cxpens€' of substantially impeding the role of the
11:rand ,I ury '
' Hr~pondPnt n>IIP;o; prnnanl~· on 8tlverthome Lumber Co. v. United
.'\tale~. :.!51 l'. S. ;)1{5 (1920) . In thai C'a"e, feqernJ officers unlawfully
"l'tZPd <'Prtam documPnt::; [)('longmg to tlw StlvPrthornC'~ and then·
hnnbt•r <·ornpun~· and prp;;pnted tlwm ron grand Jur~· that had nln•ady
utdu•tf>d t hr Stlvrrthonw, , A dto;t rtrt eottrt ordPr<>d thr return of the-
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Respondeut also argues that each and every question
based on evideuce obtained from an illegal search and
se1zure cons~itutes a fresh and independent violation of
tloeumentH but Impounded photogrnphs nnd ropje;; of the original:,;,
Later, the prosrcutor cau~ed the grand jury to is~ur ~ubpoenas duces
tec·um ro t hr 8IIverthom!'1:i to producr the originals, und thmr refusal
to comply led to a contrmpt ritution. In reversing the judgme11t,
the Court held thnt thr ;,;ubpoenn:s were uwnlid brcnpse they were
lm;sed on knowledge obtained from thr il!egnl!y seized evide1we, citing
Weeks v. United States, stt]n·a. l\J r . .Justice Holmrs, writing for the
Court, Ht ntrd that the "('l;~:>rnce of the provi~ion forbiclcliilg tlH'
apquisitiOn of Pvidencr 111 n certnin wny is not merely that the
OVJJlrnce :so acqUired Hhall not be used before thr Court but that
it. shill! not be q~ed at all." 251 U. S. at 392.
Silverthorne Js distinguishable from the present case in several
rrspct•1s. There, the Silverthornes hnd previously been incliotod by
the grand jury und had st11nding to iqvok(l the exclusionary rule on
the bns1s of their ~tntq8 Hs crimmnl defenclants. The Govermnent's·
111terest m reca]Jtunng the anginal docum<,nts wns obvioqsly based on
a belief that they might be useful m fl criminal prosecution. Indeed,
the pnmary con:s('quence of thr Court's decision wa~ to Pxcludethe evjdenre from thr ~qbr;rquent criminal triaL Furthermore, priOI'
to thr I~sunnce of the grnnd jt1ry subpornus there 11ad bern u juqjoial
detcrmmation th11t tju• ~rarch nnd se1zure was illegaL The Silver-.
thorne8' claim wn:s not rnjs(ld for the first time in pre-indictmen~
motJOJJ to supprei:i.~.
By contrast, m the instant ca~(l responqent hncl not bern 111clicted
by the grand Jlli'Y nnd was not u criminal defendant. Under tradi-.
twnal PrlllCipje~;, he had no :stand1ng to mvoke the rxclusionary rqlo ..
The rffect of the Di~trict Court's order was to deprive the grand
.1ury of te8timony It needed to eonduct 1ts investig11tion. Lastly,
rrsponclrnt's motion to 1mppres.,; was maqe prior 1o indktment anct_
reqmred mterruptwn of thr grand jury proce(ldings. In these mrenmstances, ·Silvertho1'1/e Is not controlling, To the extent that the·
( 'mirt's broad d1ctum m1ght be con~:;t n)ed to ~uggrst a ditff~r~nt rr~ult m t t'Je present cnsc, we note that It ha:> bern substantially under• .
minf'd by laH•r cnses. 8ee Pnrts lll nnd IV of thll:l opinion .
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the witness' constitutional rights." Ordinarily, of course,
a witness has no right of privacy before the granct jury.
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every
rn11.n owes his testimony . He rpa invoke his fifth
Amendp1ent privilege agains se -incrimination, ut e
may not decline to answer on the grounds that his
responses might prove ~mbarrassing or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v. United
States, supra. Respondent's ' claim must be, therefore,
not merely that the grand jury's questions ipvade his
privacy but that because those questions are based on
illegally-obtained evidence, they somehow constitute distinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We
disagree.
The pl!rpose of the .fourth Amendm~nt is to prevent
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privapy
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong
conctemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, committed in this case, is fully accomplished by the origil1al
search without probable cause. Grand jury questions
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no inctependent governmental invasion of one's person, house, pfl,pers,
• At oral argument . connsrl for rPspondent statPd the contention
as follows ·

' 1 subrntt to thP Court that each question asked of qw Respondent before the grflnd jttry, whirh qurstipn was only asked pecause
of a pao;t violation of the fourth Amendment, ramottnts to] a new,
qnmediate violntwn of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] qJ.JeStipn
qerived from a pu t violatwn, n question into the privncy pf thf:l
wttnes~S ;tmo~mts t.o another intrusiop in vwlatwn of tile Fourth
Amendment' ' Tr. of Ornl Arg. 17.
· [H]Pfu~mg to answPr u q~testion ill which the question oqnc(:livftbly
i:,. derived from a past violation of 1he Fourtn Amendwent, gives
nsr \O an addtttonnl or new Fourtll Amet1dme11t rigpt to r!')si&i
i!'hswering that qq<·stiort becnl)sP tlw que~tion itself hepomes an
adclittonnl mt-rn~wn
Tr_ of Or11l Arg. 20.

'

.
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or effects, but rather thf' usual abridgement of personal
privacy common to all grand jury questioning. Questions based on illegally-obtained evidence are only a
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search
and seizure. They work no new wrong. Whether such
derivative use of illegally-obtained evidence by a grand
jury should be proscribed presents a question not of
rights but of remedies.
In the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizure but also any derivative use of that
evidence. The prohibition of the exclusionary rule must
reach such derivative usc if it is to fulfill its function of
deterring police misconduct. In the context of a grand
jury proceeding, we believe that the damage to that
institution ~a-n t~tenfloie.l4~xolusionary
~
outweighs any possible incremental deterrent effect. ~l conclusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an unlawful
·
----search and seiwre and any question or evidence derived
therefrom.' 0 The same considerations of logic and policy
apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure
and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not distinguish between them.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
lt ~hould he notc•d that, rvrn :tbl:'Pnt tli<' <'xdu~IO!I:tr.'· rule, a
grand Jury wit np;;:,; ma~· ha V<' nt hrr rrm('(li<·~ to rPd rr~;; t lw inj my to
hi::; pnvaey and to Jll'f'V<'llt a ftnilwr 111va~ion in tlw fut un•. Hr may
b<• entitlf'd to mmntain a rausr of ::~rtion for dHJnagf's ag;nin;;t the
officer;; who concluctf'd tllP unlawful Hf'arch. Bivens v. Si:r Unlmown
Named AgPnts of the Federal Bureau of fnuestigat.ion. 40:3 U. S. :381-1
(1971) . He may also ::;f'f'k rf'tum of the illf'gall~·-~f'izPd pro]Wl't~ · .
nnd exrlmuon of thr propNt~· and itH fruit" from bring u:;rd ns cvidenrf' a~am:-;t hun 111 a cnmmal 1rial. Go-Bart lmportiug Co. v.
Umted States, 282 U. S. 344. In thPHC cireum~tanC'f•:s, we canuo1 say
that l:'ll<'h a Wl1nr~~ i:o neceo::sanly lf'ft remrclile:ss in thr face of an
unlawful srar<'h and sr1zurr ,
'
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MR. Jus•rJCE Pow~~LL delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
This case presents the question whether a witness
summoued to appear and testify before a grand jury
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search
and seizure. The issue is of considerable importance to
the administration of criminal justice,

I
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a
warr;:tnt authorizing a search of respondent John Calandra's place of business. the Royal Machine and Tool
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The• warrant was issued
in connection with an extensive investigation of suspected illegal gambliug operations. It specified tpat the
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of
bookmaking records and wagering paraphenalia. A
master affidavit submitted in support of the application
for the warn:wt co11tained information qerived fro~n state-·
rnents by confidential informants to the Federal l3ureau
of Investigation (FBI), from physical surveillance con~·
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ducted by FBI agents. and from court-authorized elec·
tronic surveillance.'
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a
two-story building. The first ftoor consists of about
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and
.inventory. The second floor contaws a general office
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied
by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary.
On December 15, 1970. federal agents executed the warrant directed at Calandra's place of business and conducted a thorough, four-hour search of the premises. The
record reveals that the ageuts spent more than three
hours searching Calandra's office and files.
Although the agents found no gambling paraphernalia,
one discovered, among oertain promissory notes, a card
mdicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making
periodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an
affidavit that he was aware that the United t;tates Attorney's office for the Northern District of Ohio was investigating possiple violations of 18 l'. S. C'. ~ ~ 892, 893,
and ~D4, dealing with extortionate credit transactions, and
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loanshark"
ing'' enterprise then under investigatioq, The agent
cpucluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized
along with various other items. including books and
records of tho company. stock certificates, and address
books.
On March 1. 19n. a special grand JUry was convened
in the Northern District pf Ohio to investigate possible
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The·
On tlw hn~t" of the ~amr affidn \'tt. f('d('ra) ag<mt:s al:so obtained
warrl\nt::; authortzing; ~rarehe~ of C11landra'~ rr:sidrncc and antomobtle. Thr prr:sent ra:sr mvolve~ only tho :;('a rch of the Royal
Mn,rhinP and Tool C'ompan~ ..
1
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grand jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him
questions based on the evidence seized during the search
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra
appeared before the grand jury 011 August 17, 1971, but
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privileged against self-incrimination. The Government then
requested the District Court to grant Calandra transactional immunity pursuant to 18 u. s. c. § 2514:
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the
hearing on the Government's application for the immumty order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress
the evidence seized in the search .
1
.
'
Calandra later moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the
.Federal Rules of Cnminal Procedure for' suppression and
return of the seized evidenc<' on the grounds that the
affidavit supporting the warrapt was insufficient and that
the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On
August 27, the Distnct Court held a hearing at which
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer
questions based on the seized materials. On October 1,
the District Court entered its JUdgment ordering the
evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and fur.:
ther ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the
grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence.·
In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737 (1971). The court held
that "due process . . . allows a witness to litigate the question whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for
the questions asked of him before the grand jury has been
obtained in a way which violates the constitutional pro~ectiOl~ agamst unlawful search and seizure.'' ld., at
742. The court found that the search warrant had
been issued without probable cause &nd that the search
had exceeded the scope of the warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit f\ffirmed ,
holding that the District Court had properly entertained·
the suppression motion and that the exclusionary rule

7'2-7:3-1.--0PiNlON
l 7NJTED STATE..~

4

1' .

CALANDRA

may be invoked by a witness before the grand jury to
bar questioning basPd on evidence obtained in an unlawful search ami seizure." United States v. Calandra, 465
F . 2d 1218 (1972). Tlw offer to grant Calandra immunity was deemed irrelrvant. ld., at 1221.
Wc gran ted thr GovPmrnen t's petition for certiorari,
U, S (1073) , We now reverse.

lT
The mstJtution of the grand JUry is deeply rooted in
Anglo-American history:' 1 n England. the grand jury
served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn
to discover and preseut for trial persons suspected of
criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against
arbitrary and oppressivr governmental action. In this
country the Founders thought the grand jury so essential
to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes cau only
be instituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand
JUry." Costello v. United States, a50 U. R. 359, 361-362
(H)56). The grand JUry's historic functions survive to
this day . Its responsibilities continue to include both
the determination ·whether then· is probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed and the protection
~ The Court uf AppP:d~ anlrnwtl t hr Dtiit net Court·~ finding that
the ~;Pa rch of Cnlaml.m',.; llll~inP:<" and ,.;pizun• of hi;; property was
unlawful. 41i5 F . 2d, at 122ti. 11. 5. AIt hough tlH• Governml'nt does
not ngn•e with t lw eourt '" find itt~?:. It lw::: not "ought reviPw of thi~;
l~iiiH' .

For a tli,.;cu~"'wn of the IHHtory nnd mlt• of th<• grand JUry, ~ee
Costello r. Umted States, :3W U. S. :359. :3(i]-:3G~ (195!1); Blair v.
l 'nited .States; 250 U. S.. :!7:3, 27!:J-2i':3 ( J!:Jl9) ; Hall' v. 1/enkel, 201
U. S. 4:3, 59 (190ti); + Blnrk.,tonl' Commc•Htarie:-< :301 et seq.; G. Ed1\[ll'd;,:, Thr Grnnd .ftlr~· l-44 (l!.lOfl) ; l F. Polloek and F . Maitland,
History of Engli,.;h Lnw 151 (:ld ed. 1909); 1 W Holcbworth, Hi~tory
.o! Engh,;h Law :n2.- :32:3 (7th rev N1 195t:i)
'
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citizens against unfounded erimmal prosecutions.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 e. S. 665, 686-687 (1972).
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide
latitude to inquirE> into violations of criminal law. No
judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates
in secret and may determine alone the course of its
inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it consider&
appropriate, and its operation. genf)rally is unrestrained
by the technical procedural and ·evidep tiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. "It is, a grand inquest,
a body with powers of investigation ~nd inquisition, thd
scope of whose inquiry is not to bP- limited by doubts
whether any particular individual will be properly sub~
ject to an accusation of crime. '' Blair v. United States!
250 U. S. 27B, 282 (1919)
. The scope of the grand JUry's powers reflects Its special
role in insuring fair and rffective law enforcement. A
grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in
which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, It is an e:r parte mvestigation to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether
criminal proceedings should be instituted against any
person. The grand Jury's investigative power must be
broad if its public responsibility is acjequately to be discharged. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra,: Costello v. United

States, supra.
[n Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the
importance of the grand jury's role .
" [T]he investigation of crime by a grand JUry implements a fundament10ll govemmental role of securing the safety of the person and the property of the
citizen . , .. " 408 U R.. at 700
"The role of the grand jury as an important
i'nsttumen t of effecti Yf' law enfotcemen t necessarily
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includes an investigative function with respect to
determining whether a crime has been committed
and who committed it . . . . 'When the grand jury
is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area ... society's interest is best served
by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375. 392 (1962). A grand
jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until
every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime
has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429
F . 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation
may be triggered by tips, rumors. evidence proferred
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S.,
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined
the evidence that a determination of whether the
proceeding will result in an indictment can be
made . . . .'' I d., at 701.
The grand jury's sources of information are widely
drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an
indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of
inac!equate or incompetent evidence. Costello v. United
States, supra; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 2~5
(1910), or even on the basis of information obtained in
violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, United States v. Lawn, 355
U.S. 339 (1958) .
The power of a fedeq:tl court to compel persons to
appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly
established. Kastigar Y. United States, 406 U. S. 441
(1972). The duty to testify has long been recognized
as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Govern-

r.

•. ,
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tnent. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438
(1932); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 688. the Court
noted that 11 [ c] itizens generally are not immune from
grand jury subpoenas .... " and that ''tlw longstancHng
principle that 'the public has a right to everyman's
evidence' .. . is particularly l;lpplicable to grand j\-lrY.
proceedings." The duty to testify may on occasion pe
Qurdensome and even embarrassing. It may ca1.1se injury
t,o a witness' social and economic status. Yet the du~y
to testify has been regarded as "so necessary to the
administration of justice" t!1at the witness' persona~
inter(3st in privacy must yiel4 to the public's overriqin~
interest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250
U. S., at 281. Furthermore, ~ witness may not interferj3
with the course of the grand jury's inquiry. He "is not
entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevalWY,
such as a Pllrty might raise, for this is no concern of his."
ld., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the author-,
ity of the Court or the granq .iLJry" or "to set limits to
tbe investigation that the grand jury may conquot."
Ibid.
Of course, the grand jury's subpoena power is not
LJnlimited.' It may consider incompetent evidence, but
it may not itself violate a valid privilege, whl'lther
established by the Constitution, statutes, or the oom·
mon law. Rmnzburg v. Hayes, 81.tpra; Uniteq Statf!S
The grand jury is ~ubject tq the court's ~upervision in several/
respects. See Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 49 (1959);
Rules 6 and 17, Feel. Rulr Crim. Proc.; L. Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Hub , 475-477 (1966). In particu lar,
the grand jury must rei~· on the court to compel production of
books, papers, documrni;:;, and thr trstimony of witnessrs, n11d the
court may quash or· modify a ~ubpoena on motion if comp!irtnpe
')\'Ould be '·unreasonable or opprcs~ive." Rule 17 (c) , Fed. Rt~!e
Cr\m, Proc,
4
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v. Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; 8'
J. Wigmore, Evidence, ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev.

I

ed. 1961). Although, for example, an indictment based'
on evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege is nevertheless valid, United'
States v. Lawn, supra, the grand jury may not force•
a witness to answer questions in violation of that
constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury may
(')Verride a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witltess is granteq immunity co-extensive with the privilege'
against self-inc~imination. Kastigar v. United States,
supra. Similarly, a grand Jury may not compel a persorr
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633-635 (1886).
Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 (1973). The
grand jury is also without power to invade a legitimate
priyacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
A grand jury's subpoena duces lecurn will be disallowed.
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76 (1906). Judicial supervision is]
properly exercised 111 such cases to prevent the wrongbefore it occurrs.

III
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment limits
the grand jury's power to compel a witness to answer
questions based on evidence obtained from a prior \
unlawful search and seiz11re. The exclusionary rule was
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of
all citizens "to be secure in their houses, papers, and
effects, ftgainst qnreasonable searphes and seizures .... "
Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and sei-
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Weeks Y. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 "C. S. 643 ( 1961). This prohibition

zure.

applies as well to the fruits of the illegally sei?.ed evidence. Wo11g Sun v. United Slates, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385
( 1920) .
The purpose of the exclusiOnary rule is not to redress
the injury to the privacy of the search victim:
"[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too
late.'' Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U. S. 618, 637
(1965) .
Instead, the rule is designed to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee
of the Fourth Amendment against unroasonable search
and seizures :
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repjlir.
Tts purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively ava-ilable way-by removing the incentive to disregllrd
it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, ~17
( 1960).
Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 l". S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan
v. United States, ex rel. Shot, 382 U.S. 406, 4l6 (1966);

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. 29 (1968). In sum, the rple
Is a .i udicially-created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal consti~utional right of the
party aggrieved!'
i~ ~onw di~agrrrmrnt. ft>'

to the prnctiral efficacy of the
Court notrd m Elkins\' . United States,
rrl<'VIIIIi ''Jelmpiriral ~tati~ticH are not
.wntlabl<'." Cf Oak~ . Stuclyin~?: the Exclu~ionary Hule in Search.
" Thrrr

Pxclu~wnnr~· n!lr, and a:; tlw
:~()..[ IT. S. :206, 21~ (19(}0).

'.
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Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusion::try
t·ule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use ot
iilegally-seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons. As with any remedial devic<>. the application
of the rule has been restricted to those areas where
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously'
Rt'rved . The balancing process implicit in this approach
is expr-essed m the contours of the standing require~
mrnt. Thus, standing w Invoke the exclusionary rule
has been confined to situations where the Government s<>eks to usc such evidence to Incriminate the
victim of the unlawful search. Brown \'. United States,
411 C. !-1. 223 ( 1973) ; Alderman v. United States, 394
l'. ~- 1ti5 ( 1969) ; Wony Sun \'. Um,ted States, S'IJ,pra,
Jones ,. United States, 362 U. ~- 257 (1960) . This
standing rt.JI<' IS premised on a recogmtion th11t the need
for deterrence and hence the ration~le for excluding the
evidence ar<> strongest where thP Governrnent's unlawful
conduct would result in Imposition of a criminal sanction
on tlw vietim of tlw search "
and ::3rtzun•, :37 l '. l'il1. L. Hev. (i(i5 (l!:liOJ. Wr have no occasion
111 t h(' pn,~r nt case to ron~tdrr the <·xt rnt of the rule's efficacy m
t'flllltllal t rta I ~
" In holding that tlw t'Pspond<•ttt had standmg to invoke the rxclu~ lllllnry rul<' tn a grand Jur~· prorPrdmg~ . till' Court of AppPab relied
on Rulr -ll (<' ),~'rd. HuiP Crim. l'ro(' . 465 F. :Zd, at 1222-1224. Rul(l
41 (<') provtdr~. tn rPirv:tnt part, that "I aj pcroon aggrieved by .un
unlawful ~eareh and ~etzurt> may movP thp dii:itrict court . . for
r·eturn of the prop P rt~ · and to ~upprP~~ for tl~<· n:; rviclence anythi ng
:;o obtnmcd . .
It further ~tate~ that "I tjhe motion sha ll be
madP beforP tnal or )l('nrmg. . ,. We• havp n·cognizPd that Rule
41 (e) lti " no broadt•r than tht> ronstt tutlonal rulP." Alderman v
C'nitr.d Statl'S, 394 U.S., at li:). n. B; Jone~ \. Uuited States. 362
l ' S. :25i (19110) Bqlr 41 (<'I. thPrl'f()rP. doe~ not conot ttute a statu- {
tory rxpan~wn of th<' excluston:tr~· ruiP ln addition, ~incc thP
Uovcrnn~<'l,l1 1"\n~ 1101 ch~tllrngPd tlw Dist rirt Court'>< order c!irecting
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TV
ln decrding whetlwr to 1~xtcnd tlw exclusiOnary rule
to grand jury proceedings, v\'<' must weigh the potential
lllj ury to the historic role and functions of the grand
jury against the potential benefits of the rul<' as applied in this context. It is evidt>nt that this extcntwn of the <'xclusionary ru]p would senously impede
tl11• grand .1 ury.
BPcause the grand .1 ury docs not
finally ad.1 udicatf' guilt or i nno<'en(•p, it has traditwnally been allow<'d to pursu1• · its investigative and
aceusatonal functions unim1wd<'d by tlw evidentiary
and procPdural restrictions applicabl<' to a criminal
tnal.
Permitting witn<'sses to invokP the exclusiOrf:;try ruh• b(•fon• a grand .JlH'Y would· preeipitate adjudication of issLH'S hithPrto r·ps(•rwd for the trial on
the merits and wou Jd delay and disrupt grand Jury proCe<'dings. :-iuppression hearings would halt the orderly
progrl'ss of an in vest1gation and might necessi taw
extended litigation of issu('S only tangentially related
to the grand JUry's primary ob.wctiv<'.' Tlw probable
result would be ''protracted interruptions of grand jury
proceedings." Gelbard ,. Cniled States, 408 L S. 41. 70
( 1972) (WHITE, L conCll!Ting). eff<'ctiv<'ly transfonnin~
rrt11n1 of t lw Iil<'jra li~·-~!'1ZC'd propl't'i ~· 1o t·c·,-pond!'llt. wP do not r·c·a('h J
I lu• rpH':'I lOll wlwthl·r t h<~t ordt•r w:1~ pi'OJH'r
Tht• Court ol .\pJwab :d"o found that t lw ( :on•rnml·nt '~ otft•r ol
munullJt~· undl'r II\ {' ~ . C. ~ ~.51-l wa~ tl'l'!'lr•vant to re~pond!•nt\
,..fandrng to tnvokt> tht• exf'iu,..tonar.\' rule·. -lti.~ I•' :!d. at U:Zl \\'P
:ll).l'l'<' \nth that drtPrmtllHtton for till' n•a,..on,.. ~tntr·d til Part,.. Ill. TV.
;tlld \' of tJlt,.. OJlllliOII
The• forc·r ol t ht~ :1t'j!lllll!'llt t,.. wl'll tlhr,-t ratt·d b~· the faet~ ol
till.' pn•,..c•nt ea,..t· A~ of the dntl' of tlu,.. dc•c·1~ton. morP than two
lllld otlt'-h:tlf .\'!'ill'" will hil\'l' Piap:'Pd ,..Ill('(' n•,-potHIPIII wa,. :'llllllli011PU
to :IJlJlP<tr and l<':'ttl\ hdor!' t lw grand Jill'~· If n·,..pmtdc•nt',.. tc•,-tt tnony wa~ nt:tl to grand .1111'<,.. 111\'(':'tigatton Ill .\ugu,..t 1971 of·
l'XIlHiton:tlp ('l'!'dtt ll'llll:'iil'IIOil,.., II I:'
pO,..:'tbl£- that tlu,.; ]J:tl'IH'IIiat•
itJVP,..tlg;tiiOll Jw,. b(•(•Jl ('OIIlpirtp]~· fl'll~ll'at('rL
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them mto prelinunary tnals on the nwnts. In sun1e
cases the delay might lw fatal to thr· etdurc<'llH'nt of tlw
criminal law. .Just last T<'rtn W<' n•affirnwd our disin-·
clination to allow litigious interfercne<' with gratl(l ,ILII'Y'
proceedings .
'Any holding that would saddk tlH' g;rand Jlll'Y
wtth mini-trials and pn'litninary showing would
assuredly impPdt' its inwstigation and frustrate th<public's interPst in the fair and E'xp<•ditious administration of tiH' eriminal law." l'11ited States , ..
Dio11isio, 410 C.~ . 1. 17 ( Hl7:3)

Cf. l 'nited 8lat.es \'. Hyan, 402 ('. S. ;)30 ( Hl71) ; Cobbledick ,., ( 'nited ~tales. :10\) l'. S. :32:3 ( Hl40). fn sum .
\\·e beli<'VC that allowing a grand j my witness to invoke
the exclusionary rule would unduly int('rfPre with the
C'ffectiw and <•xpeditious discharge of thl' grand jury's
duties.
Against this potential rlalltag<' to tlw role and functions of tlw grand jury. ,,.<' must wPigh tlw benefits t()
he d<'ri V<'d frO Ill tlJ is prO)JOS<'d <'Xti'IISiOtl of the <'XC] U~ionary ruh•.
~ltppn'ssion of tlw tiS<' of lllcgally-seized
c•videt1ee against the S('areh victim i 11 a erimi nal trial
ts thought to lw an important tnPtlwd of eff<,etuating
t.lw Fourth AnH'tHiment. But it do<•s t1ot folio\\' that thP
Fourth AuwrHlnwnt n•quir<'S adoption of <>very proposal'
that might d<'t<•r polie<' misconduct. In .tldermr111 \'.
Cnited States, :~!l4 l". ;-;.,at 174. for exan1pl<'. this Court
lfpeJin<'d to <'Xt<·ncl the exelusionary mk to otH' who was
11ot tlw \·ietim of tlw un]a,,·ftil search
"Th<' rktPrT<'tlt values of pt'PW'ntmg tlw rrwnmr
nation of thos<' whos<' rights tlw polie<• have ,·iolated
hav<' lw<·n eonsid<•r<>d suffieiPnt to JUstify the suppression of prohati\'<' <'vid<'nec' <'Ven though the ease
i;tgainst. tlw rkfPndattt! is wP:;IkPtled or d<>stroyed .
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WP adhen• to that ,IUdglltE'tlt. But we are uot convinced t,hat tlw additional IH'Jtdits of extending the
Pxel usionary rulE' to oLiwr defendants would justify
further c·neroaehnH'Ilt upon tlw puhlie interest in
prosfwutin~-~: tho::-c' aeeusl'd of crime and having t.hem
aeq ui tt<'d or con vwted on tlw basts of all tlw <WI'
cl<-'tlCC which expos<'s tlw t,ruth .' '

We thlllk this observation equally aJ)p'Iwabk• 111 the
prC'sent context.
Any inc,·enwntal deterrPnt pffeet which might be
achieved by t~xtend i ng tlw ru ]p to grand jury proceedings is UtlCPrtain at bt>st. \\"hatevc•r deterrance of policf' (
misconduct may n~sult frotn tht> c•xclusion of illegallyseized evidence from crlllllnal trials. it is u nrea]istie to
nsstlllH' that applicatiotl of the rule to' grl;ind JUry pmC<'<'dlllgs would significantly further that goal. ~uch au
extCilSJOll would d('tC'I' only police investigation COllscious]y din~eted toward the discovery of evidence solely
for use in a grand jury investigation. The tncentive to
disre~ard the requin•n1ent of the Fourth A111endment
sokly to obtain an indwtnwnt from a grand jury Is sub- f
stantially negated by the Inadlllissibility of the il1egally-·
seized cvidellee 111 a subsequent crimlllal prosecutio11 of
the ::-f'arch vietim. For tlw most part, a prosecutor would
!w unlikrly to request an indictment when' a couviction
could not be obtained. WP thereforr decline to embrace'
a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly
minimal advance i 11 the deterrPnce of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially tmpeding tJw rok of the
grand .1 ury ·
primnril~· on 81/Verthome Lumber Co. v. l'nlted
(19201 ln that <·n~e. f(•d<'ral olflec•r,_; unlawfully
~c·tzrd c·<•rtalll documrnt:, h<•lonl-(lllg to tlw Sth•rrthome" and tlwtr
lumbrr t"Ompau~· :111d pn·~rnt<·d tlwm to a grand .im~· that had nln•acly
inrlictc·d tlw Sil\'('rthoi"IH'"· ,\ dr~t 1'(('1 ('0\11'1 ordPr<'d tlw rrtur:n ol the

' Rt•Hponrll'tlt I"l'lw,_;

:States, 251 (' . 8

:~ss
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v
Respond0nt also argu<'R that C'aeh and <.'very questi01l
based on evidence obtained from an illegal search and
seizure constitutes a fresh aiHI independent violation of
dormnrnt;; but Jmpoumlc•d photol!:raph~ and <·opir~ of thr ori~inab.
Ln.t rr. the pro,rru tor ea U:"Pcl t hP gr:111d jm~· to i~"m' "ubpoenn,.; dU('es
tecum :to tlH• SilvPrthomr" to prodtH'C' t!H• onginab. and tlwir rrfusal
to romp!~· lrcl to :1 eontpmpt citation. Tn rrvrr,.;in~ tlw judgnwnt ,
t he• Comt hrld th:t t t hr :"11 hpo<•n:l~ \\'C•rc• in1·a lid hr<·nu~r t hP~ · IV<'rP
ba,rd on kno\\'lPd~r oht aint>d from t hr iiiPg:tll~· "rizrd Pl·idrneP, ('it in~
W eeks v. ( ' niter! Stales, supm. :.rr . .ru~ticc • Tiolmr". writin~ for thr
C'onrt. "tat('(] that thr ·'p~"r ncP of th<• pro1·i,ion forhiddin~ thr
ar qui ~ ition of p,·id<·m·<· m :1 r·Prtain ll'a~ · i" not nwrrl~· tllilt thr
pvid<'JH'r :"O aequin·d .• hall not lw u,.;pd bdorr tht> Comt but that
1t "hall not hr li:"Pd at :ill." 2;31 P. S. nt :m2.
Silvl'l'thome i,.; di,tingui~hablc• from I hP JH'<':"<' nf ea,.;r in ~rvrrnl
rrsJWd s. ThPJ'<'. tlw Sil \'('rf honw" had JH'<'I·iou,J,,· h<•Pn indirt rei b~·
thr grand Jill'~ · :md tim" eould in1·okr tlw <'xehJ"iollar~· rnl<' on
th<' ba"i' of thrir "t:Jtu,.; a" eriminal drff'JHl:mt:< . Thr Government':;
intrrr~ t in rrc·n ptming thr ori~inal do<·umPnt,.; \\'H" ob1·iou,.;l~· fonndrd
on :1 brlid thnt th p~ · mi~ht hr U:<P ful in thr erimin:tl pro~P<·ution
nlrrad~· aut horizrd h~· thP grand jm~ · . Indrrd. t hr prima r~ · eon,rqnrnc·r· of tlw Comt ',.; dPri:"ion ll':t" to <•xri\J(k tlw r1·idrnre from thr
"nh,c•qur nt C'J'imm:tl tri:1l. FurtiH·rmor<•. prior to the j,,uanee of the
grnnd jur~ · "uhpoc•na". thc•rr had lwrn n judicial drtrrminntion that
thr "ran·h :tnd ~c·iwn• \\':t~ ii!Pg:tl . TIH• ~ilnrthomc• ',.; ('!:tim wn" not/
r:ti:"rd for thr fir,.;! timr in :1 prr-indi<·t nlPnt motion to "upprr~"
rrquiring inti'J'l'llption of gmn<l jur~ · proc·r<•<lin~" ·
B~· rontmRt, Ill thr in~ t:mt r·n"<' n•"pond<•nt had not bc•<'n indicted
b~· tlw grand jur~· and 1\':t,; not :1 eriminal dc•frnd:tnt. Undrr traditional Jll'in!'ipl r~. hr had no ,.;tanding to ill\·okr t hP rx<'ltJ8ionar~· rule.
Tht> pffc<'l of t hr Di"t rid Comt ',.; ordrr 11':1:" to dpprin· thr grnnd
Jur~· of tr~timon~ · it nrrded to <'OJHill<'f it " inw"tigntion . La ~t l~·.
f<',;pomll'nt ·,. motion 10 "uppn'"" had not hP<'Il prrl'iou,.;]~· madr nnd}
rPquirPd intrnupt im1 of thr grnnd jm~· JH'ot•ePding:>. In thr,;e rire um~t ane e.'. Siluerthonte 1:s not ('O ntrollin~
To thr rxtrnt that the
Court',.; broad dirtum might br con"t ru<'d to " ug~r,.; t a diffPrPnt re~ ult in thr prP,rnt casr, wr note that it hm; bren "ub,tantiall~· undermined by lntrr cases. See Pari s III nnd IV of thi~ opi11ion.
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the witness' constitutional rights.u Ordinarily. of course,
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury.
Absent somf' recognized privilege of confidentiality, every
man owes his trstimony. Hr may invoke his Fifth
AmPndment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina· }
tion, but he may not decline to answer on the grounds
that his responses might prove C'lllbarrassing or result in
an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v.
United States, supra. Respondent's claim must be, therefore, not merely that the grand JUry's questions invade
his privacy but that. because those questions are based on
illegally-obtainrd evidence, thPy somehow con&titute distinct violations of his Fourth Ameudment rights. We
uisagrPe.
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent
umeasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy
of one's person, house. papers. or effects. The wrong
condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, committed in this ca~e. is fully accomplished by the original
search without probablf' cause. Grand jury questions
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no independ~
cnt governmental invasion of one's person, house, papers,,
~At .

oral nrgunwnt .

roun~<·l

for

n·~pondrnt ~tated

the content JOn

a,; follow,;

' " l ~ubtlllt to t hr Court that <'arh que:st tOn n~krd of the Rr::;pond<!llt. b!'fore the f.!:rHnd jur~·. wht('h qu<'~tion wa~ only n::-krd b<'cau~e
of a pa~t Yiolatiou of thr Fourth AmrndnH'nt, rmnount::; toJ a new,
itimwdiatr nolatiou of tlw Fomth Anwndnwnt . . .
I AI qur::;tion
deriv<·d from a pa~t nolntion. a que,;tion into the privacy of the
wit II<'~" amount>' to another int ni::Hon in vwlatwn of the Fourth
Anwndmrnt .'' Tr. of Oral Arg. 17
" fHlPfu~mg to an~w<· r a que~twn 111 whtrh thr qii<'HttOn roncetvnbly
1~ dPrnwl from a pa~t nolat1on of 1he Fourth Anwndment, gives
rt::'P to an nddtt1onal or tww Fourth AnwndmPnt nght to resist•
nntiwc•rmg that qu<·~t 1011 heeatN' thr quP~t ion it:<Pif brcomf's an
udditionnl intru~wn
" Tr. of Om! Arg . 20
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or effects. but rathrr tlw usual abridge1nent of personal
pnvacy common to all grand jury q urstioni ng. Questions based on tllegally-obtainC'd evidence arc only a
derivativC' usf' of tlw product of a paE't unlawful Sf'arch
and seizure·. They work no nC'w Fourth Amendment
\\TOnj:!;. Whf'ther such derivative liS(' of illf'gally-obtained
t>vidence by a grand jury should br proscribed presents a
qtwstion not of rights but of remedies.
ln the usual context of a criminal trial. the defendant
ts entitlf'd to suppress not only tlw fruits of an unlawful
search and seizurP but also any c!C'rivativP use of that
f'videneP. Tlw prohibition of tlw exclusionary rule must
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of
deterring policr misconduct. ln thC' context of a grand
Jury proceeding, we belicvf' that the damage to that
Institution from the unprecedented <'xtension of the
exclusionary rok urged by respondent outweighs the
benC'fit of any pot'sible incremental deterrent effect. Our
conclusio11 necessarily controls both thC' fruits of an
unlawful sf' arch and seizure all( I any q U<:'stion or C'videncc
derivNI therefrom.'" Tlw !"amc considerations of logic
and policy apply to both the fruits of an uulawful search
and seizure' and derivative use of that evidence, and we
do not distinguish bct•veen them.
Tlw judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.
It ,d10uld br notrd thnt, rvc•n ah~rnt tlw pxelu~IOilar.l· rulr, a
gm nd jury w1tnr:<~ mn~· hav<• otlwr rrmPdl<':< to n·drr~H tlw injury to
lu~ priv:te~· and to prc•v<'lll a fu11lwr JllVH~ion 111 th<' future. He ma.1·
he· PIH itlrd to mamtam a eau:<r of :tetion for damage:; agnin~t the
offieN,; who ronduetf'd tlw unlawful ,.;rar<" h. !li ven,~ v. Si.t U11known
N anU'd .4gents of tlu· Pedaal B urmu of hu·c~lt(Jal ion, ~();{ U. S. :388
(19il)
HP ma~ abo >'f'<'k return of tlw ii!Pg;nll~·-:;elz<'d propert~· ,
and ex('IU~IOJJ of thP propert~· and It:< fnnt" from bring u~rd as evidenee Hgamst hnn 111 a crimmal trw!. Go-Bart lmporti11(J Co . 1·.
l lmted State~. :182 ( I H. :{H ( 19:H). In t hrse c1rcum~t anccs, we
cannot ~a~· that ,.;uch a w1tnP"~ ~~ nece:-<~nnly left renwdileH;; 111 tho
facr of an unlawful ,.;ear<' h and ~C'IZHI\'
'
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The Court holds that the exclusionary rule in
and seizur<' cases does not apply to grand jury proceediugs because the objective of the rule is "to deter future
unlawful police conduct." ante, p. 9, and "it is unrealistic
to assum(• that application of the rule to grand jury
proceedings would significantly further that goal." /d.,
13. This downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a
determination whether its application in a particular
type of )t'O
·
· furthers deterrence of future police
mis nduct reflects a s
ti 1g misconception, unless it
is a purposefujrejection, of the historical objective and
p rposP of the rule.
connnan!Js-o · w Fourth Amendment are of course
directed solely to public officials. Necessarily therefore
only official violations of those commands could have
created the evil that threatened to make the Amendment a d'e ad lett('r. But eurtailment of the evil. if a
consideration at all, was at best only a hoped for effect
of the exclusionary rule. not its ultimate objective.
I ncleed, there is no evidence that the possible deterrent
effect of the rule was given any attPntion by the judges
chiefly responsible for its formulation. Their concern
as guardians of the Bill of Rights was to fashion an
enforc('ment tool to give content and meaning to the
Fourth Amendment 's guarant<>es, They thus bore out
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James Madison's prediction in his address to the First
Congress on June 8, 1789:
"If they [the rights l arc incorporated iu to the
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardian of those rights; they will be an impenetrable
bulwark against every assumption of power in the
Legii'lati ve or Executive; they will be naturally led
to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration
of rights." I Annals of Cong. 439 (1834).
Since, however, those judges were without power to
direct or control the conduct of law enforcement officers,
the enforct>ment tool had necessarily to be one capable
of administration by judges. The exclusionary rule, i l
not perfect, accomplished the twin goRls of enabling the
judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people-all potential victims
of unlawful government conduct-that the government
would not profit from its lawless bt>havior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously underminiug popular trust in J
government.
_->That these considerations, not the rule's possible deterrent effect, were uppermost in the minds of the framers
of the rule clearly emerges from the decision which
fashioned it :
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put
courts of the United States and Federal officials, in
the exercise of their power anrl authority, under
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power and authority, aud to forever secure the people, their persons. houses, papers and effects against
all unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law. . . . The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain

-
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GOnvivtion by means of unlawful seizures ... should
find no sanction in the judgrner1ts of the courts
which are charged at all times with the support of
the Co11stitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of
such fundamental rights . ...
"This protection is equally extended to the action
of the Government and officers of the law acting
under it. . . . To sanction such proceedings w9uld
be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect
if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against· such una·ulhorized action." Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392, 394 (1914) (emphasis added) .
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes added
their enormous influence to these precepts in their notable
dissents in Olrns't ead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438
(1928). Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime
is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy." 277 U. S., at 485.
And Mr. Justice Holmes said :
" [ W] e must considPr the two objects of desire, both
of which we cannot havP, alld make up our minds
which to choose. It is desirable that criminal should
be detected, and to that end that all available evi-·
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dence should be used. It also is desirable that the
Government should not itself foster and pay for
other crimes. when they are the means by which
the evidence is to be obtained . . . . We have to
choose, and for my part, I think it is a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Governmellt should play an ignoble part.
" . . . If the existing code doPs not permit district
attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it
docs not permit the judge to allow such iniquities
to succeed. " 277 e. S .. at 470.
The same principles were reiterated only five years ago.
ln 1'.!:!J::u_ Y. Ohio, 392 U . S. 1, 12- 13 ( 1968) , Chief Justice
\Yarren said for the Court :
"The rule also serves another vital function-'the
imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins "· United
Stares, 364 l'. , '. 206, 222 (1960). Courts which
sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be
made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citize11s by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions."

It is true that deterrence was a prominent consideration in the determination whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367
r. H. 643 ( Hl61). which applied the exclusionary rule
to the States, should be given retrospective effect. Linkletter , .. Walker, 381 F. S. 618 ( 1965). But that lends

\

no support to today 's holding that the application of the
exclusionary rule depends solely") upon whether its invocation in a particular type of proceeding will significantly further the goal of deterrence . The emphasis
UJ!n deterrence in Linkletter must be understood in thC'
li
of th e crucial fact that the States had justifiably
rehe from 1949 to 1961 upon Wolf Y. ColoradJ, 338
F . S. 25 ( 1949) , and consequently, that application of
Mapp would have req_uired the wholesale· release of in.-

-

7:2-734-DISSEI'\'1'
UNJTED STATES v. CALAi'IDHA

5

numerable convicted prisoners, few of whoni could have
been successfully retried. In that circumstance, Linkletter held not only that retrospective application of
Mapp would not further the goal of deterrence but also
that it would not further "the administration of justice
and the integrity of the .!uciicial process." 381 U. S., at
637. Cf. Kaufman v. United States , 3D4 F. S. 217, 229
(1969).
Thus. the Court seriously errs in describing the
exclusionary rule as merely "a judicial-created remedy
des!gn~to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect .. . ." Ante, p. 9.
Rather, the exclusionary rule is "part and parcel of the
Fourth Amendment's limitation upon lgovernmental]
encroachment of individual privacy.'' Mapp v. Ohio, 367
F. S., at 651, and "an essential part of both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments." id. , at 657, that "gives
to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him. to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law· enforcement is entitled, and,
to the courts. that judicial integrity so necessary in the
tru<.> administration of justice." I d., at 660.
This Mapp summation crystalizes the series of decisions
that developed the rule, and with which today's holding
is plainly at war. For the first time. the Court today
discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of
the rule to insure that the .1· udiciary~oids even the
slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government
conduct. This rejection of "the imperative of judicial
integrity," Elkins "· United States, supra, 364 U. S., at
222', openly invites "l tjhe conviction that all government
is staffed by .. . hypocritt>s I, a conviction] easy to
instill and difficult to erase.'' Paulsen, The Exclusionary
Rule and Misconduct by thf' Police, 52 J. Crirn. L. and
P . S. 255, 258 ( Hl61 ). When judges appear to.
become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
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Constitution that they are sworn to uphold,'' Elkins v.
United States, 364 e. H., at 223. we imperil the very
foundation of our peoples' trust in their G'overnment on
wl1'iCi1'0Ur TJeincor:acy rests. Sec On Lee Y. U niled
States, 843 P. S. 747. 758- 759 (1052) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The exclusionary rule is needed to make
the Fourth Amendnwnt something rPal; a guarantee that
does not carry with it the rxclusion of evidence obtained
by its violation is a chimera. Moreover,

"f i 1nsistence on observance by law officers of traditional fair procedural requirements is, from the long
point of view, best calculated to contribute to that
end . However much in a particular case insistence
upon such rules may appear as a technicality that
inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history
of tlw criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness." Miller \'. United States, 357
F. H. 301, 313 (195R) .
The judges who developed thr rxclusionary rule were
well aware that it embodiE'd a judgment that it is better
for some guilty persons to go free than for the police
to behave in forbidden fashion. A similar judgment led
the Court to drcide in Silverthorn e Lumber Co., Inc. v.
United States, 251 r. ~ . :3R5 ( 1920), that a grand jury
must be denied access to plainly relevant but illegally
srit::ed papers. In that case, after federal agents unlawfully seized papers belonging to the Silverthornes and
their corporation, and presented the documents to a
grand jury \',:hich had previously indicted the Silverthornes. a district courtordered the documents returned
and copies that had bren prepared in the interim
impounded. After returning the originals. the grand
jury attctnpt<•d to recoup them by issuance of a subpoena
duces t ecu,m
Compliance with the subpoena was:

d..cq. r::....r..... .J...~-'-·
r$~/

l ..J
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refused, and contempt convictioJJS followed. In reversing the judgment of conviction. the Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes held that the Government
was barred from utilizing any fruits of its forbidden act,
stating that " [ t] he essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain ,.,-ay is that not merely
'evidence so acquirerl shall not be used before the court
but that it shall uot be used at all.·· 251 U. S .. at 392.
Silverthorne plainly controls this case. Respondent,
like plam ti1fS-m-error 111 Stl ve~t hon~e,' seeks to a voic~
furnishing the grand jury with evidence that he would
not have been called upon to supply but for the unlawful
search and seizure. The Court would distinguish Silver-thorne on the ground that there the plaintiffs~in-error
had been indicted and could invok<' the exclusionary rule
"on the basis of their status as criminal defendants," since
the Government's effort to obtain the documents was
"obviously founded on a belief that they might be useful
in the c·riminal prosecution already authorized by the
grand jury." Ante, p. 14 n. 8. The effort was clearly
not "obviously" founded on any such belief. Overlooked
is the fact that the grand jury's ii1terest in again obtaining the documents in Silverthorne may well have been
to secure information leading to further criminal charges,
especially since indictments of three other individuals,
as well as additional indictments of the Hilverthornes,·
had been the consequc:>nce of initial submission of the
documents to the grand jury. See Brief on Behalf of
Plaintiffs-in-Error, at 4. 18-19/ Only if Silverthorne is

~

1

Neitlwr. I lw . 'i.lvert horne LumbPr Co ..

lK'can~P

s

it was a corpora-

~-------r-1I-OI-1,-·;ee7/'(;fe'" \', (enkel. 201 ll . S. 4:~ (190fi), nor m;pondent,

becaut>r hr wa~ grantrd I ransactional 1mmnnity, could invoke thr
privi!c!l:r again~t srlf-incrimination. Thr ~if na Iion:-; arr therefore
coml!letl"l~- compa rablr.
2
The Court al~o argnr~ that "[t]ht> Silvrrthornr',; cbim wa~ not
rai~cd for thr fir~t timl' in a prP-mdirtmrnt motion to o;uppress
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overruled can its precedential force to compel affirmanM
here be denied.
Co11gressional concern with the Silverthorne holding
\Vas clearly evidenced in enactment of 18 U. S.C. ~ 2515,
w 1he never any wire or oral communiproviding that
cation haf\ been intercepted. no part of the contents of
such communication and no evide11ce derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any proceeding in or
before any . . . grand jury .. . if the disclosure of that
.information would be .itt violation of this chapter.''
(Emphasis added.) 1n Gelbard \', Unded States, 408
U. H. 41 (19.72). wr set aside thE' adjudication in criminal
contempt of a grand jury witness who refused to comply
with a court order to testify on thE' ground that interrogation was to br based upon information obtained from
tho witness' communications allegedly intercepted by
fedf'ral agents by means of illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Our reasons track the grounds
advanced in Silverthorue.

"r

"The purposes of ~ 2515 and Title III as a whole
would bE' subverted were the plain command of
§ 2515 ignored when the victim of an illegal interception is called as a witness before a grand jury
and askC'd questions basC'd upon that interception.
Moreover. ~ 2515 servrs not only to protect the
privacy of communications, but also to ensure that
the courts do not become partners to illegal couduct;
the rvidentiary prohibition was enacted also 'to protect the integrity of court and administrative prorequiring intt'rrupt 1011 of grand Jill'~ ' procerdiug~, " ante. Jl . 14 n. R,
and t hcrrforr Jli"C'~umably Its al:'~rrtion oecasionrd no delay. Howevf'r, t hr District Coul't in Sil uerthorue had gran trd ;In ea r!irr application for rPturn of thP :;PizNI documrnt~ from thr grand jury after
drtrrmining that tlw~· had bren obtainPrl in violation of the Fourth
Amrndmrnt . Thr Court mmk 110 intimation that thr Di~triet Court
arlee! improrwrly in eon~idermg the initial applirntion

:r:;;;:·
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ceedings.' Consequently, to order a grand jury
witness, on pain of imprisonment, to disclose evidence that ~ 2515 bars in unequivocal terms is both
to thwart the congressional objective of protecting
individual privacy by excluding such evidence and
to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Government agents." 408 U.S., at 51 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly to allow C~ra to be subjected to questions
derived from the illegal search of his office and seizure
of his files is "to thwart the [Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments' protection I of ... individual privacy ...
and to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Government agents. " "And for a court. no petition of the
executive department, to sentence a witness, who is
[himselfl the victim of the illegal [search and seizure]
to jail for refusal to participate in the exploitation of
that [conduct in violation of the explicit command of
the Fourth Amendmentj is to stand our whole system
of crimipal justice on its head." In re Evans, 452 F . 2d
12:39. 1252 (1971) (Wright. J., concurring).
It is no answer, as the Court sugges~s. that the grand
jury witnesses' Fourth Amendment rights will be sufficiently protected "by the inadmissibility of the illegally
seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecutjon of
the search victim." Ante, p.1:3. This. of course. is no alternative for Calandra. since he was granted tran~actional
immunity and cannot be criminally prosecuted. But
the fundamental flaw of the alternative is that to compel
Calandra to testify in the first place under penalty of
contempt necf'ssarily "thwarts" his Fourth Amendment
protection aud "entangles the courts in the illegal acts.
of Government agents,' ' -consequf'nces that Silverthorne
condemned as intolerable.
To be surf', the exclusionary rule does not "provide
that illegally seized evidence is i 11admissible against any(
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one for any purpose. " Alderman v. U11ited States, 394
U. S. 165. 175 ( 1969). But clearly there is a crucial
distinction between withholding its cover from individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been
violated- as has been done in the "standing" cases,
Alderman Y. United States, 394 U. S. 165 ( Hl69), Jones
v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 ( 1960 )-, and withdrawing its cover from persons whose Fourth Amendment
rights have in fact been abridged.
Respondent does not seek vicariously to assert another's Fourth Amendment rights. He has himself been
the victim of an illegal search and desires "to mend
no one's privacy [but his] own. " Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41. 63 (1972) (DovGLAS, J .. concurring) .
Petitioner is told that he must look to damages to redress
the concededly unconstitutional invasion of his privacy.
In other words, officialdom may profit from its lawless11ess if it is willing to pay a price.
-1 n Mapp, the Court thought it had "closef d] the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness" in violation of Fourth Amendment
rights. 367 l . S., at 654-655. Tho door is again ajar.
' As a consequence, I am left with the uneasy feeling that
today's decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door·
still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule
j 11 search and seizure cases; for surely they cannot believe that application of the exclusionary rule at trial
furthers the goal of deterrence. but that its application
in grand jury proceedings will not "significantly" do so.
Unless \ve are to shut our eyes to the evidence that
crosses our desks every day, we must concede that official
lawlessness has not abated and that no empirical data
distinguishes trials from grand jury proceedings. I
thus fear th1;1,t when next we confront a case of a con-
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viction rested on illegally seized evidence, today's decision
will be invoked to sustain the conclusion in that case
also that "it is unrealistic to assume'' that application
of the rule at trial would "siguificantly further" the goal
of deterrence-though. if the police are presently undeterred, it is difficult to see how removal of the sanction
of exclusion will induce more lawful official conduct.
The exclusionary rule gave life to Madison 's prediction
that "independent tribunals 'of justice ... will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights. " We_ betray the trust upon which
that prediction rested by today's long step toward abandonment of the exclusionary rule. The observations of
, a recent commentator highlight the grievous error o.f
the majority's retreat:
"If constitutional rights are to be anything more
than pious pronouncements, then some measurable
consequence must be attached to their violation.
It would be intolerable if the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure could be violated
without practical consequence. It is likewise imperative to have a practical procedure by which
courts can review alleged violations of constitutional
rights and articulate the meaning of those rights.
The advantage of the exclusionary rule-entirely
apart from any direct deterrent effect--is that it
provides au occasion for judicial review, and it giveS'
credibility to the constitutional guarantees. By
demonstrating that society will attach serious consequences to the violation of constitutional rights,
the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the
moral and educative force of the law. Over the long
tenn this may integrate some fourth amendment

72-734-DISSENT
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ideals into the value system or norms of behavior
of law enforcement agencies." Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Seach and Seizure, 37 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 665, 756 (1970); see also Dellinger. Of
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1562-1563 (1972).
I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.

To: The ('-;..,.,..
Mr .
Mr. <Tu., i.
Mr. Ju.
,1...

1.11·. J\
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4th DRAFT

l 'nited Htates Court of Ap1wals for the Sixth Circuit.

.Joh n P. Calandra.

Ma. .fu::;TrCE PowELL delivPred the opinion of the
('ourt.
This case presents the question whether a witness
summoned to appear aud testify bPfore a grand jury
may refuse to answer questions ou the ground that they
are based on evidence obtaiuecl from an unlawful search
and seiwre. The issue is of considerable importance to
the adutinistration of criminal 1ustice.

T
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a
warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calandra's place of bus111ess. the Royal Machine and Tool
Company il1 Cleveland. Ohw. The warrant was issued
in connection with an extensiw investigation of suspected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of
bookmaking records and wagering paraphenalia. A
master affidavit submitted iu support of the application
for the warrant cont~:~oined information derived from statements by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) , from physical surveillance con~
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ducted by FBI agents. and from court~authorized elec•
tronic surveillance.'
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a
two~story buildiug. Tlw first floor consists of about
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and
inventory. The second floor contams a general office
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied
by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary.
On December 15. 1970, federal agents executed the war~
rant directed at Calandra's place of business and con~
ducted a thorough. four~hour search of the premises. The
record reveals that the agents spent more than three
hours searching Calandra's offict-> and files.
Although the agents found no gambling parapherua!ia,
one discovered, among certaw promissory notes, a card
mdicating that. Dr. Waltf't' Loveland had been making
periodic paynwnts to Calandra. The agent stateq in an
affidavit that he was aware that the United States Attor~
rwy's office for the Northern District of Ohio was inves~
tigating possible vwlations of 18 P. S. C. § § 892, 893,
anc./894. cl<'alillg with extort.ionate credit transactions, and
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loanshark~
ing'' enterprise then under investigation. The agent
concluded that the card bearing Dr Loveland's name
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized
along with various other items, wcluding books and
records of the company, stock certificates. 11nd address
books.
On March 1. H)71, a special grand JUry was convened
111 the Northern District of Ohio to mvestigate possible
loansharkmg activities in VIOlation of federal laws. The
1
On tlw hast.- of 1lw ~amt1 affidavit, J rdrnd agPnts al:;o obtained
warrant, aut hortzing ~earehcs of Calandra·~ rrsidenc!:' and automobile. Tlw prr,;rnt ea~r mvolw~ onh tho ~rarch of the Royal
Machuw and Tool Compan\
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graud jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him
questions based on the evidence seized during the search
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 19-71 , but
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privileged against self-incrimination. The Government then
requested the District Court to grant C11landra transaetiona.l immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2514.
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the
hearing on the Government's application for the immunity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress
the evidence seized in the search.
Calandra later moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and
return of the seized evidence 011 the grounds that the
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that
thE> search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On
August '27, the District Court held a hearing at which
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer
questions based on the seizeJ materials. On October 1,
the District Court entered its judgment ordering the
evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and further ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the
grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence.
In re Cala.ndra, 332 F. Hupp. 737 ( l971 ). The court held
that "due process ... allows a witness to litigate the question whether the evidence which c9nstitutes the basis for
the questions asked of hun before the grand jury has been
obtained in a way which violates the con~titutional protection agamst unlawful search and seizure." ld., at
742. The court found that the search warrant had
been 1ssuecl without probable cause and that the search
had exceeded the SCO(W of th(' warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the ~ixth Circuit affirmedl
holding that the District Court had properly entertained
tlw suppression motion and tha.t the exclusionary rule

,.
'\
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may bC' mvokeJ by a witness before the grand jury to
bar quC'stiomng basPd on evidence obtained in an unlawful search and SCJZUI'f' . ~ l'nited States v. Calandra, 465
F . 2d 121H (Hl7:l). Tlw offrr to grant Calandra immumty was dPPnwd Irrel<>vant. /d., at 1221.
\Ve granted the Govl:'rnm<>nt's petition for certiorari,
- - F s - (1~17a) .
110\\ r<'VPrSP

w('

H
flw institUtiOn ot the grand JUry is deeply rooted in
Anglo-AmPncan history. ' ln England, the grand jury
RPrved for centunes both as a body of accusers sworn
to discowr and presPnt for tnal persons suspected of
crumnal wrongdomg and as a protector of citi~ens against
arbitrary and oppressive gov<>nunental action. In this
eountry the .Founders thought the grand jury so essential
t.<J basw liberties that thPy provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only
be mstituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury.' Costello \. ( 'nited .States, 350 U. ~- 359, 361-362
(195o). The graud JUry 's historic functions survive to
thus day Its responsibilities continue to include both
tlw determination whetlwr there is probable cause t<?
! The Court of Appl'al" alfirnwd tlw Dt~trirt Court '~ findmg that
.t.he ~mrrh of l'alandm ·~ bn~lllP~~ and ~etzurp of his property was
tmlawfnl ..J.fi5 F . 2d , at I:Z2G. 11. 5. Although the Govl'rnment does
not agrPP with tlw court'~ findmg, It ha>' not ~ought review
~~~llP
In additiOn. t lw Covrrnuwnt ha.s not rhallrnged the District
Court.\ ord<·r dm'rtmg r<:'tttrn ol t lw illegally seiz<'d propPrty to

of th,is1

t"('~j)Olld('llf

For a dt~<'ll~~wn of tlw lu~tory aud role of the grand jury, see
Costello ' l 'nited ~tate.~. a50 !'. S :~5~. J<ll-ao2 (195fl); Blair v.
(hnted States, ·250 ll . S :!7:l. 279-:zs:~ (1919); Hnle v. Hmkel, 201
{ ' ~ . 4:~ , 59 (190fl). 4 RlaebtonP C'omnwntari<'~ a01 et seq. ; G. Ed1\"l:trd~<. Thr Grand .Jmy I 44 {19ot)) , l F Pollock and f. Maitland,
Ht~tory of Englt~h Law 1.11 (:Zd <
·d 1909) , l W Holdsworth, Histor>'
(tf Ena:lii<h LH w !H:Z ;~.:!_;{ ((t h n·v Prl. l91iH,J .
;j
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believe a crime has been committed and the protection
of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.
Branzburg v. Ha.yes, 408 U. S. 665, 686-687 (1972).
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide
latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No
judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates
i.J,l secret and may determine ~lone the course of its
i1~quiry. The grand jury may compel the production of
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers
appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained
by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of orimiual trialr;;. "It is a grand inquest,
a body with powers of investigatio11 and inquisition, the
scope of whosf• inquiry is not . to b~ limited by doubt~
whether any particular individual will be properly subject to an accusation of crime." Blair v. United States,
250. U. S. 273, 282 ( 1919) .

The scope of the grand jury's powers reflects its special
role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A
grand jury proceeding 1s uot an adversary hearing in
w,hich the gmlt or mnocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, his au e:t parte investigation to determine
'Yhether a crime has been committed and whether
nriminal proceedings should be mstituted against any
person. The grand jury's mvestigative power must be
broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged. Bra·nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. H., at 700; Costello
v. United States, 350 l' . S., at 364.
. In Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the
Hnportance of the grand jury 's role

..

" [T 1he in vestigatioq of crime by a grand jury implements a fu11damental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and the property of the
citizen .. " : 408 U. S., at 700.
, "The role of the grand .iury as an important
instrument of etfect1ve law enforcement necessarily

,.
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includes an investigative function with respect to
determining whether a crime has been committed
and who committed 1t . . .
'When the grand jury
is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area . . . society's iuterest is best served
by a thorough and extensive 111 vestigation. ~ Wood
v Georgia, 370 U. 8. 375, 392 ( 1962). A grand
jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until
every available clue has been r·un down and all witnesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime
has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429
F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation
may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proferred
hy the prosecutor, or the persoual knowledge of the
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S.,
at 36~. It is only after the grand jury ras examined
the evidence that a determmation of whether the
proceeding will result in an indictment can be
made .. , :· ld., at 70L
The grand jury's sources of mformatio11 are widely
drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an
.indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of
inadequate or incompetent evidence, C'ostello v. United
States, supra; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245
(1910), or even on the basis of information obtained in
violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-mcrimination. United States v. Lawn, 355
n. s. 339 (1958) .
The power of a federal court to compel persons to·
appear· and testify before a grand jury is also firmly
established. Kastigar \'. United States, 406 U. S. 441
(1972) . The duty to testify has long been recognized
~s. a basic obligatwn that fvery citizen owes his Govern-

··.
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l'nent. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U . S. 421, 438
( 1932); Cnited States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 V. S. , at 688, the Court
·n oted that " [ c] itizens generally are not immune from
grand .1ury subpoenas . . .'' and that "the longstanding
pnnc1ple that 'the public has a right to everyman's
Pvideuce ·
is particularly applicable to grand jury
prqceedings.' ' The duty to testify may on occasion be
burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury
'to a witness' socJal and econonuc status. Yet the duty
to testify has been regarded as "so necessary to the
administration of justice'' that the witness' personal
mterest in privacy must yiel(J to the public's overriding
interest in full disclosure. Blair v. Onited States, 250
F. S., at 281. Furthermore. a witness may not interfere
with the course of the gr11nd jury's inquiry. He "is not
entitled to urge ob,1ec~ions of incompetency or irrelevancy,
.such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his."
ld., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the authority of the Court or the grand ,1ury '' or "to set limits to
the mvestigation that the grand .1ury may conduct.:'

!bid.
Of course, the grand jury's subpoena power is not
unlimited.4 It may consider incompetent evidence, b4t
1t may pot itself violate a valid privilege, whether
established by the Constitution, statutes, or the com-

mon law. Rra:nzb·urg v Hayes, supra; United States
~ Tlw grand JHry 1:; ~nh.J crt to tlw <·ourt :s :supcrviswn in several
rP.spect:-;. ~ee Brown r . l'mted States , :359 U. S. 41 , 49 (1959);
HulP:s f1 and 17, FE'<.!. Hule Cmn. Pror , L. Orfield, Cnminal Procedure UndPr tlw Frderal Hule~. 475-477 ( 1966) . In particular,
the grand JUry mu~t rPb' on the rourt to rompel production of
booki<, pnp<'rH. docunwnt ... , and tlw H·~timony of Witn!'S:;es, and the
court may quash or modify a ~ ubpoena on motion 1f compliance
would be '' unrPa :sonublf' or oppre,:,;r;tve" H.ulo 17 (c) , Fed . .l:Wde
Gr.Vn.- Pro<'.
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v. Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; 8'
J. Wigmore. Evidence, ~~ 2200-2301 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961). Although, for t>xample. an indictment based
on evidence obtained in viOlation of a defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilegC' is nevertheless valid, United
States , .. Lawn, supra, the grand Jury may not force
a witness to answer questions In violation of that
conf:ltitutional guarantee. Ratl1er. the grand jury may
override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the witness is granted immunity co-ext0nsive with the privilege·
against self-incrimination. Kastiyar \'. United States,
supra. Similarly. a grand JUry may not compel a person
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him.
Boyd , .. Cnited States, 116 C. :::;. 610. 633-635 ( 1886) .
Cf. Couch v. United States, 40~) U. S. 322 ( 1973) . The
grand jury is also without power to invade a legitimate
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
A grand jury's subpoena duces tecum will be disallowed
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. 76 (1906). Judicial supervision is
properly exercised m such cases to prevent the wrong
before it OCCUlTS.

III
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment limits
the grand jury's power to compel a witness to answer
questions based on evidence obtained from a prior·
unlawful search and seizure. The exclusionary rule was
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of
all citizens "to be secure in their houses, papers, and
effects, agaiust unreasonable search<>s and seizures . .. ."·
Under this rule. evidence. obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment cannot be used i11 a criminal proQt:ecling ag&inst the victim of the ill~gal search and aei-
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Weeks v. United States, 232 l -. R. 383 (1914);
Mapp \'. Oh1·o, 867 l '. ~- 64:3 ( 1961) . This prohibition

t:ure.

applies as well to the fruits of . the illegally seized evidence. ·wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
HnverthoniP Lumber Co . \', United States. 251 U. S. 385
( 1920)

The pur·pose of the exrluswnary rule IS not to redress
flw injury to the privacy of the search victim ;
" [T ]lw ruptured pnvacy of the victims' homes a11d
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too
late." Lwkletter \' Walker, 3RI U. S. 618. 637
( 1~)(),))

lnstead. tlw rule's prune purpose IS to deter future unlaw-)
ful police eond uct and thereby effectuate the guarantee
of the Fourth Anwndnwnt against unreasonable search
and se1zures.
"The rule ts calculated to prevent. not tQ repair.
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the
eonstitutiona] guaranty m the only effeotively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.'' Elkws \ f'nited States, 3()4 ll . S. 206, 217
( IDtiO)

Accmd. /'.lapp v. Ohw, :367 l". S. 643, 656 ( 1961); Tehau
\' ('nited States, e.r rei . Shot, 382 U. ~- 406, 416 (1966) ;
Terry v. Ohio, 302 C ~ - 1, 29 ( HJ68) ln sum, the rule
1s a .Judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Anwndment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggriPwrl
5 ThC'rr 1~ ~ome dt~agrN'IliPJtt

a, to the practiCal efficacy of the
rul\', anrl a,., tlw Court notPd m Elhns v United States,
:31)-! l' :-1 . 20fi . 211- ( HJHO J, n•lt•va11t ;, I<' Jmpimal statilstics are not
}J.vailab!P... ('f Oak~ . ~tudnu~r thr Exeht~Jonary Rule tn Searcq
t•xelu~wnary

,:
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Despite its broad deterrent purvose, the excltisionary
t't1le has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of
illegally-seized evidence In all proceedings or against all
persons. As with any remedial device, the application
of the rule has been restnct0d to those areas where
tts remedial obJectives are thought most efficaciously
served. The balancing process implicit in this approach
is expressed in thE> contours of the standing requirement. Thus. standing t.o invoke the exclusionary rule
has been confined to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the
victim of the unlawful search. Brown v. United States,
411 L". S. 223 ( 1973); Alderman v. United States, 394
F. S. 165 ( 1969); Wony Sun v. United States, supra;
Jones v. United States, 362 C. ~. 257 ( H)60). This
standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the
evidence are strongest where the Government's unlawful
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction
on the victilll of the search "
u.nd Setzurr, ;~i U. Chi. L. Hev. ti65 (i970) . We have no occasion
iu tht~ prr:;ent ca:;c to ron~idrr thr rxtent of tlw rule'~ efficacy in
enmmal trw!~
;; In holdmg that the respondem had :;tandmg to invoke the exclu:;wnary rule 111 a grand Jtll'Y proceedmg,.:. the Court of Appeals relied
011 Rule 41 (e), Fed. Hule Crim. Proc.
4(i5 F . :.!d, at 1222-1224. Rule
4;1 (e) provtdes, in relevant part' that .. raJ person aggneved by an
unlawful search and seizun· mny movt• thr di::;trict court . . . for
return of the propert~· and to suppre.::s for u~e a:,; evidence anything
so obtauwd . . . · It further state~ that '' l tJhr motwn shall be
made before trtal or hrarlng . . ." We ha vp recognized that Rule
41 (e) 1::; '' no broader than the con:;tttutional rulr." Alderman v.
United State&. :394 (1 ~ .. at 17:1 , n. f"i ; Jones , .. United States. 362
C S. 25i (1960) . RuiP 41 (e) . thercforr. doc~ not ron~t1tut.e a :stattJ ...
lor.y rxpanHion. of the Pxrht~lOIIHr'Y rql<'
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ln decidmg whethE-r t<~ ext<>nd tlw exclusionary rule
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential
inJUry to thP historic role and functions of the grand
.iury against thE' potentta.l benefits of the rule as applied m tlw; context. It is evident that this extentJOtl of the Pxclusionary rule \vould seriously impede
thE' gram1 .1 ury.
Because the grand .1 ury does not
finally ad.1 udicate guilt or innocence, it has traditiOnally hN•n allowf'd to pursue its investigative and
accusatorial functJOtts unimpeded by the evidf'ntiary
and JH'ocedural restrictwns applicable to a criminal
trial.
Pernutting witnesses to invoke the exclusionary rul<' before a grand JUry would precipitate adjudieation of ISSUE'S hitherto res~rve(l for thE' trial on
the merits and would delay and disrupt grand Jury procec•dings. Supprrssion heanngs would halt the orderly
progress of an investigation and might necessitate
extended litigation of issues only tangentially related
to the grand JUry's pnmary ob,ircti ve. 7 The probable
result would bE' "protracted interruptions of grand jury
proceedwgs," Oelbard v. ( '11ited States, 408 P. S. 41, 70
(1 H72) ( \\.'HIT!~ . .J .. roncurring). effrctively transforming
them into preliminary trials on the merits. In some
al~o found 1 hat t ht• Govrrnmen1't; off<>r of
ttndt•r 1~ 11 ~ (' § :Z51-t wa~ 1rn•lpvan1 to l'<'iSJlondrnt'~
r<tandm~ lo 111vuk<· tlw l'\t'lii~Jonar, rult'. 4ti.'i F 2d, at 1221. We
llf.trl'e WJ1 h Ihat t!Pt I' !'Ill lila t 1011 for 11H' r<>a~Oil~ ~I a tPd 111 Part~ II I' rv.
;tnd \' of tin:< opm1on
Till' for<·t · of t ht,. ar,.mtH·llt '"' w<'ll JlJu,.t ra1l'tl hy the iactl:' of
tlw pre~Pilt t'Hl:'t' . A,. of th<• dat<> of tJu,. deeJt;JOll, morH than two
and orw-halt ymr~ will hnvP l'lapHNI ~Ill<'!:' n•spondenl wn::; ~ ummoned
to ap(H'ar all(! t('~tlf~· hl'for<· the grand Jur~·. lf reHpond<'nl ·~ tr::;ti•
mony wa;; vital to grand .JUry ·,- JllVt':<tJgatJon Ill August 1971 of
extortwnat<• crl'cht iran:;aetJOll,., 11 1" po;;~iblr that tl11:< parttcul~r
invel:ltlga t toll hak ht•<·n r•oJuplPt l'ly ffll::<t rat t'll

l'lw ( 'om1 of Apprab

immunn~·
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cases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the
criminal law. Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclination to allow litigious interference with grand jury
proceedings ·
" Any holding that would saddle the grand JUry
with mini-trials and preliminary showing would
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the
public's interest i.n the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal law. '' United States v.
Dionisio, 410 F. S. 1, 17 ( 1973)

Cf. United Stales v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 ( 1940). In sum,
we believe that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke
the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the
effective ami expeditious discharge of the grand jury's
duties.
Against this potential d~:puage to the role and func-·
tions of the grand jury. we must weigh the benefits to
he derived from this proposed extension of the exclusionary rule. Suppressiop of the use of illegally-seized
evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial
IS thought to be an important method of effectuating
the Fourth Amelldment. But it does not follow that the
Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal
that might deter police misconduct. In Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S., at 174. for example, this Court
declined to extend the excl usionary rule to one who was
not thr victim of the unlawful seareh :
" Th(~ deterrent values of preventiug the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated
have been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case
against the defendant is weakened or destroyed.
1\re adhef(~ to that .1 udgment. But we are not con-

·r

\..

~

.
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vi'nced that the additional benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the bas1s of all the evi'"'
dPnce which exposes thP truth ."

\\re think this observation equally applicable in the
present context.
Any incremental dt>terrent effect which might be
achieved by rxtencling the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence of police
misconduct may result from thP exclusion of illegallyseized evidence from crimmal triais. it is unrealistic to
assumt> that application of the rule to grand jury prqceedings would significantly further that goal. Such a,n
extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely
for usp in a gralld JUry mvestigation. The incentive to
disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment
solely to obtam an mdictment from a grand jury is subf4tantially negated by the inadmissibility of the illegallyseized evulence in a subsequent criminal prosecution of
the search victim. For the most part, a prosecutor would
hP unlikely to request att indictment where a conviction
could not be obtained. We therefore decline to embrace
a v1ew that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly
minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the
grand .1 ury ·

~ HPspondent re!Jp::; primarily on S!1Ve1'thorne Lumber Co. v. Umted

I

:!51 l' . R. :~85 ( 1920) . wh1rh the d1s;;ri1t contends "plainly
eoutrols tlu~ <'H~r. " Post, p. - . In that CH8e, frderal officers
unlawfull~· ~Plzed ePrtam document~ brlongmg to thr Silverthornes·
and the1r lurnbPr company and pre,;entrd tlwm to a grand jury that
h11d aln·arl'y llldH'tr([ til<' SJ!vrr.thor.m.<·~ aud tlw rompauy. A d.istl!irt

.State~;,

,I

'
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v
Respondent also argues that each and every question
basf'd on evidence obtained from an illegal search and
se1zure constitutes a fresh and independent violation of
cuu rt ordt•red t ht• rrt urn of t lw doclllnC'nt out tmpuundrd phutoand c•opiP~ of thP original:;. Lat<·r, thC' pro::;ecutor cau~C'd the
grand Jllr~· to ~~~II<' ~ubpoc•nas duce; tectnm to tlw Sih·erthorne~
and tlw c·ompan~· to produrr tlw originab, and tlwir rrfusal to comply
lc•d to a c·unt<'mpt cttatwtt. ln r<'Y<'r~ing tlw Judgment, the Court
hdd that tlw Hubporna" WPI'<' mvalid becau;;p they wNr ba"ed
oil knowlrdge ohtainrd from the· illt•gall~· srtzC'd rvid(·nc·C', citing
Weeks ,. l 'nitf'd State!!, wpra. :\Ir .. Ju~ticP Holme::;, writing for the
Court. :<tilted that thP .. r,.;seneP of the provt~wn forbidding the
acqll!::;ttion of C'vtdt•ncP 111 a rt•rtnm way 1::; not mere]~· that the
evtdrnee ~o acqlllred "hall not bt> used before tlw Court but that
tt. "hall not ))(' ll"t>d at all." :!51 l'. 8., at a9~.
Silverthorne i::; dt:<tmgmshahiP from the present case in ~<'vera!
Hignifieant rp::;pert". Tht•n•, plaint\ff;;-ttt-Prror had previously been
indictPd by the grand ,Jury and tlms could invoke the exclu~ionary
ntlP 011 the bastt' of thetr Htatus a~ rrnnmal clc•fendauts. .\Joreover,
1he CovPrtJm('llt ·,_ tnt<'rC':;t Ill rPraptunng: t lw ongmal document~ wa;;
foundPd on a belt<'f that the~· Iml-(ht h(• u~efulm the criminal prosecution already authonzt'd b~· tht• grand Jury. It did not appear that
th<' gram! Jury nC'ed<'<l tlw documents to pprform tt;; mve::;ttgative or
H<'CU:<atonal functtOll::>. Thu:;, tlw primar~· con~e(juence of the Court's
dt·rt><JOn wa~ to C'X<'Iude thP Pviclenrr from thC' ~ubsequent criminal
trw I. Fmally, pnor to the i:<~ltam<· of t lw grand jury subpoena~,
tht'l'l' had been a judtctal dN<•rmutn t io11 that t lw ::;earrh and ~:;eizure
wa;; Illt'gal. The claun of plainttff::;-HH'rror WH~:< not rai::;ed for the fin;t
tmw 111 a. prc•-indictmPllt motHm to "'uppre::;s r<'quiring interruption
of grand Jlll'Y prorePdingl:' .
By c·ontra::>t , in 1hC' instant ru::;e re;;pondent had not been indicted
by the grand jury and wa~ not a criminal defendant. Under tradi-·
twnal pnnrtplet', he had no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule·.
The effect of the District Court'H order wa;; to deprive the grand
,iury of tc;;tunony 11 ttt>(:'(led to conduct it~ investigation. Further-·
more, rC'spondPnt ·~ motion to ::;uppress had not been previously made
and rpqutrPd mterrupt10n of the grand Jlll'Y proceeding::;. In these·
•c•rrumstancrs, Silve1·tborue t;; rertfUJ)I;r not controlling. To the
~~:raph,
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the witness' constitutional rights." Ordinarily, of course,
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury.
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every
man owes his testimony. He may invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination , but he may not decline to answer on the grounds
that his responses might prove embarrassing or result in
an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v.
United States, supra. Respondent's claim must be, therefore. not merely that the grand jury's questions invade
his privacy but that, because those questions are based on
illegally-obtained evidence, they somehow constitute distinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We
disagree.
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong
condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, committ>xtent that the Court'~ broad dicttim mtght bt> construed to ~:;uggest
a diffrrent result in tlw prcst>nt ca~St>, we nott> that it has bern ~ub
stantially undmnincd by Iuter cases. Ser Part~; III and IV of this
opinion
0 At oral argument. couusel for respondent stated the contention
as follows :
'' I ~:;ubmit to the Court that 0ach question asked of the Respondent. befort> the grnnd jury, which question was only a~:;ked because
of a pa:;t violation of tlw Fourth Amendment, [amounts to] a new,
immediate vwlation of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] question
deriwd from a past violation, a. question into the privacy of the
witness amounts to another intrusion in violation of the Fourth
Amendment ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.
"[R]efuHing to anHwcr a que~;tion in which the question conceivably
is derived from n. past violation of the Fourth Amendment, gives
ri:;e to an additional or nt>w Fourth Amrndment right to resist
answering that question because the question itself becomes iHl
additwnal intrusion . .. .'' Tt·. of Oral Arg. 20,

·.
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ted m this case, is fully accomplished by the original
search without probable cause. Grand jury questions
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no independent governmental invasion of one's person. house, papers,
or effects, but rather the usual abridgement of personal
privacy common to all grand jury questioning. Questions based on illegally-obtained evidence are only a
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search
and seizure. They work no new Fourth Amendment
wrong. Whether such derivative use of illegally-obtained
evidel1Ce by a grand jury should be proscribed presents a
question not of rights but of remedies.
In the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful
search and seizure but also any derivative use of that
evidence. The prohibition of the exclusionary rule must
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of
deterring police misconduct. In the context of a grand
jury proceeding, we pelieve that the damage to th~:~-t
institution from the 'unprecedented extension of the
exclusionary rule urged by respondent outweighs the
benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect. Our
conclusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an
unlawful search and seizure and any question or evidence
derived therefrom. 1 " The same cousiderations of logic
10
It. ~houJd be noted that, ever1 absent the cxdu:siouary rule, a
grand jury witness may haVf other remedie:s to redre&:; the injury to
his privacy and to prevent It further invasion in the future. He mny
be entitleq to maintain a cause of action for damage:; against the
officers who conducted the unlawful Hearch . B'iveus v. Six U~tknown
Named Agents of the Fede1'al Bur-eau of Investigation , 40:3 U.S. 388
(1971) . He m:~y also Sf'(>k return of the illegally-seized property,
a.nd exclu:sion of the propert)' 1q1d rts frmt~ from being used as evidence against hrm in a criminal trw!. Go-Ba1't lrnpo1'ting Co. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931) . In tlw:;P crrcumstances, we
cannot say tlurt such a witne:s:s is necessa rily left remedile:re in tbe
face of an unl~,twful search al).cl seiz\trf;'

,.
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and policy apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search
and seizure and derivative use of that evidence. and we
do not distinguish between them."
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

11 The dis>~ent'· reliaucP 011 Gelbard v. United States. 408 P. S. 41
(1972), is misplaced. There, the Court construed 18 U. S. § 2515,
the evidentiary prohibition of Tit. III of the Ommbu~ Crime Control
and 8afe Streets Act of Hl6H, 82 Stat. 211, ns amended, 1R P. S. C.
§§ 2510--2520. It held that § 2515 could b<• invoked by a graud jur~·
witness as a defe11~e to a routempt charge brought for refusal to
answer 4ueb'tions based ou informatwu obtained from the witness'
communications alleged to have been unlawfully intercepted through
wiretapping nnd electronic surveillancr. The Court'::; holding rested
exclusively on an mterpretation of § 2515 and Tit. III, which represented a rongressi01wl effort to afford sprrwl safeguards agamst the
unique problm~s po~ed by llli~n,;e of win•tapping and electronic surveillaucr. Therr was no indicatiOn. 111 either Gelbard or the legislative hi:>tory of Tit. Ill, that § 2215 wa::; regardf'd as a restatement
of existmg law . A,; ~I R. ,) l':;TWE W H I'l'E notPd m Ius conrurrmg
opinion in Gelba1'd, § :2515 "unquestionably works a change m the
law with resprct to tht> rightH of ~~:ratid jur~· witnrssPs. . '' 408 U. S.
69, 70.
The disst>nt also voices coucern that today '~ decision will betray
" thP imperative of judicial mtegrity," ''tmnction illegal government
conduct," and rven "impenal the ver~· foundation of our peoples'
trust in their Government.'' Post, p. -- . There i~ no basis for
this alarum. "Illegal conduct' ' IS hardly sanctwned, nor arP the
foundation,; of thP Republi<· Imperiled,, b~· declimug to makt> nn
unprecedented Pxtenswn of t hr pxclusionar~r rule to grand Jury
proccPdings whcrP thr rule'~ ohJ!'CtlvP" would not bP effpctively
SPrvcd and wherP othPr Important nnd historic values would hE~
unduly prejudiced. ComparP Alderman v. United States, S'Upra ,~
L.ink/etter v. fFnJke,. .~upra, and rw.;eb riteci supra, p 9•
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BRENNAN, with whom MR. JuSTICEl
and Ma . JuSTICE MARSHALL join. dissenting.
The Court holds that the exclusionary rule in search
and seizure cases does not apply to grand jury proceedIngs because the principal objective of the rule is "to deter
future unlawful polic<' conduct," ante, p. 9, and "it is
unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand
jury proceedings would significantly further that goal ''
ld., 13. This downgrading of the exclusionary rul<' to a
determination whether its application in a particular
type of proceeding furthers deterrence of future police
misconduct reflects a startling misconception, unless it
is a purposeful rejection. of the historical objective and
purpos<' of the rule.
The commands of the Fourth Amendment are of course
directed solely to public officials. Necessarily therefore
only official violations of thos<' commands could have
created the evil that threatened to make the Amendment a dead letter . But curtailment of the evil, if a
considrration at all. was at best only a hoped for effect
of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective.
Indeed, there is no evidenc<' that the possible deterrent
effect of the rule was given any attention by the judges
chiefly responsible for its formulation. Their concern
as guardians of the Bill of Rights was to fashion all
enforcement tool to give content and meaning to the
Fourth Amendment's guarantPf'S. They thus hore out
MR.
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James Madison 's prPdiction in his address to the First
Congress on June 8. 17R9 :

" If they fthc rights] are incorporated mto the
Constitution. indepcnc!Pnt tribunals of justice will
consider themsPlves in a peculiar manner the guardian of those rights; thPy will be an impenetrab le
bulwark against every assumption of power in the
Legislative or RxPcutive; they will be naturally led
to rc>sist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in thC' Constitution by the declaration
of rights." I Annals of Cong. 439 ( 1834) .
Smce. howrver. those .JUdges werC' without power to
direct or control the conduct of law enforcement officers,
the enforcenwnt tool had nPcessarily to be one capable
of administration by judges. The exclusionary rule, if
not perfect. accomplishC'd the twin goals of enabling thP
JUdiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people- all potential victims
of unlawful governmrnt conduct--that the government
would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizmg the risk of sC'riously undermining popular trust in
government.
That these considerations. not the rulP's possible deterrent effect. were uppermost in the minds of th(' framers
of the ruk clearly Pmrrges from the decision which
fashioned it
"The pffect of the Fourth Amendment is to put
courts of the t ' nited States and FPderal officials, in
the exercise of their power and authority, under
limitations and restraints as to the exercisC' of such
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against
all umeasonable searches and seizures under the
guisE' of law .
The tt>ndency of those who execute the crimmal laws of the country to obtain

72- i:~4- DISSEN1'
ll~ITED

STATES

11 .

CALANDRA

3

convivtion by means of unlawful seizures ... should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts
which are charged at all times with the support of
the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of
such fundamental rights . . ..
"This protection is eq ually extended to the action
of the Government ami officers of the law acting
To sanction such proceedings w~uld
under it. .
be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect
1j 11ot an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action ." Weeks v.
United States, 232 P . ~. 383. 392, 394 ( 1914) (emphasis added) .
Mr. J ustic0 Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes addeu
their enormous influence> to these precepts in their notable
dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 P . fl. 438
( Hl28). Mr. Justice Brandeis said
'In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously Our Government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime
ts contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker. it breeds contempt for law ; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy ·· 277 F . S .. at 485.
And Mr . Justice Holmes said ·
'' [ W l e must consider the two objects of desire, both
uf which we cannot have, and make up our minds
which to choose. It is desirable that criminal should
be detected, and to that. end that all availabl0 evi~
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dence should be used. It also is desirable that the
Government should uot itself foster and pay for
other crimes, when they are the means by which
the evidence is to be obtained . . . . We have to
choose, and for my part. I think it is a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.
"
If the existing code does not permit district
attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it
does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities
to succeed." 277 F.~ .. at 470.
The same principles were reiterated only five years ago.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. ~. 1, 12-13 ( 1968), Chief Justice
Warrcn said for the Court
"The rule also serves another vital function-'the
imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins Y. United
States, 3()4 F . S. 206, 222 ( 1960). Courts which
sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be
made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered
governmental usc of the fruits of such invasions."
It is true that deterrence was a pro min en t consideration in the cktermination whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. ~. 643 ( Hl61). which applied the exclusionary rule
to the States, should be givcn retrospective effect. Linkletter v. ~Walker, 381 U. S. 618 ( 1965). But that lends
no support to today's holding that the application of the
exclusionary rule depends solely upon whether its invocation in a particular type of proceeding will significantly further the goal of deterrence. The emphasis
upon deterrence in Linkletter must be understood in the
light of the crucial fact that the States had justifiably
relied from 1049 to 1961 upon Wolf v. ColoradJ, 338
U. S. 25 (1949), and consequently, that application of
Mapp would have required the wholesale release of in-
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numerable convicted prisoners. few of whom could have
been successfully retried. In that circumstance, Linkletter held not only that retrospective application of
Mapp would not further the goal of deterrence but also
that it would not further "the administration of justice
and the integrity of the judicial process." 381 U. S., at
637. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 229
(1969)
Thus. the Court senously errs in describing the
exclusionary rule as merely "a judicial-created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gener~
ally through its deterrent effect . . . . " Ante, p. 9.
Rather, the exclusionary rule is "part and parcel of the
Fourth Amendment's limitation upon lgovernmental]
encroaclmwnt of individual privacy," Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U S., at 651. aile! "an essential part of both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments," id., at 657, that "gives
to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him. to the police officer no. less than
that to which honest law· enforcement is entitled, and,
to the courts. that judicial integrity so necessary in the
true administration of justice." I d., at 660.
This !VIapp summation crystalizes the series of decisions
that developed the rule, and with which toclay's holding
lS plainly at \Var.
For the first time , the Court today
discounts to tlw point of extinction the vital function of
the rule to insure that the JUdiciary avoids even the
slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government
conduct. This rejection of "the imperative of judicial
integrity." Elkins v. United States, supra, 364 U. S., at
222. openly invites "I t l he conviction that all government
is staffed by . . . hypocrites l, a conviction] easy to
mstill and difficult to erase.'' Paulsen, The Exclusionary
Rule and Miscomluct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. and
P R. 255, 258 (1961). When judges appear to
beconw "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
0
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Constitution that they are swor11 to uphold," Elkins v.
United States, 364 C . S .. at 223, we imperil the very
foundation of our peoples' trust in their Government on
which our Demcoracy rests. Sec On Lee v. United
States, 343 F. S. 747, 758-759 ( 1952) (Frankfurter, J ..
dissenting). The cxcl usim1ary rule is needed to make
the Fourth Amenclnwnt something real; a guarantee that
does not carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained
by its violation is a chimera. Moreover.

''I ij nsistence on observance by law officers of traditional fair procedural requirements is, from the long
pow t of view. best calculated to contribute to that
em!. However much in a particular case insistence
upon such rules may appear as a technicality that
Inures to tlH' benefit of a guilty person, the history
of the criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut methods ill law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness." Miller \' ( 'nited States, 357
TT. S. 301,313 (1958) .
The .JUdges who developed the exclusionary rule were
well aware that it embodied a judgment that it is better
for some guilty persons to go free than for the police
to behave i11 forbidden fashion. A similar judgment led
the Court to decide in Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v.
l'nil('d States, 251 l'. S. 385 (1020), that a grand jury
must be denied access to plainly relevant but illegally
seized papf'rs. In that case. after federal agents unlawfully seized papers belonging to the t::lilverthornes and
their corporation, and presented the documeuts to a
grand jury which had previously indicted the Silverthornes. a district court ordered the documents returned
and copies that had been prepared in the interim
impounded. After returning the originals, the grand
JUry attempted to recoup them by issuance of a subpoena
d1-tce.s tecum. Compliance with the subpoena was
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refused. ami contempt convictions followed. ln reversmg thE' judgment of conviction. the Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes held that the Government
was barred from utilizing any fruits of its forbidden act,
stating that "l tj he essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidencE' so acquirE'd shall not be used before the court
but that it shall not be used at all." 251 U. S .. at 392.
Silverthorne plainly controls this case. Respondent,
like plaintiffs-in-error in Silverthorne,' seeks to avoid
furnishing the grand jury with evidence that he would
not have been called upon to supply but for the unlawful
search and seizure. The Court would distinguish Silver·
thorne on tlw ground that there the plaintiffs-in-error
had been indicted and could invoke the exclusionary rule
"on the basis of their status as criminal defendants," since
the Govl'rnment's effort to obtain the documents was
founded on a belief that they might be useful in
the criminal prosecution already authorized by the
grand Jury·· Ante, p. 14 n. 8. The effort was clearly
uot found<.'d on any such belief. Overlooked is the
fact that the grand JUry's interest in again obtaining the' documents in Silverthorne may well have been
to secure information leading to further criminal charges,
estwcially since indictments of three other individuals,
as well as additional indictments of the Silverthornes,
had been the consequence of initial submission of the
documents to the grand jury. See Brief on Behalf of
Plaintiffs-in-Error, at 4, 18-19." Only if Silverthorne is
XrJther thl' 8Ilvrrthorne Lumber Co., lwrau::;t:' It wa~ a corporatwa, ~c·p //ale ,.. Hrnkel. :201 U. S. 4:3 (1906) , nor respondent,
h<·rau~r he wa~ granted tran::;actional immunity, could invokr the
pnvilrgr agam:st ::<rlf-mcrimmatwn Tlw ~Ituation:s arr therefore
complPtPiy romparab!P
" The Court al~o argue':' that "It Jh<· SIIvNthorne's chum wa::;· not
nu~Pd for tlw fi r"t t im<• 1t1 a pn·-indict ment motion to ;;up press
1

I
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overruled can its precedential force to compel affirmance
here be drnied.
Congressional concern with the Silverthorne holding
was clearly evidenced in enactment of 18 U.S. C. ~ 2515,
providing that " [ w Ihen ever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of
such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any proceeding in or
before any
grand jury ... if the disclosure of that
mformation would be in violation of this chapter.''
(Emphasis added.) In Gelbard v. United States, 408
U.S. 41 (1972), \Ve set aside the adjudication in criminal
contempt of a grand jury witness who refused to comply
with a court order to testify on the ground that interrogation was to be based upon information obtained from
the witness' communications allegedly intercepted by
federal agents by means of illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Our reasons track the grounds
advanced in Silverthorne
"ThE> purposes of ~ 2515 and Title III as a whole
would be subverted were the plain command of
~ 2515 ignored when the victim of an illegal interception is called as a witness before a grand jury
and asked questions based upon that interception.
MoreovE-r, ~ 2.115 serves not only to protect the
privacy of communications, but also to ensure that
the courts do not become partners to illegal conduct;
the E-videntiary prohibition was enacted also 'to protect the integrity of court and administrative prorequiring mterru]ltiOn of grnnd jury procrcding~," ante, p. 14 n. 8,
and therC'fore pr'C'~umabl~· it:; a~sertion OC'Ca8ioned no drlay. HowPver, tl1C' District Court in Silverthorne had granted an earlier application for rt>turn of thP :seiz<•d documents from the grand jury after
determining that thC'y had been obtained in violation of tht' Fourth
Amt'ndmrnt. Tlw Court made no intimation that the Di;;trict Court
acted Improper!~· in con:sidering the initial application
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ceedings.' Consequently, to order a gra11d jury
witness. on pain of imprisonment, to disclose evidence that ~ 2515 bars in unequivocal terms is both
to thwart the congressional objective of protecting
mdivid ual privacy by excluding such evidence and
to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Government agents." 408 U.S., at 51 (footnotes omitted) .

([\

Similarly to allow Calandra to be subjected to questions
derived from thE> illegal search of his office and seizure
of his files is "to thwart the [Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendnwnts' protection! of ... individual privacy .
and to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Governmrnt agents.·· " And for a court, no petition of the
executiw department, to sentence a witness, who is
[himself I the victim of the illegal [search and seizure]
to .Jail for refusal to participate in the exploitation of
that [conduct in violation of the explicit command of
the Fourth AmenclmentJ is to stand our whole system
of criminal justice on its head." In re Evans, 452 F . 2d
1230. 12.52 (1071) (Wright, J., concurring) .
It is no answer, as the Court suggests, that the grand
.JUry witnesses' Fourth Amendment rights will be sufficiently protected "by the inadmissibility of the illegally
seized eviclencp in a subsequent criminal prosecution of
the search victim ·· Ante, p.l3. This, of course. is no alternative for ( 'alandra, since he was granted transactional
immu11ity and cannot be criminally prosecuted. But
the fundamental flaw of the alternative is that to compel
Calandra to testify in the first place under penalty of
contempt necessarily "thwarts" his Fourth Amendment
protectio11 .and.. " ntanglcs the courts in the illegal acts
of Govprnnwnt agpn "- consequencf's that Silverthorne
condemned as intolerable
To be sure , the exclusionary rule does not "provide
that illegally seizPd <-'vidc>nce is i nadmissiblP against any-
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n\ITED :STATES

1'

CALANDHA

one for any purpose.'' Alder111a11 v. United States, 3!)4
V . ~ 165, 17.S (1969). But clearly there is a crucial
distinction between withholding its cover from individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been
violated- as has been done iu the "standing" cases,
Alderman v. United Stales, 394 1'. S. 165 ( 1969). Jones
,. fTnited States, 362 C. S. 257 ( Hl60)-. and withdrawing its cover from persons whose Fourth Amendment
rights have in fact been abridged.
Respondent docs not seck vicariously to assert another 's Fourth Amendment rights. He has himself been
the victim of an illegal search and desires "to mend
no one's privacy [but hisj owt1." Gelbard v. United
States, 40~ l T. :-->. 41. ()3 (197:2) (DOVGLAS, J., concurring) .
Pctition0r is told that he must look to damages to redress
the cotwrdPdly unconstitutional invasion of his privacy
ln oth0r words. officialdom may profit from its lawlessness if it is willing to pay a price .
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "closerdJ the only
courtroom door remaining opeu to evidence secured by
official lawlessness'' in violation of Fourth Amendment
rights. 3()7 l '. S .. at 654-655. The door is again aJar.
As a consequence. I am left with the uneasy feeling that
today 's decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themsclvrs to reopen the door
still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule
111 search and seizure cases; for surely they can not belicvf' that application of the exclusionary rule at trial
furthers the goal of deterrence. but that its application
111 grand jury proceedings will not "significantly" do so .
Unless we are to shut our eyes to the evidence that
crosses our desks every (lay, we must concede that official
lawlessness has not abated and that 110 empirical data
distinguishes trials from grand .1 ury proceedings. J
thus fear that when next we confront a case of a con-
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viCtion rested on illegally seized evidence, today's decision
will be invoked to sustain the conclusion in that case
also that "it is unrealistic to assume" that application
of the rule at trial would "significantly further" the goal
of deterrence-though. if the police are presently undeterred. it is difficult to see how removal of the sanction
of exclusion will induce more lawful official conduct.
The exclusionary rule gave life to Madison's prediction
that "independent tribunals of justice . .. will be nat~
urally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the dec·
laration of rights. '' We betray the trust upon which
that prediction rested by today's long step toward aban·
donment of the exclusionary rule. The observations of
a recent commentator highlight the grievous error of
thr maJority's retreat
"lf constitutional rights are to be anythmg more
than pious pronouncements. then some measurable
consequence must be attached to their violation
It would be intolrrable if the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure could br violated
without practical consequence. It is likewise imperatlvr to have a practical procedure by which
courts can rrview alleged violations of constitutional
nghts and articulate the meaning of those rights.
The advantage of the exclusionary rule-entirely
apart from any direct deterrent effect--is that it
provides an occasion for JUdicial rPview. and It gives
credibility to thr constitutional guarantees. By
demonstrating that society vvill attach serious consequences to the violation of constitutio11al rights,
the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the
moral and euucative force of the law. Over tho long
tern1 tlw; may integrate sollH' fourth amendment
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ideals into the value system or norms of behavior
of law enforcement agencies." Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Seach and Seizure, 37 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 665, 756 ( 1970) ; see also Dellinger. Of
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, ·
85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1562-1563 (1972).
I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals,
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